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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis seeks to shed light on what I claim is a neglected aspect in 
the writings of later Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin. I badge this 
the ‘unity problem’. Many interpreters tend to underestimate, or 
ignore, this important aspect, and to focus instead on what I will call 
the ‘compatibility problem’. The compatibility problem focuses on 
cases where philosophers say something which we would not say in 
ordinary language, or when philosophers violate its rules. According 
to this reading, Austin and Wittgenstein show philosophers that this is 
a source of traditional philosophical troubles.  
 
I argue for a different reading. My claim is that Austin and 
Wittgenstein think, instead, that in some specific cases philosophical 
trouble arises because philosophers look for one common thing in all 
cases where the same word is used. The aim in these cases is not to 
identify strings of words that we would not ordinarily say, rather it is 
to show that looking for something common to all cases in which we 
use the same word is problematic.  This is the ‘unity’ problem.  
 
I will examine how both philosophers characterise the unity problem, 
and how they demonstrate that there is something misleading in 
looking for one common thing in all the cases in which we use the 
same word. This constitutes what might be termed the ‘theoretical’ 
part of the thesis. Alongside this, I will examine key examples of 
Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s application of this ‘theory’ to their 
treatment of specific philosophical problems.  These applications 
constitute some of the central examples in their writings, such as 
‘understanding’ for Wittgenstein, and ‘truth’ for Austin. I will argue 
that their work on these examples does not fit comfortably into the 
framework of the compatibility problem, and is better viewed through 
the lens of the unity problem.  
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Preface 
 
1. Motivation and problems 
 
There are many philosophers who are considered members of the 
school of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), including later Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, P. F. Strawson and others. In 
this thesis I focus on the writing and interpretation of later 
Wittgenstein and Austin. My claim is that the focus of many 
commentators on one particular approach to their philosophy tends to 
neglect another important perspective.  
 
I will argue that most interpreters focus on what I will call the 
‘compatibility problem’.  The compatibility problem concerns cases 
either where philosophers say something which we would not say in 
ordinary language (OL), or when philosophers violate the rules of OL. 
OLP is supposed then to show philosophers that this is a source of 
traditional philosophical trouble in cases such as the mind-body 
problem, the nature of truth… etc., and that philosophers need to take 
into account how we use OL in resolving these difficulties.  
 
I argue for a different reading. I want to bring out and highlight a 
neglected thread in Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s writings in which, I 
claim, they are better seen as tackling a different problem: namely that, 
in some instances, philosophical trouble arises because philosophers 
look for one common thing in all cases where the same word is used. 
This I badge the ‘unity problem’. In such cases, the aim of the appeal 
to OL is not to identify specific sentences or strings of words that we 
would not say in OL, it is rather to show that it is the looking for 
something ‘in common’ which is problematic.   
 
The principal aim of this thesis, then, is to examine this neglected 
aspect in the writings of Austin and Wittgenstein. I will examine how 
both philosophers identify the unity problem, and how they 
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demonstrate that there is something misleading in looking for one 
common thing in all the cases in which we use the same word. This 
constitutes what might be termed the ‘theoretical’ part of the thesis. 
Alongside this, I will also examine key examples of Wittgenstein’s 
and Austin’s application of this ‘theory’ to their treatment of specific 
philosophical problems.  These applications constitute some of the 
central examples in their writings, such as ‘understanding’ for 
Wittgenstein, and ‘truth’ for Austin. I will argue that their work on 
these examples does not fit comfortably within the framework of the 
compatibility problem, and is better viewed through the lens of the 
unity problem.  
 
In doing so, I assess and challenge some of the most influential 
readings of OLP and Wittgenstein and Austin, suggesting that by 
focusing on the unity problem the work of Austin and Wittgenstein 
can be seen in a new and revealing light. Of course, aspects of the unity 
problem have been addressed by commentators before, but, I claim, 
such treatment has underestimated the overall importance of such an 
approach and, in many cases, has ignored key insights.  
 
2. Plan and arguments 
 
As outlined above, the thesis examines Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s 
work on the unity problem. In chapter 1, I set out the background to 
this study and introduce two prominent ways of reading OLP. The 
‘corrective interpretation’ broadly identifies violations of ordinary 
language rules by philosophers and demands correction, whereas the 
‘suggestive interpretation’ makes a similar comparison between what 
philosophers say and our ordinary usage, but merely advises, or 
engages in dialogue with, the philosopher. I will demonstrate that, in 
reading Wittgenstein and Austin, both interpretations focus on the 
compatibility problem and neglect the unity problem. 
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The next four chapters constitute the core of the thesis, and examine 
and analyse Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s treatment of the unity 
problem in detail. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss Wittgenstein’s work on the 
unity problem, and Chapters 4 and 5 Austin’s. In each pair of chapters, 
the first chapter sets out the ‘theoretical’ aspects, analysing the sense 
in which Wittgenstein and Austin identify what is in common, the 
problems they find with such an approach, and the alternatives they 
offer. The second chapter in each pair then tackles in detail specific 
central examples from each philosopher’s writing, analysing how their 
particular approaches to the unity problem operate in the context of 
discussing particular philosophical problems. 
 
Thus, in chapter 2, I follow how Wittgenstein treats the unity problem 
in The Philosophical Investigations (PI), focusing on passages 65-67. 
Here, Wittgenstein argues that there need not be one common thing in 
virtue of which we use the same word in different cases, and that there 
might instead be different kinds of relations and affinities between the 
cases for which we use the same word. I term these concepts ‘family 
concepts’, in contrast with ‘common feature concepts’. In this chapter, 
I discuss a number of different interpretations given to passages 65-
67, and argue for a particular reading.  
 
In chapter 3, I examine Wittgenstein’s answer to the unity question in 
the context of his discussions on ‘understanding’ in PI. I claim that 
Wittgenstein shows that there need not be something in common in all 
the cases where we use the word ‘understanding’, and argue that his 
discussion of ‘understanding’ does not fit well within the framework 
of the compatibility problem, but, rather, should be viewed as tackling 
the unity problem. In the passages examined, Wittgenstein’s view is 
that what philosophers say is, in fact, compatible with OL, but the 
mistake they make is to look for one common feature, and it is this that 
leads them into philosophical troubles.  
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In chapters 4 and 5 I move to Austin’s work. In chapter 4 I conduct a 
similar ‘theoretical’ examination to that undertaken with Wittgenstein, 
and analyse Austin’s answer to the unity question, using 
reconstructions and extracts from Austin’s works. Austin tackles the 
question by attacking the answer given by philosophers who adopt the 
false dichotomy that a word either has just one and the same meaning 
in all instances of its use, or is ambiguous and has a number of totally 
different meanings. In opposition to this, Austin wants to show that 
there are some words which have a range of different-but-related-
meanings. The problem is that philosophers ignore these kinds of 
words. I will focus on Austin’s work on three particular word types: 
‘trouser-words’, ‘dimension-words’ and ‘adjuster-words’.  The most 
important of these is dimension words. Dimension words, according 
to Austin, do in fact have a common stable component in all uses, the 
abstract meaning or semantic function. However, Austin is at pains to 
point out that this common abstract layer is almost always too thin to 
bear any philosophical weight in real situations. This is borne out in 
chapter 5, where I examine Austin’s theory in the context of specific 
philosophical problems, in particular his discussions on ‘real’ and 
‘truth’.  
 
Austin complains that philosophers tend to focus on what is in 
common, and to ignore the differences between the different cases 
where we use the same word. In the passages I examine, I do not deny 
that it is often possible to read Austin as reminding philosophers how 
ordinary language works and showing that their approach is 
inconsistent with this usage. My point, however, is that attention to the 
unity problem alongside Austin’s analysis of the particular types of 
words both better represents Austin’s position and better explains how 
philosophers come to make the mistakes that they do, including the 
error of using language in a way that runs counter to ordinary language 
usage. Thus there will, on occasion, be lessons for philosophers 
concerning the use of ordinary language, but my contention is that 
focusing almost exclusively on these findings, as those who view his 
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work through the compatibility problem lens do, is a far less profitable 
route from the perspective of explaining Austin’s thought, as well as 
being a less legitimate strategy so far as interpretation of his work is 
concerned. 
 
In the last chapter, I summarise my findings and draw together the 
threads from each of the chapters. Whilst my analysis makes it clear 
that there are important differences between Wittgenstein’s and 
Austin’s positions, I claim that it is also apparent that, in the instances 
examined, the unity problem is a more plausible and productive 
framework through which to view important parts of both of the 
philosophers’ writings. I claim that both Wittgenstein and Austin 
demonstrate the need for caution in presuming answers always lie in 
some sort of common feature or irreducible factor when undertaking 
philosophical enquiry, and that both demonstrate how such 
investigations can go astray if sufficient attention is not paid to clear 
counterexamples and the importance of context.  The thesis is very 
careful not to extrapolate its findings beyond the ambit of the specific 
examples analysed, but, equally, I do not claim that such instances 
exhaust the possible application of the framework I recommend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter 1 
Ordinary Language and Philosophy 
Introduction 
Philosophers generally considered members of the school of OLP 
include later Wittgenstein, Austin, Ryle, Strawson, and others. Within 
this school and its literature, interpretation is a key preoccupation, and 
two ways of reading OLP are particularly prominent. The ‘corrective 
interpretation’, broadly identifies violations of ordinary language rules 
by philosophers and demands correction, whereas the ‘suggestive 
interpretation’ makes a similar comparison between what philosophers 
say and our ordinary usage, but merely advises, or engages in dialogue 
with, the philosopher. This thesis concentrates on the writing of 
Wittgenstein and Austin, and the question of which  these two camps 
each philosopher better fits within is fiercely contested within the 
secondary literature, however, resolving this dilemma is not my 
principal aim. Rather, I will question what seems to be a fundamental 
presupposition concerning the nature of the underlying problem made 
by both interpretive approaches, arguing that adopting such a 
framework leads to a sort of tunnel vision which results in 
commentators overlooking an important thread in both philosophers’ 
writings.  
I will argue that, in addressing Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s views on 
particular philosophical problems, both interpretations focus on issues 
of compatibility between, on the one hand, what philosophers say and, 
on the other, how ordinary language is used (the key difference 
between interpretations being in terms of the actions required of 
philosophers once this common lens has been applied and differences 
identified). This method, I claim, is too restrictive and fails to 
accommodate an alternative approach, one that takes Austin and 
Wittgenstein to, at times, be concerned with employing a different 
approach.  
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In this thesis, therefore, I make a distinction between the nature of the 
general ‘problem’ OL philosophers typically presume to underlie, or 
be the root cause of, a host of particular philosophical problems (the 
issue of compatibility, shared by both interpretations), and the force of 
the role ascribed to OL in (re)solving philosophical problems, the 
latter depending on the particular interpretive school being employed. 
I will argue that, so far as the former is concerned, the general 
presumption of a ‘compatibility problem’ is too exclusive, and that 
viewing a number of important philosophical issues in light of what I 
call the ‘unity problem’ is more productive, and represents more 
accurately the way in which both Wittgenstein and Austin demonstrate 
what is going wrong in the particular problems under discussion. So 
far as the latter is concerned, the aim of this thesis is not to draw a 
general conclusion, but it will become apparent, when the treatment of 
particular problems by Wittgenstein and Austin are examined in depth, 
that I think that neither philosopher fits exclusively into either account.  
So far as this chapter is concerned, I will firstly explain in greater depth 
the two main interpretations of OLP (section 1), before, in section 2, 
explaining in detail the compatibility and unity problems, and why I 
find the exclusive focus of both interpretations on the former 
unsatisfactory. Finally, in section 3, I will address particular 
differences between Austin and Wittgenstein, clarifying their 
relevance to the topic of the thesis.   
1. Two interpretations of OLP  
Ordinary language philosophers generally hold that paying attention 
to the way in which ordinary language works, and highlighting 
differences between this and the way which philosophers use words, 
will assist in (re)solving philosophical problems. However, there are a 
number of differences in the way in which particular schools of 
interpreters understand what this practice consists in. I will focus 
primarily on two interpretations, both in the context of examining the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein and Austin. The first I call the ‘corrective’ 
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interpretation, and the second the ‘suggestive’ interpretation. In what 
follows, I will describe each in more detail and explain the differences 
between the two, highlighting in particular the different role that the 
appeal to ordinary language is presumed to play in each.  
1.1. The corrective interpretation 
I will use two principal sources. The first is the corrective 
interpretation given to Wittgenstein by two of his most influential 
followers, P.M.S Hacker and Hans-Johann Glock. The second is the 
characterisation of the corrective interpretation given by John Searle 
and Paul Grice in posing one of the most influential objections to 
OLP1.  
1.1.1. The corrective interpretation of Wittgenstein  
The main proponent of this reading is Hacker. He writes that ‘the 
problems of philosophy stem from failure to grasp the articulations of 
existing grammar...Describing the use of the words...is a matter of 
specifying or stating how words are used in the practice of speaking 
the language. Usage sets the standard of correct use; so the 
investigation is a corrective one. We must remind ourselves how we 
use the problematic expressions - that is to say what count in the 
practice of speaking our language as a correct use. So we are...stating 
rules...for the use of the expression.’ (Baker and Hacker, 2009, p. 291). 
Hacker states that Wittgenstein appeals to everyday use to tabulate the 
rules which philosophers must not transgress: the mistake that 
philosophers commit is that they transgress these rules. Philosophical 
problems ‘are, directly or indirectly, solved, resolved or dissolved by 
conceptual investigation.’ (Hacker, 2009, p. 140).He adds that ‘[T]he 
features of our concepts that are marshalled for philosophical purposes 
                                                          
1 Oswald Hanfling writes that Grice’s work ‘has been a powerful influence in the 
widespread rejection of that [OL] philosophy’. (Hanfling, 2000, p.176). Guy 
Longworth writes that ‘Grice’s work has played a central role in the negative 
reception of the core of Austin’s work…’ (Longowrth, 2011, p.118).  
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are specified by conceptual truths,’ and these conceptual truths 
‘describe aspects of the nature of their subject; they characterize the 
concept at hand; and they are manifest in the use of words.’ (Hacker, 
2009, p. 141). 
Let us take an example. Hacker takes Wittgenstein to engage in such 
a conceptual investigation in his discussion of ‘understanding’: ‘So, 
for example, ‘understanding is an ability, not a mental state or process’ 
is tantamount to the grammatical explanation that to say that someone 
understands something is not to say what mental state he is in or what 
process is taking place in his mind, but to indicate something he can 
do.’ (Hacker, 2009, pp. 143-144.)Thus, according to Hacker, 
Wittgenstein seeks to establish, through conceptual investigations, that 
understanding is an ability, not a mental process or state. Wittgenstein 
elucidates the sense-determination rules for the use of the expression 
‘understanding’ and, by the conceptual truths which are manifest in 
the use of words, he finds that it is nonsensical to say that 
understanding is a mental process or state, but it makes sense to say 
that understanding is an ability. Another example is found in 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘the questions of whether machines can 
think or whether the brain can think... For such questions are 
concerned with what does or does not make sense. And the way to 
examine whether something does or does not make sense, for example 
whether it makes sense to say that computers think or that the 
prefrontal cortices think, requires methodical investigation of the use 
of the verb ‘to think’ and its ramifying logico-grammatical 
connections and presuppositions.’ (Hacker, 2009, pp. 140-141).Again, 
the idea is that it is through investigating how we use words in OL that 
we will understand what makes sense and what does not and, 
consequently, be able to answer the particular philosophical question.  
In the same vein, Glock explains that ‘‘Grammatical rules’ are 
standards for the correct use of an expressions which ‘determines’ its 
meaning’; (Glock, 1996, p. 150) those rules ‘determine the prior 
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question of what it makes sense to say… [The function of these rules] 
is to draw attention to the violation of linguistic rules by philosophers, 
a violation which results in nonsense.’ (Glock, 1991, pp. 77-78). Thus, 
like Hacker, Glock is clear that OL reminds philosophers of the rules 
that they must not transgress on pain of introducing nonsense. For 
example, Glock credits Wittgenstein with showing that scepticism is 
nonsensical through just such an approach. ‘Scepticism … is the view 
that knowledge is impossible, either in general or with respect to a 
particular domain…’ (Glock, 1996, p. 336). The problem with 
scepticism, Glock explains, is that it violates the rules of OL, as shown 
by Wittgenstein’s PI 246: ‘If we are using the word "to know" as it is 
normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very 
often know when I am in pain’. Thus, Glock comments: ‘According 
to the rules of grammar, it makes perfectly good sense to say that I 
know that others are in pain’. (Glock, 1996, p. 337). The sceptic’s 
position, that knowledge is impossible, is shown to be incompatible 
with our ordinary use of the word ‘knowledge’.  
The corrective interpretation, then, is a strong doctrine. Ordinary 
language sets the rules for correct usage and the boundaries between 
sense and nonsense. The ordinary language philosopher is charged 
with tabulating such rules, identifying violations by philosophers, and 
correcting their mistakes, particularly where philosophers say things 
that we don’t, in fact, say in ordinary language. In this way, it is 
proposed, many philosophical problems are avoided or dissolved.  
1.1.2. The Searle/Grice interpretation 
One of the most influential objections to OLP was proposed by Searle 
and Grice. In order to introduce their objection, Searle and Grice give 
their own characterisation of the practices and methods of OL 
philosophers2. Note that their interpretation does not focus on Austin 
                                                          
2 The objection first appeared in Searle’s essay ‘Assertions and aberrations’ (Searle, 
2011), and was then developed and explained in Searle’s Speech Act (Searle, 1969). 
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or Wittgenstein exclusively, but is rather an attempt to show the 
general approach of those philosophers who appeal to OL in order to 
(re)solve philosophical problems.   
Searle writes: ‘The [OL] philosopher notices that it would be very odd 
or bizarre to say certain things in certain situations; so he then 
concludes for that reason that certain concepts are inapplicable to such 
situations.’ (Searle, 1969, p. 141) .Here are some of Searle’s examples: 
Wittgenstein’s observation that we ordinarily don’t say ‘I know I am 
in pain’, B.S. Benjamin’s observation that we ordinarily don’t say ‘I 
remember my own name’, and Austin’s observation that we ordinarily 
don’t say ‘I buy my car voluntarily’ (Searle, 1969, pp. 141-143). 
Searle then explains the method of OLP. The OL philosopher, after 
noticing that there are things we don’t say in OL, ‘claims that a certain 
concept or range of concepts is inapplicable to certain states of affairs 
because the states of affairs fail to satisfy certain conditions which the 
author [the OL philosopher] says are presuppositions of the 
applicability of the concepts… it does not even make sense to use the 
expression [in the above examples] …because …[it] requires certain 
special conditions for its applicability, which conditions are lacking’ 
in these examples. (Searle, 2011, p. 208). Grice gives a very similar 
characterization to the method of OL philosophers3: ‘[O]ne [the OL 
philosopher] begins with the observation that a certain range of 
expression, in each of which is embedded a subordinate expression 
α…is such that its members would not be used in application to certain 
specimen situations, that their use would be odd or inappropriate or 
even would make no sense; one then suggests that the relevant feature 
of such situations is that they fail to satisfy some condition C… and 
                                                          
Grice discusses Searle’s view in detail and develops it in the first chapter of The 
Ways of Words (Grice, 1989). 
3 Grice opens The Ways of Words with a prolegomena which discusses those 
inappropriate statements which Searle talks about, those things which we don’t 
ordinarily say. He uses the same examples Searle uses. See Grice, 1989, 
prolegomena.  
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one concludes that it is characteristic of the concepts expressed by α, 
a feature of the meaning or use of α, that E(α) is applicable only if C 
is satisfied.’ (Grice, 1989, p. 3).  
Thus, according to Searle/Grice, the OL philosopher, after noticing 
that there are things which we would not say in OL, explains that the 
concept under discussion is used only when some specific condition is 
satisfied. For example, we don’t say ‘I know’ unless there is a 
suggestion that I might not know, and I would not add ‘voluntarily’ 
unless the action might be nonstandard, and so on. These conditions, 
the presence of uncertainty, and the action being nonstandard, are not 
satisfied in the philosophers’ uses of ‘I know I am in pain’ and ‘I buy 
my car voluntarily’4. Philosophers who say such things misuse the 
language. To use these concepts correctly, what we ordinarily say 
should be observed, and words should not be used as you like5.  
So Searle and Grice agree with Hacker and Glock that there are things 
that we would not say in OL, and that Austin, Wittgenstein and other 
OL philosophers are trying to draw attention to these things. In 
addition, according to Searle and Grice, OL philosophers ask other 
philosophers to conform to OL, in order to avoid uttering nonsense.  
As a result, it is clear that Searle and Grice view ordinary language 
philosophy as corrective6.  
                                                          
4 Here we need some qualification. For ‘I know I am in pain’, it seems that the 
condition is never satisfied. For ‘I buy my car voluntarily’, it is not satisfied in the 
standard cases. However, for present purposes we can ignore the differences; the 
point is to characterize the main features of the corrective interpretation.  
5 Grice gives a more complicated explanation. He suggests that we might think of 
three different positions that OL philosophers might take in order to explain why we 
don’t say these things in OL.  
6 Searle offers an alternative explanation of why we don’t say these things in OL: 
‘the reason it would be odd to say such things is that they are too obvious to be worth 
saying.’ (Searle, 1969, p. 141). The same line is taken by Grice, who thinks that what 
we would not say is ‘true… however misleading’. (Grice, 1989, p. 9). Both think 
that we don’t say these things because it is too obvious and trivially true to be said, 
not because it is nonsensical. 
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To summarise, corrective interpreters of OLP tabulate the rules of 
ordinary language, identify the things which philosophers say which 
violate these rules, demonstrate that such violations typically resulting 
nonsense, and recommend corrections in accordance with ordinary 
language usage.  
1.2. The suggestive interpretation 
The suggestive interpretation also traces the differences between what 
we ordinarily say and what the philosopher says, but does not see these 
differences as violations of rules which must be adhered to. Instead, 
the offending philosopher is merely asked to consider and take into 
account how ordinary language works.   
I focus on suggestive interpretations of Wittgenstein and Austin in the 
next two sections, before examining one of the most influential 
suggestive readings of both, that given by Stanley Cavell and James 
Conant.  
1.2.1. The suggestive interpretation of Wittgenstein 
In his reading of PI 116, Gordon Baker7 focuses on Wittgenstein’s 
‘What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use.’ He (Baker) suggests a reading of this remark which 
illustrates the differences between the two interpretations of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. He first characterizes his opponent’s view, 
the corrective one.  
According to that reading, ‘metaphysical’ ‘means roughly the same as 
‘non-standard’, ‘deviant’, or ‘abnormal’… [Thus] philosophers 
misuse expressions, thereby speaking nonsense…The activity of 
clarifying concepts or describing grammar [bringing them back to 
                                                          
7 Early Baker works with Hacker and introduces the influential Baker and Hacker 
commentary to PI, which is the standard corrective interpretation to PI. Later Baker 
has a different reading, which is mainly suggestive. In what follows, when I refer to 
Baker and Hacker, I refer to the corrective interpretation. When I refer to Baker 
alone, I mean later Baker and his suggestive reading.  
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everyday use] is corrective…’ (Baker, 2004, p. 94). He identifies 
Hacker’s reading as the standard corrective account.  
He then gives his own suggestive reading.  ‘[N]o claim is made that 
this [everyday] use is sacrosanct or that we have no right to depart 
from it…[Rather] the point is to persuade ‘the metaphysician’ to 
clarify precisely why he is not content to stick to this familiar use in 
this particular context’ (Baker, 2004, p. 103). The aim of bringing the 
words back to everyday use is to show that the metaphysical use is not 
compatible with everyday use, that there are differences between what 
the philosopher says and what we ordinarily say, and then to ask the 
philosopher why she is not satisfied with our ordinary use. There is no 
claim that we must conform to OL.  
A similar interpretation is given by Rupert Read. He thinks that ‘the 
crucial mistake in ‘Wittgenstein studies’ has generally been to 
misidentify the contrast class that Wittgenstein intended’ between 
metaphysical and ordinary. The mistake is to think ‘that philosophy 
can proceed … by means of paying careful attention to the way we 
normally actually speak, and prohibiting uses that conflict with the 
way we normally actually speak.’ (Read, forthcoming, p. 1). Read, 
inspired by Baker, thinks that: ‘If the philosopher with whom we are 
in dialogue can convince us that he has developed a novel use (that has 
a use), then we should allow that this is part of the language. If, on the 
contrary, we can convince him that he has not specified a use for his 
words, then he allows that what he has come up with is nothing that 
has a sense.’ (Read, forthcoming, p. 4). The suggestive method thus 
consists in asking the philosopher who uses language in a different 
way from the way we do in OL to examine the sense of his use, but 
there is no demand that he conforms to any rules of OL.  
Baker and Read take the conversational part of the method, as well as 
the assent of the philosopher with whom we have the conversation, to 
be the key to understanding Wittgenstein’s appeal to OL.  
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We move now to suggestive readings given to Austin’s texts. 
1.2.2. The suggestive interpretation of Austin 
According to Austin, ‘[O]rdinary language is not the last word: in 
principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon. Only 
remember, it is the first word.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 185). The question is, 
in Austin’s words, ‘Why should what we all ordinarily say be the only 
or the best or final way of putting it?’ (Austin, 1979, p. 183). Austin’s 
answer to all these suggestions is that it should not. OL is not always 
the only, nor the best, nor the final word. The suggestive role of OL, 
that it is the first word, not the last word, and that it doesn’t have a 
corrective role, that there is no demand to conform to OL in Austin’s 
writings, was emphasised by his interpreters. For example, G. 
Warnock complains that amongst the views misattributed to Austin is 
the idea ‘that ‘ordinary language’ is sacrosanct, immune of criticism 
and insusceptible of supplementation or amendment… [Austin] 
naturally recognized that it might in certain ways be confused or 
incoherent or even, for certain purposes, totally inadequate’ (Warnock, 
2011, p. 18). J. Urmson writes in a similar vein: ‘Austin did not think 
that ordinary language was sacrosanct…all he asked was that we be 
clear about what it is like before we improve it’8 (Urmson, 2011, p. 
24).  
In the introduction to a new anthology on Austin, Martin Gustafsson 
writes that ‘Austin is well aware that everyday patterns of use might 
prove insufficient to handle various practical and theoretical needs that 
                                                          
8 For an example of this distortion, see Hampshire, 2011, where he attributes to 
Austin two different theses on the relation between philosophy and OL, a strong one 
and a weak one.  The strong one is corrective. Hampshire writes: ‘For every 
distinction of word and idiom that we find in common speech, there is a reason to be 
found, if we look far enough, to explain why this distinction exists… If, as 
philosophers, we try to introduce an altogether new distinction, we shall find that we 
are disturbing the economy of the language by blurring elsewhere some useful 
distinctions that are already recognized’ (Hampshire, 2011, pp. 33-34). According 
to the strong thesis, therefore, philosophers must conform to OL, and not try to 
change its rules. The weak thesis is not corrective; it states that we need to clarify 
the distinctions we have before the attempt to refine them.  
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can arise, and that such ordinary forms of usage might therefore have 
to be revised or abandoned.’ (Gustafsson, 2011, p. 14). Mark Kaplan, 
who is working on Austin’s epistemology, gives many examples of 
misreadings of Austin which attribute to him different forms of the 
corrective interpretation9. He objects that none of these examples ‘fit 
at all with what he [Austin] actually wrote’. (Kaplan, 2010, p. 805). 
By contrast, Kaplan’s interpretation is a suggestive one: ‘when we find 
our epistemological inquiries leading us to views at odds with what we 
would ordinarily say or do, [we are not asked]…to stop….We can 
either reconsider the path to which those enquiries have led us, or 
change what we are prepared to say and do in ordinary life to conform 
to our epistemological views.’ (Kaplan, 2010, p. 808). For Kaplan, 
either the philosopher is going to revise his reasons to depart from OL, 
or we are going to change how we use OL. There is no suggestion that 
OL sets correct standard rules, and that we have to conform to it.   
The point is that Austin was explicit that OL is the first word, but not 
the last word. In other words, that OL has a suggestive role, not a 
corrective one. In that sense, it therefore seems that Baker/Read’s 
reading of Wittgenstein’s metaphysical/everyday use distinction is 
compatible with Austin position in holding that we need not conform 
to OL10.  
                                                          
9 See Kaplan, 2010, pp. 801-805.  
10 However, Baker himself doesn’t see the similarities with Austin: he points to 
Austin as one of the representatives of the corrective interpretation, see Baker, 2004, 
p. 92.  
Note that the similarity I refer to is mainly in the claim that we need not conform to 
OL. However, I don’t find any indication in Austin’s writings that he accepts the 
conversational method.  
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1.2.3. The Cavell/Conant reading 
We move now to a more detailed examination of one of the influential 
suggestive readings of OLP, one which covers both Austin and 
Wittgenstein.  
Cavell writes: ‘If it is TRUE to say “‘I know it’ is not used unless you 
have great confidence in it”, then, when you are speaking English, it 
is WRONG (a misuse) to say “I know it” unless you have great 
confidence in it.’ (Cavell, 2002, p. 16). How should we understand 
such a statement? According to Cavell, questions on what we would 
and would not say are ‘asked of someone who has mastered the 
language… [and such a question is] a request for the person to say 
something about himself, describe what he does.’ (Cavell, 2002, p.  
66). He adds, we are interested in ‘determining where and why one 
wishes, or hesitates, to use a particular expression oneself’, an 
expression which we would not use in OL. (Cavell, 2011, p. 61). 
Cavell thinks that statements such as ‘we would not say such and such’ 
are not supposed to show that philosophers need to conform to OL. 
Rather, they question the motives and reasons that the philosopher has 
for saying what he says, thereby encouraging him to give his reasons 
for departing from OL. This in turn allows a dialogue to take place, 
and it is this dialogue, and not the drawing of the bounds of sense 
which philosophers must not transgress, which Cavell takes to be the 
core of the appeal to OL.  
James Conant’s aim in giving a reading of ‘what we would not say’ is 
similarly to undermine the corrective interpretation, and to introduce 
a version of the suggestive interpretation. According to Conant, Baker 
and Hacker’s corrective interpretation ‘conceives the possibilities of 
meaningful expression as limited by “general rules of the 
language”…and imagines that by specifying these rules one can 
identify in advance which combinations of words are licensed and 
which prohibited’ (Conant, 2001, p. 122). What the philosopher says 
when he departs from OL usage violates the rules of grammar, and 
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‘therefore there is something determinate he wants to mean but he 
cannot mean by his words.’ (Conant, 1998, pp. 249-250). In other 
words, we try to say, and mean, these things in philosophy, and we 
then utter nonsense. This is where, according to the corrective 
interpretation, the OL philosopher interferes, and points out that these 
things are nonsensical, that we don’t say them in OL, and that they are 
prohibited by the rules of grammar.  
Conant’s view, however, is different. According to him, 
‘Wittgenstein’s teaching is that the problem lies not in the words, but 
in our confused relation to the words: in our experiencing ourselves as 
meaning something different  by them, yet also feeling that what we 
take ourselves to be meaning by the words make no sense.’ (Conant, 
1998, pp. 247-248) .Thus, the failure is not in any specific strings of 
words which are to be excluded and condemned as nonsensical, but 
rather in our failure to give meaning to our sentences. Conant thinks 
that what actually goes on in the cases under discussion is something 
like this: the philosopher imagines that he means something where he 
doesn’t, and he calls this the hallucinations of meaning. Instead of 
nonsense consisting in independent strings of words, which we try to 
mean but we can’t, nonsense is in our own confused imagining that we 
mean something.  
Thus, the main difference between Conant’s approach and the 
corrective interpretation consists in where nonsense is to be identified. 
Rather than in the strings of words which don’t make sense, Conant 
takes Austin and Wittgenstein to identify the problem in the attempt 
to mean something where nothing at all is meant. As a result, he finds 
the corrective interpretation unsatisfactory, and, since no particular 
string of words is prohibited, it follows that there is no corrective role 
for OL in the way outlined by, for instance, Hacker. In other words, 
there is no point in tabulating the rules, because the rules don’t draw 
the lines between what makes sense and what doesn’t. The line is 
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drawn in our relation to what we mean, not in the strings of words 
independent of what we want to say and mean.  
Since the problem is related to the attempt of the philosopher to mean 
something nonsensical, Cavell and Conant focus instead on deploying 
the conversational method which, they believe, will be the more 
appropriate to helping the philosopher himself to see that what he is 
trying to mean is nonsensical. 11 
From the above discussion, the differences between the two 
approaches or interpretations should be clear. Whilst both diagnose 
problems in philosophy as stemming from differences between what 
philosophers say and what we ordinarily say, instead of characterising 
such differences as violations of rules which must be corrected, as is 
the case in the corrective interpretation, the suggestive interpretation 
seeks to prompt the philosopher, highlighting the problems that this 
departure from ordinary language engenders, ultimately leaving any 
action, corrective or otherwise, to the philosopher’s choice.  
2. Interpretation and the ‘Unity’ and ‘Compatibility’ 
problems  
In examining and explaining the two different general ways of reading 
ordinary language philosophers, and Austin and Wittgenstein in 
particular, we saw that both interpretations started by identifying 
discrepancies between ordinary language use and what philosophers 
say. Although the two readings disagree about what should be done 
when such discrepancies are encountered, whether they should be 
corrected or merely considered, both diagnose this lack of 
compatibility between philosophical and ordinary use as the 
underlying cause of a variety of philosophical problems. This 
                                                          
11There are differences between Cavell and Conant on reading Austin: Cavell 
criticises Austin, as we will see below, for not being clear on the method and the role 
of the appeal to OL. See Cavell, 2011. Conant seems to ignore the differences 
between Austin and Wittgenstein. See Conant, 2011. 
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‘compatibility problem’ is cited in all the above examples offered by 
Grice, Searle, Hacker, Glock, Conant and Cavell, and is taken, it 
seems, to be the initial concern for all ordinary language philosophers, 
and particularly Wittgenstein and Austin.12  
However, I will argue that in representing Wittgenstein and Austin in 
this way, i.e., as being initially always focused on the compatibility 
problem, key insights into their philosophy are neglected. Instead, I 
claim that their focus is often on a different problem, and that Austin 
and Wittgenstein think, in some cases, philosophical trouble arises 
because philosophers look for one common thing in all cases where 
the same word is used. I badge this concern the ‘unity problem’. The 
aim of the appeal to OL in these cases is not to point out the things 
which we would not say in OL, rather it is to indicate that ordinary 
language shows that it is the looking for something common to all 
cases in which we use the same word that is problematic.   
Wittgenstein discusses the issue of what it is that is common, and 
whether there is any such thing, in PI 65-67. In PI 65, in response to 
an interlocutor demanding a definition of a language game, he writes: 
‘Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these 
considerations.—For someone might object against me: "You take the 
easy way out! You talk about all sorts of language games, but have 
nowhere said … what is common to all these activities, and what 
makes them into language or parts of language.”’ The great question, 
then, is what is common to all these activities we call language. In the 
Blue Book, Wittgenstein calls looking for a common feature a 
                                                          
12 Note that none of these interpreters completely ignores the unity problem. For 
example, the discussion of projection in Cavell’s The Claim of Reason might be 
understood as a discussion of the unity problem and the compatibility problem. In 
addition, there are many discussions of the issue in Baker’s later works, Read and 
in other writings of suggestive interpreters from different points of view. However, 
it seems fair to say that in their attempt to reply to corrective interpretations, 
suggestive interpreters, focus on the compatibility problem and on giving a 
different reading to it. 
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tendency ‘to look for something in common to all the entities which 
we commonly subsume under a general term’. (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 
17). But how can we tell if there is a common thing? According to 
Wittgenstein, we need to look at concrete cases to see if there is one. 
‘Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be 
called 'games' "—but look and see whether there is anything common 
to all.’ (PI 66) Thus, we should not assume that there must be a 
common thing; we have to look and see if there is one. As we shall see 
in chapter 2, he suggests that we might use the same word in different 
cases because of different kinds of relations and affinities. 
 
Austin takes a pretty similar line. According to him, as we shall see in 
chapter 4, philosophers think that there must be something in common 
in virtue of which we use the same word in different cases. He 
scrutinises this assumption and argues that in OL things are more 
complicated than this. In his examination of the question ‘what is 
real?’, Austin points out that the term ‘real’ ‘does not have one single, 
specifiable, always-the-same meaning... Nor does it have a large 
number of different meanings - it is not ambiguous, even 
“systematically.”’ (Austin, 1962, p. 64). According to Austin, there 
are words that have always-the-same-meaning, and, on the other hand, 
there are ambiguous words like ‘bank’, which can mean either a 
financial institution or the edge of a river, meanings that are 
completely different. But there is also, he thinks, a middle ground 
between always-the-same meaning and ambiguity, and many 
philosophers neglect the middle ground. As a result, they fall into a 
false dichotomy: ‘one meaning/ambiguity’, which often causes them 
erroneously to look for one meaning for each word. Were they to study 
ordinary language properly, Austin claims, they would find that many 
words have, instead, a number of different but related meanings. 13  
   
                                                          
13 There are differences between early Austin and later Austin which I ignore in this 
chapter for brevity, but I will address in chapter 4.  
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In particular, Austin argues, as we shall again see in chapter 4, that 
with certain types of word there might indeed be something in 
common, but that this commonality exists at an ‘abstract’ level, and 
that focusing on this common factor obscures the many differences 
that exist at the ‘concrete’, contextual level. As a result, philosophers 
who always make the focus of their enquiry the common feature are 
likely to make mistakes by failing to pay attention to this crucial aspect 
of ordinary language.  
 
Thus, the purpose of the appeal to OL in the case of the unity problem 
is to reach one of two conclusions. Either to show that there need not 
be something in common between all cases in which we use the same 
word (Wittgenstein mainly), or to show that, even in cases where there 
is something in common, it would be problematic and misleading to 
ignore the differences between the different cases where we use the 
same word (Austin mainly).  
 
The central aim of this thesis is to show how important this unity 
problem is to a proper reading of Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. Both, in slightly different ways, attack the assumption that 
there must be a common thing in all uses of the same word, and both 
want us to consider detailed examples in ordinary language in order to 
see how diverse and subtle the different uses of the same word can be 
and thus how inadequate philosophical analysis based solely on a 
presumed common feature could be.  
 
The thesis will therefore distinguish throughout between the 
compatibility problem and the unity problem, and will focus on 
examples of the latter. As I said above, this does not mean that I take 
Wittgenstein and Austin to be unconcerned with the compatibility 
problem, but rather that neither takes it always to be the central 
problem in practising ordinary language philosophy. Thus, in 
analysing the specific examples from Austin and Wittgenstein in the 
following chapters, we will see that the question of compatibility with 
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ordinary language is important. However, in the cases discussed, the 
problem identified turns out not to be one of strict compatibility, 
because in such instances what philosophers say is in many cases 
compatible with ordinary language. Instead, the concern is that what 
they say is too narrow when the diversity of use in ordinary language 
and the way in which particular types of word or concept actually work 
in context is fully understood. 
 
Thus, I will argue in chapter 3 that Wittgenstein’s main aim in his 
discussion on ‘understanding’ is to show us that there is no one 
common meaning of understanding, and that he takes what the 
philosopher says to be compatible with OL but too restrictive, because 
the philosopher’s looking for common meaning in all uses blinds him 
to the subtleties of ordinary language in context. In chapter 5 we will 
see that Austin highlights similar problems in his discussion of ‘real’ 
and ‘true’. Ayer’s account of ‘real’ is found to be compatible with OL 
but too narrow for the generalisations he makes, whereas the account 
of ‘true’ given by philosophers is also compatible with ordinary 
language, but only weakly so; philosophers in this case focusing on a 
thin abstract level instead of the more determinate concrete meaning 
that varies with the circumstances of use. 
  
One of my overall claims, therefore, is that interpreters who focus on 
the compatibility problem misrepresent the actual examples of Austin 
and Wittgenstein, whichever doctrine of interpretation they follow. 
Cavell and Conant, as representative of the suggestive interpretation, 
Grice and Searle, as representative of opponents to OLP who 
nevertheless offer a corrective interpretation, and Hacker and Glock, 
as representative of corrective interpretation, all focus on the 
compatibility problem. My proposal is not that Austin and 
Wittgenstein ignore the compatibility problem, but that some of the 
central examples in their writings don’t fit into this problem 
framework. This is why I take it that bringing out the discussion on the 
unity problem, and the centrality of it for Austin and Wittgenstein, 
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adds to our understanding in the wider context of ordinary language 
philosophy.  
 
3. The differences between Austin and Wittgenstein 
One of the features of this thesis is the emphasis placed on the common 
ground between Austin and Wittgenstein regarding their work on the 
unity problem, and, in support of this, I will offer a detailed analysis 
of how each tackles specific philosophical problems. However, whilst 
I will argue that it is potentially a mistake to interpret their work as if 
it were focused on, or presupposed, the compatibility problem, as 
many commentators do, it will also become clear that, even in their 
treatment of the unity problem, Austin and Wittgenstein differ in 
subtle ways. There are also, of course, significant wider differences 
between the two philosophers in their general approach, ambition, and 
method, and whilst the investigation of these is beyond the scope of 
the thesis, in what follows I will briefly touch on two specific 
differences in their stances in order to clarify the focus and purpose of 
the thesis. The first makes explicit the restricted scope of the analysis 
undertaken in the thesis with respect to how each applies the findings 
of ordinary language philosophy, whereas the second clarifies why 
differences in their views on the way in which a study of language 
should be conducted are relevant. 
3.1. On philosophy and language 
 
For Austin, the study of ordinary language might yield a variety of 
results. In some cases it will enable the philosopher to begin the study 
anew. Thus Austin writes, regarding his study of excuses, that ‘the 
philosophical study of conduct can get off to a positive fresh start…’ 
(Austin, 1979, p. 180). Equally, he thinks it might help in dissolving 
some philosophical problems. For example, in the introduction to 
Sense and Sensiblia (S &S) he says that this study will help us in 
‘dissolving philosophical worries’. (Austin, 1962, p. 5) .Or it might 
have the effect that, ‘a number of traditional cruces or mistakes … can 
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be resolved or removed.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 180). Lastly, it might open 
our eyes to the difference between what we ordinarily say, and what 
some philosophers say, but leave any decision open to us. For 
example, regarding his study of ‘if’s and ‘can’s, Austin comments that 
‘[D]eterminism … may be the case, but at least it appears not 
consistent with what we ordinarily say. (Austin, 1979, p. 231). 
Austin’s work, typically, discusses a philosophical issue by paying 
attention to what we ordinarily say and what the philosopher says, 
shows that there are differences, and allows that any one of a range of 
results might follow.  
 
Wittgenstein’s approach is somewhat different. For him, after 
conducting the investigations of how we use the words in OL, 
‘philosophical problems should completely disappear.’ (PI 133). In 
other words, ordinary language philosophy ought to be able to resolve 
philosophical problems, and, in so doing, render the range of outcomes 
that we saw Austin endorsed largely irrelevant.14  
 
However, the purpose of this thesis is not to adjudicate on these 
differences. Instead, its aim is to show that viewing Austin’s and 
Wittgenstein’s OLP, and their treatment of specific philosophical 
problems, through the lens of what I have described as the ‘unity 
problem’ is an important, and often neglected, approach to interpreting 
their writing. It is the commonality of this framework with which I am 
                                                          
14 In addition, it seems that there is a difference between Austin and Wittgenstein on 
the very question of the nature of philosophical problems, and whether philosophical 
problems disappear or not depends on this. For a good discussion on this point, see 
Cavell, 2011. Cavell suggests that Austin doesn’t show the philosophical relevance 
of his study of OL; and he contrasts this with the articulation of what philosophy is 
about, and the relevance of the study of OL to philosophy, he finds in Wittgenstein. 
Cavell writes: ‘My assumption is that there is something special that philosophy is 
about… I emphasise that Austin himself was …never anxious to underscore 
philosophy’s uniqueness, in particular not its difference from science.’ (Cavell, 
2011, p. 61). This is one of Wittgenstein’s central claims: that philosophy is to be 
distinguished from science, see PI 109, and one of the main differences between 
Wittgenstein and Austin.  
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concerned here, rather than the differences in their wider views 
outlined above.  
 
3.2. On studying language  
 
Austin wants to contribute to a theory of language. He thinks that by 
the joint labours of philosophers, grammarians and students of 
language we might witness the birth of a ‘science of language’. 
(Austin, 1979, p. 232). In How to do things with words (HTDW) he 
seeks a classification of speech-acts and classifies different kinds of 
individual words in groups: adjuster words, excluders, and dimension 
words. In addition to his interest in how our misunderstanding of OL 
might affect philosophy, Austin is generally interested in language 
itself 15. Wittgenstein is different, he is not interested in a science of 
language, or in language by itself. Rather, he is interested in 
philosophical problems. He describes how we ordinarily use the 
troublesome philosophical words and compares this with how 
philosophers use them, ‘[A]nd this description gets its light, that is to 
say its purpose, from the philosophical problems.’ (PI 109) There are 
no theoretical interests in Wittgenstein’s PI beyond philosophical 
problems. There is no attempt to advance a theory of how language 
works. In fact, ‘our considerations could not be scientific ones.’ (PI 
109). Wittgenstein separates philosophy from science.   
                                                          
15 For example, in the introduction to S & S, he writes ‘we may hope to learn 
something positive in the way of a technique for dissolving philosophical 
worries…and also something about the meanings of some English words… which, 
besides being philosophically very slippery, are in their own right interesting’. 
(Austin, 1962, p. 5). Again, in ‘The Meaning of a Word’, where he mentions the 
debate between the nominalists and the realists, he says that the nominalists didn’t 
search the linguistic facts ‘which are, in themselves, interesting enough’. (Austin, 
1979, p. 70). In both cases, he thinks that linguistic studies are, by themselves, 
interesting. Urmson writes that Austin ‘thought that the institution of language was 
in itself of sufficient interest to make it worthy of the closest study.’ (Urmson, 2011, 
p. 23). Guy Longworth states that for Austin ‘language use is a central part of human 
activity, so it’s an important topic in its own right’. (Longworth, 2011, p. 104). 
Hanfling writes that it ‘is clear, both from his writings and from the memoirs of those 
who remember his lectures, that Austin was fascinated by words and meanings in 
themselves, independent of their relevance to problems of philosophy.’ (Hanfling, 
2000, p. 26). 
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These differences are reflected in the way in which each tries to answer 
the unity problem. In Wittgenstein’s answer, his main concern is not 
to record how we actually use language, nor how to theorise about how 
language works. Rather, he wants to show that there need not be one 
common thing between all the cases in which we use the word. 
Looking for something in common generates philosophical troubles. 
On the other hand, Austin is seeking to record exactly how we use 
some specific words, and he is trying to classify the uses, as part of an 
attempt to form a larger theory.   
 
The following four chapters can be seen as a theoretical study of 
language, in the way Austin sees his studies, or as descriptions of how 
we ordinarily use language in order to (re)solve some philosophical 
problems, as Wittgenstein sees his endeavours. The thesis is neutral as 
to both claims. The focal point here is the similarity between them, as 
explained above:  how they tackle the unity problem, and take it to be 
of one of the central problems.  
 
4. Summary 
 
In this chapter I introduced two main interpretations to OLP, the 
corrective interpretation and the suggestive interpretation. The former 
identifies violations of ordinary language rules by philosophers and 
demands correction, whereas the latter makes a similar comparison 
between what philosophers say and our ordinary usage, but ‘merely’ 
advises, or engages in dialogue with, the philosopher. I then made a 
distinction between the nature of the general ‘problem’ OL 
philosophers typically presume to underlie, or be the root cause of, a 
host of particular philosophical problems and the force of the role 
ascribed to OL in (re)solving philosophical problems. My aim was to 
highlight that there are different ‘problems’ addressed by Austin and 
Wittgenstein, and that most interpreters in both camps focus on one 
problem, the compatibility problem, the problem that arises when 
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philosophers violate the rules of OL. This focus, I claim, is too 
restrictive and does not take into account some of the central examples 
in the writings of Austin and Wittgenstein. These are better viewed 
through the lens of what I called the ‘unity problem’.   
 
In the second section, I introduced the ‘unity problem’, outlining that 
for Austin and Wittgenstein there will be cases where what 
philosophers say is compatible with OL, and so the source of the 
particular philosophical problem is not one of compatibility, as 
generally presumed. Instead, trouble arises in such cases because 
philosophers look for a single common element present in all instances 
where the same word is used. I made it clear that we should expect to 
see, in the detailed analysis undertaken by the thesis, differences 
between Austin and Wittgenstein regarding the exact treatment of this 
problem. For instance, for Wittgenstein there need not be something 
in common between all cases in which we use the same word, whereas 
for Austin there might be, although even in cases where there is 
something in common, he thinks it would be problematic and 
misleading to ignore the differences between the different cases where 
we use the same word.   
  
The next four chapters address the unity problem. In chapters 2 and 3, 
I analyse and discuss Wittgenstein’s work on the unity problem, and 
in chapters 4 and 5 I address the same issues in Austin’s writing. In 
each pair of chapters, the first chapter sets out the ‘theory’ each 
philosopher takes: what they find problematic with the presumption 
that we should look for something common to all instances of the 
word’s use, and the alternative approaches they offer. The second 
chapter in each pair analyses the specific treatment given by each 
philosopher to particular philosophical problems in which the search 
for a common element has been the root cause of the problem. The 
overall aim is to demonstrate that viewing the work of both 
philosophers through the compatibility problem lens, and ignoring the 
perspective offered by an analysis of the unity problem, is too narrow 
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an approach, and one which will inevitably ignore important insights 
that Austin and Wittgenstein bring to bear on philosophical problems.  
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Chapter 2 
Wittgenstein and the unity question 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter and the next address Wittgenstein’s work on the unity 
problem. Usually, Wittgenstein is considered one of the main figures 
in OLP, along with Austin, Ryle, and Strawson. Most interpreters, as 
we have seen in the first chapter, tend to conceive OLP as focusing on 
the compatibility problem, which is applied to various philosophical 
problems, such as the mind-body problem, the nature of truth… etc. 
The compatibility problem is concerned with cases where 
philosophers say something which we would not say in OL. 
Interpreters take this to be the mistake that philosophers commonly 
commit and the source of philosophical problems. In this thesis, 
however, I argue for a different perspective and a reassessment of the 
way in which the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s work 
is approached. I want to bring out and highlight a neglected thread in 
key parts of Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s writings where they appear 
to tackle a different issue from the compatibility problem. Their stance 
is not to claim that what philosophers say is incompatible with OL, in 
many of the instances is examined it is not, but rather they seek to 
show how philosophers are led into philosophical trouble because they 
look for one common feature in all cases in which we use the same 
word. In chapter 1 I called this the ‘unity problem’. 
 
In this chapter, I will examine Wittgenstein’s treatment of the unity 
question, largely as it appears in the PI 65-67. Here, Wittgenstein 
argues that there need not be one common thing in virtue of which we 
use the same word in different cases, and that there might instead be a 
number of different kinds of relations and affinities that determine 
usage of the same word. I term these concepts ‘family concepts’, in 
contrast with ‘common feature concepts’. In the following chapter, I 
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examine concrete examples from the PI, in the context of discussing 
some philosophical problems, where Wittgenstein tries to show that 
the concept discussed in each of these examples need not have 
something in common in all its uses. As a result, I will argue that these 
examples are better seen through the lens of the unity problem rather 
than focusing on issues of compatibility with ordinary language.  
 
1. PI 65-67 
 
Most interpreters take Wittgenstein to propose that, for some concepts, 
there need not be one defining common feature, and there are 
overlapping similarities which justify our calling different things by 
the same word. They term these concepts ‘family resemblance 
concepts’, in contrast to ‘common feature concepts’. The first two 
interpretations we examine, interpretations A and B, adopt this 
reading. Interpretation C, to which I adhere, takes Wittgenstein to say 
that there are different kinds of relations and affinities, and that 
similarities are only one kind of these relations. Interpretation C is 
therefore not inconsistent with A and B, but goes further, regarding 
‘family resemblance concepts’ as just one kind of ‘family concepts’. I 
will claim that there is undue focus on the notion of similarities in the 
relevant secondary literature, and this somewhat narrow approach can 
be misleading and is not justified by close attention to the text. In what 
follows, I will examine Wittgenstein’s PI 65-67, and then analyse the 
three different interpretations given to these passages. 
 
In PI 65-67, Wittgenstein gives three examples, suggesting in each 
case that there is no one defining common feature that determines 
usage. The first example is ‘language’. In PI 65, Wittgenstein faces 
‘the great question’. He writes: ‘Here we come up against the great 
question that lies behind all these considerations.—For someone might 
object against me: “You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts 
of language games, but have nowhere said … what is common to all 
these activities, and what makes them into language or parts of 
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language.”’ Since Wittgenstein doesn’t give a definition of a language-
game, a topic he was discussing in the previous passages, his 
interlocutor objects and demands one, a definition in terms of a 
common feature which defines the concept discussed. The great 
question is: what is common to all these activities we call language? 
 
Wittgenstein’s answer is straightforward, ‘[I]nstead of producing 
something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these 
phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the 
same word for all,— but that they are related to one another in many 
different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these 
relationships, that we call them all "language".’ According to 
Wittgenstein then, there is no one common feature in virtue of which 
we call different things by the same word ‘language’, but, instead, the 
use of the term is governed by the existence (or otherwise) of different 
kinds of relations, and it is these that determine whether we call 
particular phenomena ‘language’.  
 
The second example is ‘games’, and is discussed in PI 66. ‘Consider 
for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic Games, and so on. What is 
common to them all?—Don't say: "There must be something common, 
or they would not be called 'games' "—but look and see whether there 
is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a 
whole series of them at that.’  If you look and see, you won’t find one 
common feature, but you find overlapping features between the 
different activities we call games, features such as losing, winning, 
entertainment, patience, skill, luck, etc., none of which is necessarily 
present in every game. ‘And the result of this examination is: we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.’  In PI 
67-a, Wittgenstein calls these overlapping similarities ‘family 
resemblances’.  ‘I can think of no better expression to characterize 
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these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various 
resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of 
eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same 
way.’ Thus, there need not be one common feature between all the 
members of the family, and it is not even necessary that there should 
be an overall similarity between all members of the family (although 
there may be on occasion). It will be sufficient for there to be different 
local overlapping similarities between members of the family, as is the 
case in games.  
 
The third example, ‘number’ is given in PI 67-b: ‘the kinds of number 
form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a 
"number"? Well, perhaps because it has a—direct—relationship with 
several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be 
said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same 
name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread 
we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside 
in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the 
overlapping of many fibres.’ The analogy of fibres within a thread is 
an excellent one, and brings out very clearly the distinction between 
global and local similarity made in the previous paragraph. The lack 
of dependence on a single common feature (the single fibre that runs 
the length of the thread) in determining membership or otherwise of 
the family of uses emphasises, instead, the binding strength of the local 
relationships between uses (the individual, shorter fibres) which, taken 
together, constitute the overall family (the whole thread). 
 
In PI 67-c, however, Wittgenstein discusses a potential objection. The 
objection is that we might say, after all, ‘there is something common 
to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common 
properties’. According to Wittgenstein, though, this is a triviality, a 
mere ‘playing with words. One might just as well say: "Something 
runs through the whole thread— namely the continuous overlapping 
of those fibres.’ The point, again, is that there is no one fibre that runs 
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its length, and the same is true for some words, where there is no one 
common feature in virtue of which we call different things by the same 
word. Instead, it is in virtue of the different local relations between the 
cases that we do so. 
  
Wittgenstein’s answer to the question ‘do we call different things by 
the same word because of a common feature?’ is therefore negative. 
However, it is important not to read this position as claiming that no 
concepts are common feature concepts. Rather, the three cases in point 
should be read as offering significant counterexamples to any claim 
that every analysis of the usage of the same word on different 
occasions should be driven by the search for a common feature. 
  
I now turn to the examination of the three different interpretations of 
these passages.  
 
1.1. Three interpretations of PI 65-67 
 
In what follows I will discuss three interpretations of PI 65-67 in the 
secondary literature. I start with Interpretation A, which is the 
prevailing one, and the one which was first proposed historically. In 
1.1.1, I explain this interpretation and the main objections raised 
against it. In 1.1.2, I move to Interpretation B, which attempts to meet 
some objections to interpretation A. I will argue that interpretation B 
fails in its ambition. Finally, in 1.1.3, I introduce Interpretation C. This 
interpretation includes aspects of the first two interpretations, and, 
although not prominent in the secondary literature, in my view better 
answers the objections raised. I will argue that it is the most 
appropriate and the closest to Wittgenstein’s text.  
 
1.1.1. Interpretation A 
 
The prevailing interpretation, Interpretation A, takes Wittgenstein to 
be saying that it is because of the overlapping similarities, and not the 
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presence of a common feature, that we call different things by the same 
word. R. Bambrough is the first to explore this interpretation, with an 
influential article on ‘family resemblance’. He explains: ‘We may 
classify a set of objects by reference to the presence or absence of 
features ABCDE. It may well happen that five objects edcba are such 
that each of them has four of these properties and lacks the fifth, and 
that the missing feature is different in each of the five cases. A simple 
diagram will illustrate this situation:  
 
     e                           d                       c                       b                   a  
ABCD                  ABCE               ABDE              ACDE          BCDE  
 
Here we can already see how natural and how proper it might be to 
apply the same word to a number of objects between which there is no 
common feature’ (Bambrough, 1960, pp. 209-210). This reading 
seems very much in line with the account of Wittgenstein’s three 
examples given above, and shows in a practical example how the 
presence of local similarities, rather than a common feature that 
persists across all examples, might be sufficient to provide a rationale 
for grouping particular activities under the same term. Bambrough 
takes it that, in addition to ‘games’, other words are treated by 
Wittgenstein in the same way: ‘reading’, ‘expecting’, ‘proposition’ 
and ‘number’ are all family resemblance concepts.16  
 
In the same vein, Anthony Kenny writes: ‘General terms such as 
‘game’, ‘language’ ‘proposition’ were applied not on the basis of the 
recognition of common features, but on the basis of family likeness.’ 
(Kenny, 2006, p. 177). Baker and Hacker write, ‘What makes the 
various activities called ‘games’ into games is a complicated network 
of similarities’. (Baker and Hacker, 1980, p. 326). And they add ‘[T]he 
investigations [PI] holds that ‘proposition’, ‘language’ and 
                                                          
16 See Bamborugh, 1960, p. 211.  
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‘number’…are family-resemblance concepts…’ (Baker and Hacker, 
2009, p. 224). 
 
Thus, according to this interpretation, classifying an activity as a game 
does not require the activity to possess a feature common to all other 
games, nor need it be similar to all such activities in one particular 
way. Instead, its membership is validated or otherwise according to its 
possessing (or not) certain overlapping and criss-crossing similarities 
with some but not necessarily all of the set of activities dubbed 
‘games’. Concepts that determine their extension in this way are called 
‘family resemblance concepts’.  
 
However, philosophers raise three main objections to this 
interpretation. The first objection is that one can always find some 
similarity between different things, and can always point out a 
resemblance between any two activities. Put in other words, in some 
respect everything resembles everything else. The criterion is 
therefore vacuous because, strictly speaking, I can justify calling any 
activity a game on the grounds that it resembles, in one way or another, 
one of the activities we call games. (There are different formulations 
of this objection in Baker and Hacker (2009), Bellaimey (1990), 
Mandelbaum (1995) and Prien (2004)).  
 
The second objection that many commentators and interpreters have 
raised questions the consistency of interpretation A with 
Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘family’. They object that the term 
seems to imply some kind of ‘genetic connection’ between the cases, 
a criterion different from interpretation A’s focus on overlapping 
similarities. After all, individuals are typically not classified as 
members of the family on the basis of their similarities to one another. 
The charge, then, is that interpretation A takes the opposite direction 
to that which is implied by Wittgenstein’s metaphor of ‘family’. 
(There are different formulations of this objection in Beardsmore 
(1995), Gert (1995), Mandelbaum (1995), and Prien (2004)).  
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The third objection concerns the apparently narrow way in which 
interpretation A reads PI 65-67. The claim is that it would be a mistake 
to confine our focus in this passage solely to consideration of 
similarities. Wittgenstein, they claim, clearly has a broader notion of 
what make us use the same word in different cases, namely that it is 
because of different kinds of relations and affinities, rather than purely 
because of similarities which are just one kind of relation or affinity. 
(There are different formulations of this objection in Gert (1995) and 
Sluga (2006)). 
 
1.1.2. Interpretation B 
 
Interpretation B seeks to answer the objections raised against 
interpretation A. As with interpretation A, interpretation B holds that, 
for some concepts, it is the overlapping similarities and not a common 
feature that justify our calling different things by the same word. 
However, in order to avoid the objections discussed above, it takes 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about family resemblance as sociological-
historical remarks. J. Hunter writes that ‘in the evolution of language 
the extension of a concept may have been gradually enlarged’ in 
different directions, and for different kinds of similarities. (Hunter, 
1985, p. 54). The concept evolved and was extended to different 
things, and for each new instance there was a similarity with an 
existing concept which resembled the new phenomenon in at least one 
feature, and the word became family resemblance concept through this 
historical enlargement. One way of reading this account is as 
presenting objection 1 with a sort of historical fait accompli. In other 
words, it is a historical fact that the over-classification dangers 
envisaged by the objection, that everything resembles everything else 
in some way, have not come to pass. Concepts, instead, have evidently 
evolved successfully on the basis of local similarity and this evolution 
has not been marked by every new phenomenon or instance being 
classified under every available concept.  
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Bernd Prien also prefers interpretation B. He explains that the problem 
with interpretation A is that it ‘takes the presence of similarities to be 
a sufficient condition for an object’s falling under a concept.’ (Prien, 
2004, p. 20). If we understand the simple presence of the similarities 
as a sufficient condition for subsuming different things under the 
concept, then the problem is that there are many similarities between 
the things we call X and the things we don’t call X, and ‘the extensions 
of concepts would have to be much wider than they actually are.’ 
(Prien, 2004, p. 20). Thus, for example, many things which we don’t 
call games nevertheless share similarities with the activities we do call 
games, and therefore, according to interpretation A we ought to call 
them games, but we do not. Prien therefore thinks, with some 
justification, that objection 1 is fatal to interpretation A.  
 
However, according to Prien, interpretation B solves the problem by 
expanding the account of the role that similarities play in determining 
which objects fall under the concept. Like Hunter, he thinks that the 
historical facts show that when in the past we have been faced with a 
new phenomenon and it has been subsumed under a concept, this has 
occurred because it resembles, in some way or other, other phenomena 
similarly subsumed under that concept. However, whilst similarity is 
required, it is equally clear that our discriminations have, in fact, been 
more fine-grained. ‘Consequently, similarities are only necessary but 
not sufficient for extending a concept to a new object.’ (Prien, 2004, 
p. 20).As a result, ‘[W]hen an activity exhibits resemblances with 
games, it does not follow that the concept ‘game’ will be extended to 
this activity.’ (Prien, 2004, p. 20). Interpretation B thus does not give 
up the basis of interpretation A, but it avoids the unrestricted reliance 
on similarity which made interpretation A vulnerable to objection 1.  
 
It seems to me that there are three problems that interpretation B has 
to face. The first arises if objection 1 is taken to be a reductio on the 
very idea of similarity governing classification. Thus, if the challenge 
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from the objector is that reliance on criteria of similarity alone will 
result in all phenomena being classified under all concepts, she is 
unlikely to be impressed by the historical account that shows that no 
such outcome has, in fact, occurred. Her response is likely to be that 
the absence of such a result confirms her objection that similarity alone 
cannot be the determining factor. However, Prien’s amplification of 
Hunter’s account, in which he recognises that similarity must be 
constrained in some way in order to account for the classifications we 
have historically made, seems to avoid this difficulty but at the cost of 
provoking a different concern.   
 
This second problem for interpretation B is that it offers what might 
be characterized as a descriptive rather than an explanatory account17. 
In other words, it describes the outcome that has in fact occurred and 
presents it as a refutation of objection 1. However, in order to explain 
how this finer-grained discrimination has been possible, supporters of 
interpretation B surely have to offer some idea of how this might have 
occurred. Prien, as we have just seen, seems to recognise the need, but 
offers no explanation beyond the idea that some factors or other 
constrain the application of similarity. 
 
Hunter, also shows some recognition of the issues and, perhaps, goes 
a little further. He states that when we face a new phenomenon either 
there is no problem in subsuming it under one concept, because we 
have learnt how to use such a concept, or there is a problem, and no 
appeal to similarities will solve the issue18. He therefore seems to 
recognise that some additional factor, in his account ‘learning’, must 
be involved, but he doesn’t elaborate on what is to be learnt, and 
therefore his position could hardly be taken to be a knockdown 
                                                          
17 The key concern is to answer the ‘How’ question, which will be the focus of the 
next section – whether this is badged as ‘explanatory’ or merely a deeper level of 
‘description’ is not material to my purpose.  
18 See Hunter, 1985, pp. 55-56. 
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argument against the earlier objections, not least because his ‘learning’ 
explanation seems vulnerable to a potential regress in which the basis 
of the original discrimination (which is then learnt by others) remains 
mysterious. As a result, if Hunter and Prien are relying on their account 
of history to carry the day, significantly more work needs to be done 
to determine what the additional factor might be, and how it is going 
to meet objection. This is addressed in section 1.2. 
 
Lastly, interpretation B appears to be open to objection 3. Recall 
objection 3: Wittgenstein has a broader notion of what make us use the 
same word in different cases than similarities alone, even if the 
application of similarities is constrained in some way. For him, our 
decisions about classification are governed by different kinds of 
relations and affinities of which similarity is just one kind.  By 
focusing entirely on similarity, constrained or otherwise, proponents 
of interpretation B (and interpretation A) ignore this wider concern. I 
will argue that objection 3 is serious and is justified by close attention 
to the text of PI 65-67. As a result, I propose that a further 
interpretation, interpretation C, is necessary.  
 
1.1.3. Interpretation C  
 
According to supporters of interpretation C, Wittgenstein in PI 65-67 
has a broader notion than similarities of the different relations which 
make us call different things by the same word. Interpretation C is, in 
fact, the combination of two suggestions of how to read PI 65-67 by 
two commentators, H. J. Gert and Hans Sluga. In what follows, I 
combine their suggestions into one interpretation. The result is a 
reading of PI 65-67 which, I claim, meets objection 3 and potentially 
avoids objection 2, if we regard Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘family’ 
in a particular way. However, interpretation C does seem to have 
difficulties with objection 1, and consideration of this issue is taken up 
later in section 1.2.  
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Gert suggests that ‘[F]amily-making relations aren’t necessarily 
relations of resemblance’, and that there are many relations which 
make families, resemblances being just one kind. (Gert, 1995, p. 180). 
For example, Gert interprets PI 67-b, where Wittgenstein suggests that 
we have a family of cases which we call ‘number’ as follows: ‘It's 
more natural… to think of numbers as forming a family on the basis 
of mathematical relations (addition, multiplication, squaring, etc.)’ 
than on the basis of similarities. (Gert, 1995, p. 179). He also cites PI 
65 and 108 where Wittgenstein talks about relations that make 
families, but doesn’t talk about resemblance. Further support for 
Gert’s position comes from PI 164, where Wittgenstein talks about 
‘family of cases’ in the context of ‘reading’ and ‘deriving’, and PI 77, 
where he talks about ‘family of meanings’ in the context of ‘good’. In 
neither passage does Wittgenstein mention similarities, nor does he 
mention ‘family resemblance’, referring only to the notion of ‘family 
of cases’. According to Gert, Wittgenstein thinks there are, in fact, 
many different kinds of relations (including similarities) which make 
us use the same word in families of cases: whilst similarity is used in 
one example, ‘games’ in PI 66, the majority of examples do not 
explicitly rely on similarity or resemblance.  
 
A similar reading is given by Sluga. He distinguishes between two 
kinds of relations which make us call different things by the same 
word. The first is the relation of ‘kinship, of descent, of some sort of 
real and causal connection…the second is that of similarity, 
resemblance, affinity, and correspondence’. (Sluga, 2006, p. 14). 
Here, we have two different kinds of terms. Consider some of Sluga’s 
examples: in historical accounts, he claims, kinship concepts are what 
we look for; we try ‘to establish direct and real connections, causal 
links, dependencies and “influences”.’ (Sluga, 2006, p. 19). This is the 
case when we look at concepts in the history of Art or Philosophy, for 
example. On the other hand, we look for what might broadly be 
described as similarity concepts when we compare types of 
philosophical ideas, or when we examine in Art styles from different 
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cultures, for example. These do not require the sorts of causal 
connections necessary in the case of kinship concepts, which, in turn, 
do not require the presence of similarities. Sluga also recognises that 
there are cases where there is overlap between the two kinds of 
concept.  
 
As noted earlier, interpretation C is based on a combination of both 
Gert’s and Sluga’s positions. As we have seen, what both 
commentators have in common is that they take Wittgenstein’s 
position in the PI to be that there are different kinds of relation which 
make us call different things by the same word, and similarities 
represent just one kind of these relations. Because interpretation C is 
not wholly reliant on the notion of similarity or resemblance, it clearly 
answers objection 3 and may, as we will see in 1.2, go some way 
towards answering objection 1. However, objection 2 may still present 
a problem. 
 
Objection 2 is concerned that the term ‘family’ seems to imply some 
kind of ‘genetic’ or causal connection between the cases, which seems 
to run counter to the claim that Wittgenstein suggests that the concepts 
are related by overlapping similarities. In other words, the problem is 
to do with the term ‘family’, and the issue is whether, in using that 
term, Wittgenstein implies a causal connection or not. 
 
The text is not conclusive, and Sluga places much of the blame for the 
confusion at Wittgenstein’s door. He suggests that Wittgenstein 
himself is responsible for the lack of clarity because he fails to 
maintain rigorously the distinction between family concepts and 
resemblance concepts in using the crucial, and much focused on, term 
‘family resemblance’. According to Sluga, Wittgenstein ‘fails to 
appreciate the genuine difference between these two ways of speaking, 
and his characterization of family resemblance combines both in a 
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single formula’19. (Sluga, 2006, p. 14). For Sluga, the term ‘family’ 
does indeed suggest causal links, and he thinks that Wittgenstein, by 
using this term ‘family’, suggests some kind of causal connection. 
However, and here he agrees with objection 2, concepts determined 
by notions of similarity or resemblance typically have no need to call 
on causal connections in determining which phenomena fall under 
their banner. It is therefore misleading and confusing to use the term 
‘family resemblance’ for types of concepts because the very idea of 
combining ‘family’ and ‘resemblance’ runs counter to their inherent 
incompatibility. As a consequence, Sluga suggests that it is better to 
stop using the term ‘family resemblance’ altogether. 
 
Baker and Hacker, though, have a different perspective on the notion 
of ‘family’ and argue that ‘the genetic explanation of resemblances 
among members of a family is irrelevant’ (my italics). (Baker and 
Hacker, 2005, p. 155).Their view is that the point of the analogy with 
family resemblances in PI 67-a ‘is to show us that there need be no 
common properties among the extension of a concept in virtue of 
which we deem them all to fall under the concept’, the use of the term 
‘family’ is not intended to make causal or genetic claims. (Baker and 
Hacker, 2005, p. 155). Thus, according to their reading, in using the 
term ‘family resemblance’ or ‘family concept’ Wittgenstein doesn’t 
imply that there must be a causal connection, and the basis on which 
objection 2 was raised is false.  
 
In constructing interpretation C, I prefer to adopt Baker and Hacker’s 
reading of this issue. For me, the text does not support the strong 
genetic or causal reading of the term ‘family’, and it seems far more 
plausible, when Wittgenstein’s use of the term in the context is 
examined, to take their weaker reading. Interpretation C therefore 
                                                          
19 Sluga refers to Nietzsche’s work which takes family resemblance, as Sluga reads 
Nietzsche, to be dependent on kinship relations. So the similarities are results of 
the kinship relations. According to Sluga, Wittgenstein, influenced by Nietzsche, 
develops the idea in two different directions without realising it.  
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reads PI 65-67 as follows. Family concepts are to be contrasted with 
common feature concepts. For the latter, it is because of the common 
feature that each possesses that we call different things by the same 
word. For the former, it is because of different kinds of relations, and 
not because of a common feature, that we call different things by the 
same word. Whilst similarity is one valid type of such a qualifying 
relation, others might be mathematical, historical and so on. Those 
commentators who read Wittgenstein narrowly, and take overlapping 
resemblances or similarities alone to be the alternative to the common 
feature explanation, lack textual justification for their position.20 In 
addition, the strong reading of the term ‘family’ is misleading and 
something of a red herring: despite the combining of ‘family’ and 
‘resemblance’ in one phrase, it seems clear from his wider use of 
‘family’ that Wittgenstein’s general purpose was not to imply a genetic 
or causal connection.  
 
All of this, of course, does not deny that the extension of some 
concepts will be determined by genetic or causal factors, just as 
Wittgenstein and interpretation C do not deny that some concepts have 
common features present in each qualifying member. The concern 
here is, firstly, to demonstrate that concepts are not formed necessarily 
on the basis of common features; secondly, to maintain that similarity 
or resemblance is too narrow a notion to be the determinant of 
conceptual discrimination in family cases; and, thirdly, that although 
some concepts may be determined on the basis of genetic or causal 
connections, Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘family’ was intended for 
a purpose that was orthogonal to this. As a result, concepts that fall 
under the term ‘family resemblance’ can be seen as a subset of ‘family 
                                                          
20 It seems that one of the reasons which make commentators focus on the 
similarities is because Wittgenstein’s texts from the 1930’s mention only 
similarities, especially the influential text The Blue Book. It might be that 
Wittgenstein changed his mind and thinks of different kinds of relations later. 
However, this would require careful study of the development of his ideas, and is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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concepts’, neither implying any necessary genetic or causal 
connection.  
 
Interpretation A and interpretation B can both now be seen to be too 
narrow, in their own different ways. Interpretation A’s focus on 
similarities or resemblances is too restrictive and fails to take account 
of the other types of affinities and relations that Wittgenstein clearly 
had in mind. Interpretation B is predicated on a strong genetic or 
causal reading of the term ‘family’ that proves to be unwarranted when 
Wittgenstein’s wider use of the terms is considered. For Wittgenstein, 
‘family’ is to be applied more widely and generally without the causal 
implication. This allows interpretation C to meet both objection 2 and 
objection 3, as we saw earlier. This leaves us with the task of assessing 
how well interpretation C fares against objection 1.  
 
1.2. Objection 1 and interpretation C 
 
The essence of objection 1 was that discrimination on the basis of 
similarity or resemblance was insufficient because it is always 
possible to find similarities or resemblances between any two things: 
everything resembles everything else in some way. Consequently, if 
an activity is called a game because of the similarities it shares with 
some other activities called games, then, in virtue of everything 
resembling everything else in some way, it seems impossible to bar 
membership to any other activity, thereby rendering the term ‘game’ 
vacuous. 
 
It should be said, of course, that interpretation C has already 
apparently limited the impact of objection 1 by denying the exclusive 
role of similarity in determining concept classification. However, 
proponents of this interpretation will be well aware that those pressing 
objection 1 may well turn their attention to the wider relations and 
affinities employed by Wittgenstein according to interpretation C and 
ask what it is that constrains the application of these relations, since 
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the same possibility of over-generation appears likely. For the sake of 
convenience I will focus on the issue as it applies to similarities, but 
both potential solutions examined below in 1.2.1 could apply equally 
easily to the wider notion of affinities etc.  
 
In response to objection 1, a number of commentators argue that 
Wittgenstein was more sophisticated than the objection implies, 
having in mind only salient relevant similarities, rather than 
similarities tout court. Baker and Hacker, for instance, argue in this 
way: ‘Wittgenstein implies that the similarities among games justify 
calling them “games”, and that the absence of relevant similarities 
justifies refusing to call an activity “a game”.’ (Baker and Hacker, 
2009, p. 215). In practice, they argue, ‘we do not accept any arbitrary 
resemblances as warranting the extension of the term’. (Baker and 
Hacker, 2009, p. 220). Gert reads Wittgenstein along similar lines: 
‘[F]amily resemblances are those salient resemblances which are 
fairly common to, or distinctive of, the members of a kind.’21 (Gert, 
1995, p. 183)If this were the case, objection 1 would be in serious 
trouble, its principal charge of lack of discrimination in determining 
similarity or resemblance being at odds with such claims.  
 
However, there is a problem with relying on the notion of relevant 
similarities or resemblances, and it is that it seems merely to provoke 
                                                          
21 Gert thinks that the notion that shared properties are synonymous with 
resemblances has led interpreters to objection 1. But ‘"resembles" shouldn't be 
thought of as synonymous with "shares properties with".’ The difference between 
shared properties and resemblances are, first, ‘not all properties contribute to 
resemblance.’ (Gert, 1995, p. 182). For example, properties such as the relational 
and negative properties: we don’t say that my apple and my computer resembles 
each other because they are both not a unicorn, or because they are both on my 
desk. The second difference is explained as follows, ‘if resemblance is merely a 
matter of sharing properties then degree of resemblance should depend on 
something like number or percentage of properties shared.’ However, according to 
him, this is not resemblance. He explains that we don’t count shared properties in 
order to determine whether two things resemble each other. Gert suggests that 
these two differences show us that shared properties are not synonymous with 
resemblances, and the confusion between the two things leads to the first 
objection, that everything resembles everything else.  
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a modification of objection 1. This says that even under the notion of 
relevant similarities, the extension of concepts to qualify will be too 
great. Take some of the relevant resemblances Wittgenstein mentions 
in PI 66. Winning and losing is apparently one of the relevant features 
for games, but winning and losing are common in battles and wars, in 
competitions for jobs, prizes and many other contests, and yet few of 
these we would classify, in our ordinary usage, as ‘games’.  
 
The same difficulty, it seems, is also likely to arise when we encounter 
a new phenomenon. The issue here is that the phenomenon is likely to 
resemble more than one concept in some relevant way, and it is not 
clear how we should choose between them on the basis of relevant 
relevance or similarity alone.  
 
1.2.1. Two solutions to modified objection 1  
 
At the heart of the issue that the modifications to objection 1 address 
is the recognition that, absent some other factor, notions of similarity 
or resemblance (or other relations) appear to be insufficient to explain 
either the decisions concerning concept categorisations that we have 
made historically, or the basis on which we might go about making 
future such decisions in the face of new phenomena. Even the 
restrictions introduced by applying the notion of ‘relevant’ to 
similarities takes us little further forward in that it, crucially, provides 
no account of how relevance is determined. 
 
In what follows I analyse two possible approaches to this difficulty. It 
is important to note that the focus in each is on identifying the principal 
factor that causes the particular decisions and not others to be made.  
The first approach ‘looks inside’ and places the responsibility on the 
psychological principles which guide us in the formation of concepts. 
I will call it ‘the psychological solution’. The second ‘looks outside’, 
and proposes that the determining factor consists in the shared interests 
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and purposes present in a community of the language speakers.  I will 
call this ‘the form of life solution’. 22  
  
‘The psychological solution’ is exemplified by Eleanor Rosch’s 
work23. She writes, ‘Wittgenstein [in PI 67] says of family 
resemblance “look and see”, and … I decided to look and see’ if there 
is a common feature or criss-crossing similarities between different 
things we call by the same word. (Rosch, 1987, p. 156). To do this, 
Rosch performed a number of experiments aimed at determining 
whether people categorise objects presented to them on the basis of 
common features or criss-crossing similarities. The findings support 
the view that, for some concepts, we do categorise the objects because 
of their criss-crossing similarities24. This seems to provide empirical 
evidence for those who consider that the exclusive search for a 
common feature is misguided.  
 
However, and more importantly for present purposes, she observes 
that ‘human categorization should not be considered the arbitrary 
product of historical accident or of whimsy but rather the result of 
psychological principles of categorization.’ (Rosch, 2004, p. 91). In 
other words, she directs the attention of those who would understand 
the principles by which objects are subsumed under concepts, and, in 
cases of similarity, the way in which relevant similarity is determined, 
to empirical psychological research. For her, the classification 
decisions we make are driven by, and manifestations of, underlying 
psychological principles. According to Rosch, these principles are 
likely to vary by concept: her research offers detailed hypotheses about 
                                                          
22 Note that both answers go beyond PI 65-67. The wording of these two passages 
is neutral to which answer is more compatible with the text. 
23 I focus here on her solution to modified objection 1, and not the details of her 
‘prototype theory’.  
24 See Rosch (1975).  
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those principles that are relevant or salient for categorising objects as 
birds and furniture25.  
 
The second answer looks toward the community that we inhabit and 
suggests that it is because we share the same form of life, the same 
interests and needs, that we are likely to pick out the same relevant 
similarities in forming concepts. According to J.E. Bellaimy, ‘the 
concept… is shaped by an interaction between the features of the 
objects subsumed under the concept, and the needs and purposes of 
the users of the language’. (Bellaimy, 1990, p. 40). To explain his 
answer, he gives an example from Bambourgh’s article: 
  
‘Let us suppose that trees are of great importance in the life and work 
of the South Sea of [imaginary] Islanders, and that they have a rich 
and highly developed language in which they speak of the trees with 
which the land there is thickly clad. But they do not have names for 
the species and genera of trees as they are recognized by our botanists. 
As we walk around the island… we can easily pick out orange-tress, 
date palms and cedars. Our hosts…surprise us by giving the same 
name to each of the trees in what is from our point of view a very 
mixed plantation. They point out to us what they called a mixed 
planation, and we see that it is in our terms a clump of trees of the 
same species… It may be that the islanders classify tress as ‘boat-
building trees’, ‘house-building trees’, etc., and that they are more 
concerned with the height, thickness and maturity of the trees than they 
are with the distinction of species that interest us.’ (Bambourgh, 1960, 
pp. 220-221). 
 
The salient resemblances in this example are the thickness, height and 
maturity of the trees. These salient resemblances are present in the 
objects which are subsumed under the concept on one hand, but the 
                                                          
25 See Rosch (1975) and (1981).  
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fact that these particular resemblances are deemed salient is a 
consequence of the shared interests and purposes of the language 
speakers, by, in the example, the use of the trees in house-building and 
boat-building…etc. It might be that for house-building trees we need 
height and thickness but not maturity; for boat-building, the maturity 
and the thickness is more relevant but not the height, and so on. The 
salient resemblances are justified by the interaction between the 
features of the things and the needs and purposes of the speakers.26 
This explains how some resemblances become relevant in forming 
family concepts. 27 
 
Gert holds a similar view, in as much as he thinks that children learn 
from their environment how to pick up the relevant similarities for 
family resemblance concepts, and that ‘we will only succeed in 
teaching the child this grouping if he already experiences the world in 
much the same way we do.’ (Gert, 1995, p. 184). In other words, the 
idea that ‘all those who share a language must be capable of 
recognizing the same family resemblances is one of the points 
Wittgenstein makes when he talks about forms of life.’ (Gert, 1995, p. 
184).We share the same form of life, and this is why we pick those 
similarities as relevant, and not others.28  
 
Each of these two answers recognises that we need an extra factor in 
order to explain how it is that we determine that particular 
resemblances or similarities are relevant to the classification of 
                                                          
26 Note that Bambourgh doesn’t address the objection directly. He was trying to 
explain what he takes Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ to be. However, as 
Bellaimey explains, Bambourgh’s reading of family resemblance seems to meet the 
objection by appealing to the interests and needs of the speakers.  
27 This, in turn, explains how our classification of the trees is different from the 
islanders’ because we have two different forms of life.  
28 Let me be clear here that there are different interpretations to what Wittgenstein 
means be ‘form of life’. I only focus on the answer given to objection 1, and how 
those commentators think of it as part of Wittgenstein’s appeal to the shared form 
of life of the linguistic community.  
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particular phenomena. Whilst Rosch identifies psychological 
principles as the key determinant, she doesn’t rule out the influence of 
the purposes and needs of humans in determining which similarities 
are relevant: ‘One influence on how attributes will be defined by 
humans is clearly the category system already existent in the culture 
at a given time.’ (Rosch, 2004, p. 93). However, it is, of course, open 
to her to claim that even the form of life present in a culture itself 
derives from the psychological principles of its members. In addition, 
although Rosch is clearly animated by Wittgenstein, she does not set 
out in any way to interpret his text. By contrast, proponents of the 
‘form of life’ hypothesis generally seek to justify their position on the 
basis of Wittgenstein’s writing.  
 
I do not intend to arbitrate between these two options here, but both 
seem potentially to provide the resources that interpretation C needs 
to counter objection 1 by explaining how the discriminations between 
relevant and irrelevant similarities or other relational factors might be 
made. As a result of this and the previous findings, it seems as though 
interpretation C will be able to answer all three initial objections, and 
is therefore to be preferred over both interpretation A and 
interpretation B.  
 
This allows us to consider the original question concerning 
Wittgenstein’s answer to the unity question, ‘do we (always) call 
different things by the same word because of a common feature?’ 
Interpretation C answers this question in the negative. Whilst 
Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of common feature concepts, 
he is nevertheless keen to emphasise that, for some concepts, rather 
than concept individuation being based on the possession of features 
that all examples share, we instead call different things by the same 
word because of different kinds of relations and affinities between 
members of the concept family. Interpretation C also makes it clear 
that exclusive focus on the role of similarities omits key aspects of 
concept formation. Instead, it proposes that similarity, although 
57 
 
important, be regarded only as one of a number of potential relations, 
along with mathematical relations, historical connections, and so on. 
Interpretation C also clarifies the potential confusion caused by 
Wittgenstein’s own term ‘family resemblance’. It regards focus on the 
genetic or causal implications of the term ‘family’ as potentially 
misleading, and favours instead the view that ‘family resemblance’ 
simply indicates a grouping formed in virtue of resemblance or 
similarity between members. On this reading, ‘family resemblance’ 
concepts are a subset of ‘family concepts’, the latter also including 
other groupings or families based on properties other than 
resemblance. 
  
Before concluding this chapter, however, I should clarify an important 
distinction which is often misunderstood in the secondary literature. 
This concerns the relationship between ‘family concepts’ and ‘open 
concepts’. My claim will be that conflation of the two misunderstands 
Wittgenstein’s text and represents a potential impediment to 
understanding Wittgenstein’s answer to the unity question.  
 
2. Family concepts and Open concepts  
 
Many commentators agree that Wittgenstein discusses the unity 
question in PI 65-80, and that he proposes that the notion of family 
resemblance should replace the search for common features in 
concepts (for example, Baker and Hacker (2005) and (2009)). In doing 
so, they describe these sections as the ‘chapter on family resemblance’. 
However, they also tend to associate ‘family concepts’ with what I will 
call ‘open concepts’, and I will argue that this is potentially 
misleading. On the face of it, it seems as though commentators follow 
this route because Wittgenstein cites the same examples in discussing 
both ‘family resemblance concepts’ and ‘open concepts’ in PI 65-80. 
 
Wittgenstein discusses the assumption that every word must be 
bounded by sharp boundaries once and for all in a number of different 
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places in the PI . For example, in PI 92, Wittgenstein writes, ‘We ask: 
"What is language?", "What is a proposition?" And the answer to these 
questions is to be given once for all; and independently of any future 
experience.’  The assumption that Wittgenstein identifies here is that 
answers to ‘what is X’ questions are to be determined once and for all, 
independent of any future experience, resulting in some kind of 
universal, timeless definition.  
 
Wittgenstein takes Gotlob Frege to require such a definition for ‘what 
is’ questions. In PI 71, he writes, ‘Frege compares a concept to an area 
and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot be called an area 
at all’. Frege explains, ‘A definition of a concept ... must be complete; 
it must unambiguously determine, as regards any object, whether or 
not it falls under the concept...Thus there must not be any object as 
regards which the definition leaves in doubt whether it falls under the 
concept... the concept must have a sharp boundary...a concept that is 
not sharply defined is wrongly termed a concept.’29 (Frege, 1960, p. 
159). I will call such definitions ‘universal’. 
  
In response, Wittgenstein argues that there might be concepts in OL 
which leave the boundaries open; I will call these ‘open concepts’. He 
suggests that not all definitions in OL need to be universal. For a 
definition to be universal, i.e. applicable to all possible cases, it must 
be applicable to cases which we haven’t faced yet, including novel or 
unpredictable situations. He offers an example:  
 
‘I say, "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and 
it suddenly disappears from sight?——"So it wasn't a chair, but some 
kind of illusion".——But in a few moments we see it again and are 
                                                          
29 Frege gives the following example, ‘[H]as the question ‘Are we still Christians?’ 
really got a sense, if it is indeterminate whom the predicate ‘Christians’ can truly 
be ascribed to, and who must be refused it?’ He requires sharp boundaries around 
the concept in order to define it. If we don’t draw these sharp boundaries, then we 
don’t know what we are talking about.  
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able to touch it and so on.——"So the chair was there after all and its 
disappearance was some kind of illusion".——But suppose that after 
a time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say 
now? Have you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one 
may use the word "chair" to include this kind of thing?’ (PI 80).  
 
Other ordinary language philosophers make a similar point. Here is an 
example from Austin which will be examined later in the thesis: 
‘Suppose I was asked if the bird which I see is a goldfinch, and I say 
‘‘I am sure it is a real goldfinch’, and then it does something 
outrageous, like explodes or quotes Mrs. Woolf... [In such a case] we 
don’t know what to say’. 30 (Austin, 1979, p. 88). 
 
Wittgenstein’s primary purpose is not to focus the discussion on 
whether something should or should not be considered a chair (or a 
goldfinch, in the Austin case). The issue is that in situations such as 
these I don’t know how to decide whether the 
disappearing/reappearing chair is a chair, or whether a Woolf-quoting 
goldfinch is a goldfinch or not. There are no rules to tell us what to say 
in such circumstances. This is precisely the dilemma we will face on 
occasion in ordinary language when we are presented by novel cases 
which invite us to decide whether or not we want to extend a concept 
to include the case at hand. Wittgenstein’s claim is that for some 
concepts in OL the boundaries are open, and we cannot tell whether or 
not a new phenomenon should be subsumed under the concept as it 
stands; a decision needs to be made.  
 
                                                          
30 There are many similar examples given by Wittgenstein, Austin and Frederich 
Waismann in different places. Waismann terms those concepts ‘open texture’ 
concepts in his paper ‘Verifiability’, see Waismann (1968.) The discussions on open 
concepts in the literature usually refer to that paper. Wittgenstein presents two 
cases using the word ‘personality’ in The Blue Book. See Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 62-
63. The three philosophers give almost the same account of open concepts, and for 
the same reason: to point out that there are no sharp boundaries in OL.  
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Closed concepts were supposed to tell us, for all possible applications, 
whether or not any given phenomenon could be subsumed under the 
concept, but it seems that in such cases the certainty inherent in the 
application of closed concepts cannot necessarily be brought to bear 
on the problem. According to Wittgenstein, open concepts are 
necessary because novel situations or phenomena may require the 
boundaries of application to be left open in order to accommodate their 
new features. As a result, the presumption that concepts need to be 
defined universally appears not to be warranted.31  
 
In the secondary literature, commentators tend to associate family 
resemblance concepts with open concepts to a greater or lesser extent. 
Richard J. Scalfani takes one of the strongest lines, stating that there 
‘is a strong indication that… the approximate equivalent of “open-
textured concept” [open concept] for Wittgenstein is “family-
resemblance concept”.’ (Scaflani, 1971, p. 340). Baker and Hacker 
write that ‘Wittgenstein asserts that family-resemblance concepts have 
no sharp boundaries.’ (Baker and Hacker, 2009, p. 216).  Sluga 
explains that, according to Wittgesntein, ‘family resemblance terms 
are typically open ended.’  (Sluga, 2006, p. 6). 
 
So far as Wittgenstein’s position is concerned, my claim is that in the 
two main passages which address open concepts, there are only two 
relatively humble claims: in PI 68 Wittgenstein simply states that 
some family concepts are open concepts, nothing more, and in PI 80, 
he states that ‘chair’ is an open concept; there is no reference to family 
concepts or to common feature concepts. If this is correct, there seems 
little justification for the stronger readings present in Baker and 
Hacker and Scalfani in particular.  
 
                                                          
31 It is important it to distinguish between vague concepts, concepts with borderline 
cases, and open concepts.  For a useful discussion on this point, see Baker and 
Hacker, 2009, p. 216 and 2005, p. 157. The focus here is on open concepts.  
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PI 68 starts with family concepts and moves to drawing sharp 
boundaries. Here is PI 68-a: 
 
‘"All right: the concept of number is defined for you as the logical sum 
of these individual interrelated concepts: cardinal numbers, rational 
numbers, real numbers, etc.; and in the same way the concept of a 
game as the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub-concepts.’  
 
The interlocutor accepts that there is no one common feature, but 
different kinds of relation in virtue of which we call different things 
by the same word, for some concepts such as ‘game’ and ‘number’.  
However, he rephrases Wittgenstein’s suggestion as a closed list of 
sub-concepts. Crucially, Wittgenstein objects to this rephrasing.  
 
‘It need not be so. For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in 
this way, that is, use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept, 
but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed 
by a frontier. And this is how we do use the word "game".’(PI 68)  
 
According to Wittgenstein, if a concept is defined as a closed list of 
sub-concepts, then it has sharp boundaries and it is not extendable. 
Since it includes only these sub-concepts, no new phenomenon can be 
added to it. However in OL, the concepts discussed, ‘number’ and 
‘game’, don’t have sharp boundaries. The conclusion is then the 
following: Don’t rephrase the notion of family concept as a closed list 
of sub-concepts, because this rephrasing would make it into a closed 
concept. The discussed concepts are not closed concepts, they are 
open.  
 
I suggest that Wittgenstein’s purpose is not to show that family 
concepts are identical with open concepts, or that common feature 
concepts are not open concepts. His objection in PI 68 is very specific: 
it is on the rephrasing of the notion of family concept as a closed list. 
If you understand a family concept as a closed list, then you treat it as 
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a closed concept. This need not be the case: some family concepts are 
open concepts in OL.  
 
Again, if we look at the other example of open concepts in PI 80, 
which we discussed above, it seems that the moral of the imaginary 
case of the chair is that we can’t tell if we would use the word ‘chair’ 
in that case. The concept is not regulated by rules for all the possible 
applications. However, there is no indication that chair is, or must be, 
a family resemblance concept. There is no reference at all to either 
family or common feature concepts in PI 80.  
 
So far as the issue of the unity problem is concerned, it also seems that 
both family concepts and common feature concepts can be ‘open 
concepts’. This is important because the association between ‘family 
concepts’ and ‘open concepts’ might incline investigators to think that 
the establishment of a particular concept as an ‘open concept’ will 
entail that it is also a ‘family concept’. However, this move is not 
warranted. A ‘common feature concept’ can accommodate novelty at 
least some of the time32, and therefore may also be regarded on 
occasion as an ‘open concept’. Equally, the fact that a particular 
concept is a family concept, does not necessarily mean that it will be 
easier to decide whether new phenomena fall under that concept or 
not. The issue of ‘open concepts’ is orthogonal to the unity problem, 
and associating ‘family concepts’ with ‘open concepts’ distorts the 
distinction between ‘common feature concepts’ and ‘family concepts’. 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 For example, M. Mandelbaum argues that photography was subsumed under the 
term ‘art’, precisely because ‘art’ is a common feature concept, and photography 
possessed the qualifying features. See Mandelbaum (1994). His article is a reply to 
M. Weitz (1994) influential article which argues that ‘art’ is a family concept 
because it is an open concept.  
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3. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I examined Wittgenstein’s answers to the unity question 
i.e. do we use the same word in different cases because the cases have 
something in common? We have seen that Wittgenstein proposes that 
for some concepts there need not be such a defining common feature, 
but there might be different kinds of relations and affinities. We term 
these concepts ‘family concepts’ in contrast to ‘common feature 
concepts’. 
 
In section 1, I examined three interpretations, and suggested that 
Interpretation C is closer to the text, and better resists the objections 
raised, than Interpretations A and B. Interpretation C answers the unity 
question in the negative. Whilst Wittgenstein does not deny the 
existence of common feature concepts, he makes it clear that for some 
concepts the possession of features that all examples share will not be 
the determinant of whether phenomena fall under that concept or not. 
Instead, he shows that we call different things by the same word 
because of different kinds of relations and affinities between members 
of the concept’s family. This interpretation also denies the exclusive 
role of similarities in determining qualifying members, and argues 
such a narrow reading is likely to distort interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s overall perspective on concept attribution. Instead, it 
proposes that similarity should be regarded as one of a number of 
potential relations, the others including mathematical relations, 
historical connections, and so on.  
 
Interpretation C also clarifies the potential confusion caused by 
Wittgenstein’s own term ‘family resemblance’. It regards focus on the 
genetic or causal implications of the term ‘family’ as potentially 
misleading, preferring instead the view that ‘family resemblance’ 
simply indicates a grouping formed in virtue of resemblance or 
similarity between members. On this reading, ‘family resemblance’ 
concepts are a subset of ‘family concepts’. The former restricts 
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qualification as members of the family to resemblance or similarity, 
whereas the latter, whilst allowing similarity, also includes other 
groupings or families based on relations or affinities other than 
resemblance. 
 
Interpretation C also recognises that, if it is to explain the way in which 
we have avoided the potential problem of over classifications raised 
by objection 1 (rather than merely assert that history shows we have 
done so), then some account of the way in which we seem able to 
discriminate between relevant and irrelevant relations must be offered. 
I discussed two possible theories but did not adjudicate between them.  
 
The result of these findings is that interpretation C seems best placed 
to meet the objections raised against interpretation A and 
interpretation B.  
 
Finally, I clarified the relationship between open concepts and family 
resemblance concepts, showing that one was not synonymous with the 
other and that even a weaker association between the two could be 
seriously misleading, particularly in the context of the unity problem 
where the distinction between ‘common feature concepts’ and ‘family 
concepts’ was critical. 
 
In chapter 1 I claimed that prominent ordinary language philosophy 
interpreters tend to view Wittgenstein’s work within the framework of 
the compatibility problem. I argued that such an approach, particularly 
if applied exclusively, risked misinterpreting Wittgenstein’s position 
on crucial issues, as well as potentially ignoring important lines in his 
thought. Instead, I proposed that key passages in his work should be 
seen as answering the unity problem, and, in the next chapter, I will 
focus on one of the central discussions in PI, that of ‘understanding’, 
and seek to show that it is better viewed through the lens of the unity 
problem rather than that of the compatibility problem. 
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Chapter 3 
Examples from Wittgenstein 
 
Introduction 
 
In seeking to understand Wittgenstein’s answer to the unity problem 
(i.e., ‘do we use the same word in different cases because of a common 
feature?’), I said that I would divide my analysis into two chapters. In 
the previous chapter, I examined Wittgenstein’s answer as it appears 
principally in PI 65-67. There we saw that Wittgenstein’s response to 
the interlocutor’s claim, that there must be something in common 
between all the cases we call X, is that for some concepts it is the 
presence of different kinds of relations and affinities, rather than any 
common feature, which is the determinant. We termed such concepts 
‘family concepts’ in contrast to ‘common feature concepts’. 
 
In this chapter, I examine Wittgenstein’s answer to the unity problem 
as it appears in the context of specific philosophical problems 
examined in the PI. I will focus in particular on his discussions of 
‘reading’ and ‘understanding’, and in doing so aim to accomplish two 
things. 
  
My first aim is to demonstrate the importance of the unity problem and 
its centrality for Wittgenstein by showing that it is tackled in some key 
passages in the PI. The in-depth analysis of these examples will, I 
hope, add a practical perspective to the more ‘theoretical’ discussion 
of the problem that took place in the previous chapter. My claim is that 
Wittgenstein wants to show that the assumption that there must be a 
common feature for these concepts in OL is not justified, and that he 
achieves this in practice by deploying both a negative and a positive 
approach. The negative method typically shows that proposed 
common features do not work in all cases, whereas the positive method 
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shows how such concepts need not possess common features and 
could instead be family concepts. 
  
My second aim is to show that Wittgenstein’s discussions on these 
concepts do not fit well into the model presumed by the compatibility 
problem. This is important because, as I observed in the first chapter, 
my claim is that the compatibility problem, which focuses on cases 
where philosophers say something which we would not say in OL, is 
often not the best lens through which to view Wittgenstein’s work. In 
the specific passages that I will examine, it seems that Wittgenstein 
thinks that what philosophers say is compatible with OL, but they are 
led into philosophical trouble explicitly because they look for a 
common feature in all uses.  
 
The reader will note that in what follows the terms ‘family 
resemblance concepts’ and ‘family concepts’ are used 
interchangeably, despite my having established a clear distinction 
between the two in the previous chapter. This is because the key 
comparison for present purposes is that between common feature 
concepts and the broad notion of family concepts (which have no 
necessary common feature), of which family resemblance concepts are 
a subset.  
 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘reading’ appears as a set of passages in 
its own right within his wider treatment of ‘understanding’. However, 
as we will see, the morals from ‘reading’ are intended to carry through 
into the discussion on ‘understanding’, and play a crucial and explicit 
foundational part in Wittgenstein’s complex position on 
‘understanding’. I therefore start my analysis by examining his 
treatment of ‘reading’. 
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1. ‘Reading’ 
 
Wittgenstein discusses whether the word ‘reading’ has one common 
feature which defines the concept in all its uses. At the start, though, 
he explicitly restricts the scope of activities that will count as ‘reading’ 
in his investigation: ‘[F]irst I need to remark that I am not counting the 
understanding of what is read as part of 'reading' for purposes of this 
investigation: reading is here the activity of rendering out loud what is 
written or printed; and also of writing from dictation, writing out 
something printed, playing from a score, and so on’ (PI 156). The 
question posed is whether we call these different activities by the word 
‘reading’ because of some common feature.33 
 
The typical pattern of exchange between Wittgenstein and his 
interlocutor on ‘reading’ goes as follows. The interlocutor proposes 
one definition after another which is supposed to capture the defining 
common feature, and Wittgenstein discusses each of them in turn. In 
each case he agrees that under certain circumstances the definition of 
‘reading’ that the interlocutor proposes works, but then gives a 
counterexample where we use the word ‘reading’ in a way which 
doesn’t fit with the interlocutor’s proposed definition. This I 
characterise as Wittgenstein’s negative approach, which is to be 
complemented by his positive approach in which he suggests that 
‘reading’ is a family concept, and not a common feature concept.34 
The two sides, as we shall see, are interrelated.  
 
                                                          
33 The example is atypical. One might ask why Wittgenstein does not count the 
understanding of what is read as part of 'reading'. It seems that the reason is that 
there is another deep connection between the discussion on ‘reading’ and the 
discussion on ‘understanding’, which is supposed to be revealed by this condition. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss such connection. I confine 
myself to discussing on the common feature.   
34 Wittgenstein gives ‘what is in common’ a sense of ‘feature’ or ‘characteristic’ or 
something akin to these terms. In what follows, he uses ‘characteristic’ in PI 154, 
‘criterion’ in PI 159, ‘definition’ in PI 162, and ‘meaning’ in PI 164, when he discusses 
whether there is something in common between all the cases of ‘reading’.  
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In section 1.1, I focus on the negative side before dealing with the 
positive side in 1.2. This lays the ground for, in 1.3, assessing whether 
Wittgenstein’s work on ‘reading’ fits better with the unity problem 
than with the compatibility problem.  
 
1.1. Two definitions of ‘reading’ –  the negative approach 
 
The first common feature definition offered by the interlocutor runs as 
follows: ‘the one real criterion for anybody's reading is the conscious 
act of reading,’ (PI 159). This definition suggests that a reader will 
always know that he is reading, and that he thus experiences different 
kinds of feelings to the person who is pretending to be reading. Those 
feelings are the ‘one real criterion’. Wittgenstein gives an example in 
PI 159 to support this definition in which he focuses our attention on 
the feelings of a man apparently reading.  
 
A man ‘learns a Russian sentence by heart and says it while looking at 
the printed words as if he were reading them.’ Wittgenstein continues, 
‘there are … many more or less characteristic sensations in reading a 
printed sentence… [Such as] sensations of hesitating, of looking 
closer, of misreading, of words following on one another more or less 
smoothly, and so on.’ Equally, though, there are ‘characteristic 
sensations in reciting something one has learnt by heart’, and in this 
example the man knows that he is pretending to read and also knows 
that he doesn’t have the characteristic feelings of reading, possessing 
instead the characteristic feeling of reciting by heart. In this thought 
experiment it appears as though the proposed criterion/definition 
works: reference to how the act feels seems to be the criterion by which 
we are able to distinguish between reading and reciting. 
 
However, in PI 160 Wittgenstein gives us two counterexamples to 
show that the first proposed definition will not work in all 
circumstances. The first is the following: ‘We give someone who can 
read fluently a text that he never saw before. He reads it to us—but 
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with the sensation of saying something he has learnt by heart (this 
might be the effect of some drug).’ In this case, the reader doesn’t have 
the characteristic feelings of reading we mentioned above, having 
instead the feeling of reciting by heart. Now, if it is the feeling that is 
the key criterion in determining whether his activity is to be described 
as reading or not, it seems as though we should say that he is not 
reading. However, this seems to run against our normal judgements 
about reading.  
 
The second example appears to demonstrate the opposite, describing 
a man who has the characteristic feelings of reading, but whom we 
would not normally take to be reading:  
Suppose that a man who is under the influence of a 
certain drug is presented with a series of characters 
(which need not belong to any existing alphabet), he 
utters words corresponding to the number of the 
characters, as if they were letters, and does so with all 
the outward signs, and with the sensations, of reading. 
(We have experiences like this in dreams; after waking 
up in such a case one says perhaps: "It seemed to me as 
if I were reading a script, though it was not reading at 
all.") 
 
In this case, the man has the required characteristic feelings of reading, 
but it is not clear that we would normally count him as reading.35  
 
Wittgenstein’s method here is to offer the reader an example that 
appears to confirm the initial common feature definition, but then to 
demonstrate through two counter-examples that this finding is not 
generalisable to all instances of reading. The implication is that the 
                                                          
35 Wittgenstein asks in the first counterexample whether the man is reading or not, 
but doesn’t give an answer. For the second, however, he does answer: ‘In such a 
case some people would be inclined to say the man was reading those marks. 
Others, that he was not.’  
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attraction of searching for and employing a common feature is 
misleading, and that such features will not bear the weight that will be 
placed on them if they are to be the defining criterion of a common 
feature definition. 
 
Wittgenstein then turns to his second definition. The initial claim here 
is that when I read an English word there is something distinctive 
about the spoken words: ‘[w]hat does the characteristic thing about the 
experience of reading consist in?—Here I should like to say: "The 
words that I utter come in a special way"’ (PI 165). To make this clear, 
compare the way you read the letter A with what happens when you 
are presented with an arbitrary mark. Wittgenstein invites us to notice 
how familiar the utterance of the letter A is, and how unfamiliar that 
of the arbitrary mark feels (PI 166). The claim is that it is this 
distinctive familiarity that distinguishes reading from not-reading: the 
familiarity marks the experience of reading.  
 
However, in a similar pattern to his treatment of the first definition, 
Wittgenstein, in PI 167-168, invites us to question the universal 
applicability of this kind of familiarity to cases of reading. He 
therefore gives us two examples of reading where there is no such 
familiarity. He asks us to think of Morse code (PI 167), or reading a 
text printed entirely in capital letters (PI 168). In these cases, we are 
reading but we don’t seem to experience the familiarity which is 
supposed to mark every case of reading. As a result it seems clear that 
the proposed definition doesn’t work. 
 
The lesson from these two negative examples is that it is extremely 
difficult to isolate features that will be present in every case of reading. 
Whilst such an approach seems to be intuitively attractive, is also the 
case that relatively easy to come up with examples that argue against 
any particular chosen common feature. As a result, the reader is invited 
to share Wittgenstein’s negative conclusion about recourse to common 
features, at least in the case of reading. This is not to say that the 
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proposed criteria are wrong in all cases – quite clearly they are not. 
The key point is that they are not correct in all cases, which they would 
need to be in order to qualify as common features.  
 
1.2. ‘Reading’ as a family concept – the positive approach 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen that, according to Wittgenstein, 
we might use the same word in different cases in virtue of different 
kinds of relations and affinities between them, not because of a single 
common feature. I called these concepts ‘family concepts’, in contrast 
to ‘common feature concepts’. In the context of ‘reading’, 
Wittgenstein writes: ‘[B]ut what in all this is essential to reading as 
such? Not any one feature that occurs in all cases of reading’ (PI 168). 
There is no single common feature which defines the concept, and 
instead of looking for such an element, he suggests that we ‘use the 
word “read” for a family of cases. And in different circumstances we 
apply different criteria for a person’s reading’ (PI 164). Wittgenstein 
thus takes ‘reading’ to be a family concept in virtue of which there are 
different kinds of relations which justify our use of the word ‘reading’ 
in different cases.  
 
What I suggest is notable about his method in his treatment of 
‘reading’ is that the positive and the negative sides are interrelated, 
and the combination of the two represents one of his approaches to the 
unity problem. The positive side is built on the work of the negative 
side, and is in fact a continuation of it. The negative side is the first 
part in which the interlocutor is looking for a defining common 
feature, and gives one proposed definition after another. In response, 
for each proposed common feature, Wittgenstein tries to show that it 
is unlikely to work for all cases, casting doubt on the possibility of 
uncovering a defining common feature. However, in exposing the 
deficiencies of the common feature approach, Wittgenstein shows that 
there are different features which appear in some cases but not in all, 
and this provides the platform for his positive claim that these features 
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constitute a family. In that sense, we see that the word is a family 
concept, and not a common feature concept36.  
 
The importance of these passages is that they show how Wittgenstein 
treats the common feature question in a concrete example. In addition, 
they shed light on the discussion on ‘understanding’, which is one of 
the most vital discussions in PI. My claim is that Wittgenstein inserts 
the passages on ‘reading’ into the middle of his discussion on 
‘understanding’ because he wants to use the finding that there need not 
be one common feature for ‘reading’ to prepare the reader for the 
conclusion that ‘understanding’, too, need not have one common 
feature. This is one of the reasons I will return to my examination of 
his work on ‘reading’ when discussing Wittgenstein’s treatment of 
‘understanding’. 
 
There are, however, a number of prominent interpreters who, despite 
the evidence adduced above, read these passages as an example of 
Wittgenstein’s work on the compatibility problem rather than the unity 
problem. In the next section I will examine whether their approach is 
warranted. 
 
1.3. ‘Reading’ and compatibility problem 
 
I pointed out in the first chapter that the main problem which OLP 
interpreters focus on is the compatibility problem, and that they tend 
to present Wittgenstein’s work as being mainly concerned with this 
problem. This problem arises when philosophers violate the rules of 
OL, when philosophers use language in a way that is incompatible 
with how we use it ordinarily. My intention here is to demonstrate that 
Wittgenstein’s work on ‘reading’, and later on ‘understanding’, does 
                                                          
36 A very similar discussion is to be found on ‘being guided’ in PI 172-178. 
Wittgenstein argues there that ‘being guided’ is a family concept.  
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not fit comfortably with this approach and should rather be viewed 
through the lens of the unity problem, as presented above. 
  
The most detailed, and perhaps the most prominent, presentation of 
Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘reading’ from the point of view of the 
compatibility problem is to be found in Peter Hacker’s commentary. 
Hacker’s conclusion on the discussion of ‘reading’ summarises his 
position nicely: ‘Being able to read is an ability, not a mental state or 
reservoir, from which the overt performance flows. Reading is the 
exercise of that ability; it is something defined not by inner processes, 
but rather by the public criteria in the various circumstances, that 
justify application of the term.’ (Baker and Hacker, 2005, p. 309). 
According to Hacker, Wittgenstein’s main aim is to show that 
philosophers violate the rules of OL, by taking ‘reading’ to be an inner 
process or state or experience. They should, instead, pay attention to 
the way in which ordinary language treats the word: were they to do 
so they would see clearly that ‘reading’ is an ability. 37   
 
As we shall see, in arguing for this conclusion Hacker states that for 
Wittgenstein inner processes or inner experiences are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for ‘reading’, although they might accompany 
‘reading’. I disagree with this reading. I find that close examination of 
Wittgenstein’s text reveals that inner processes or experiences can be 
constitutive of reading in virtue of qualifying as one of the different 
features which constitute the family. This last point is key to my 
disagreement with Hacker. Both I and Hacker allow that ‘reading’ 
might be a family concept, but we differ over whether inner processes 
are included in the family or not. Hacker thinks they should not be, 
                                                          
37 A similar reading for these passages on ‘reading’ is suggested by Glock and R. 
Fogelin. According to Glock: ‘Reading is the exercise of an ability, not the 
manifestation of mechanism, mental or biological’. (Glock, 1996, p. 374).  Fogelin 
gives a similar reading. See Fogelin, 1987, pp. 147-154. However, it is only in 
Hacker’s detailed commentary that we find the view explained fully. I will discuss 
Glock’s and Fogelin’s views on ‘understanding’ below.  
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whereas I read Wittgenstein as allowing them to be members, 
although, of course, membership does not equate with being necessary 
features. This difference is best explained in the context of our 
differing readings of the two definitions we examined above.  
 
Recall the first definition: ‘the one real criterion for anybody's reading 
is the conscious act of reading,’ (PI 159). Hacker comments on PI 159-
160 as follows:  
 
‘The experiences that accompany reading (or the experience of 
thinking one is reading) are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
reading. They are not criteria for reading, and their absence is 
not a criterion for not reading.’ (Baker and Hacker, 2005, pp. 
336-337). 
 
A similar treatment is offered for the second definition, in which the 
words we are reading are said to come to us in a distinctive way, with 
a feeling of familiarity, for example. Commenting on the second 
definition, Hacker writes that PI 165 discusses: 
 
‘[T]he thought that reading is a particular process, a 
special conscious activity of the mind. The words one 
reads … come in a special way … But again, no 
experiences of the way they come are either 
individually necessary, or jointly or disjunctively 
sufficient for reading. The fiction of the special way the 
words come, and the idea that reading is a quite 
particular but elusive process, are examined in §§165–
8.’ (Baker and Hacker, 2005, p. 309). 
 
Hacker takes the passages to show that the proposed definitions don’t 
work. Inner processes or inner experiences are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for ‘reading’; however, they might accompany ‘reading’. In 
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that sense, Hacker concludes that ‘reading’ is not an inner process or 
a set of inner experiences.  
 
We said that Hacker recognizes that one of Wittgenstein’s aims in 
discussing ‘reading’ is to show that it is not a common feature concept 
but is instead a family concept, and, in his commentary on PI 164, he 
states that ‘reading’ is indeed such a concept. (Baker and Hacker, 
2005, p. 339). However, he doesn’t relate this finding to his discussion 
of the two definitions above in a way that I think is satisfactory. His 
conclusion that ‘reading’ is not an inner process or a set of inner 
experiences is too strong. 
 
My position is that Wittgenstein should not be read so strongly 
because he is not trying to establish that the type of feelings discussed 
can never be qualifying features for reading. Rather than seeking to 
establish either necessary or sufficient conditions for reading he is, in 
his initial negative approach, instead merely seeking to show that what 
we had thought might be a necessary condition proves on examination 
to be no such thing. His negative approach, then, is intent on 
destabilising preconceptions regarding the essential nature of reading, 
using ordinary language to demonstrate that these do not hold water.  
 
And whilst Wittgenstein, as we saw earlier, also has a positive method 
which he applies to the problem, it again does not seem to be the sort 
that provides the evidence that Hacker needs to sustain his position. 
Thus, Wittgenstein does not question, in his negative phase, a 
particular claim concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
reading in order, in his positive phase, to come up with one of his own. 
Instead, his negative purpose is to show that the particular necessary 
and sufficient definition offered does not work (and, by implication, 
to suggest that we should question generally whether such a definition 
is likely to work), and his positive aim is to encourage us to view 
‘reading’ as a family concept, a type of concept which, by its nature 
(examined in the previous chapter), seems opposed to ruling out 
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particular features as being incapable of being the qualifying features, 
at least under specific circumstances.  
 
Viewed in this way, my conclusion is that Wittgenstein’s text and 
method argue against Hacker’s strong conclusion that the purpose of 
the passages is to show that the experiences or feelings that on 
occasion accompany reading can never be features of ‘reading’. It 
seems to me far more plausible to take Wittgenstein as saying that each 
of the features in the two proposed definitions cannot constitute a 
common feature of reading, but that they may be part of the family of 
defining features. 38  
 
Part of the reason that Hacker, in my view, takes such a strong reading 
of Wittgenstein is that he automatically views Wittgenstein’s text 
through the compatibility problem lens. In looking to find 
incompatibilities between the philosopher’s use of language and the 
way in which ordinary language actually works he is, I think, 
predisposed to rule in or rule out in general, and this, perhaps, leads 
him to read Wittgenstein, too, as ‘ruling out’ inner processes or 
feelings in the context of considering reading. However, I hope it is 
clear from the discussion above that this is unlikely to be 
Wittgenstein’s purpose. His approach is more subtle and suggestive, 
his aims principally being to cast doubt on the idea that reading is a 
common feature concept and suggests that it is, instead, a family 
concept. Looking at his work through the lens of the unity problem 
makes it much easier to appreciate this subtlety, and makes it far more 
difficult to make the mistake (and I think it is a mistake) that Hacker 
does in his reading. This, for me, demonstrates why the presumption 
that Wittgenstein’s text should be viewed through the lens of the 
compatibility problem is dangerous: it predisposes commentators to 
                                                          
38 As for Hacker’s conclusion that ‘reading’ is akin to an ability to do something, it 
doesn’t seem that Wittgenstein explicitly says that ‘reading’ is the exercise of an 
ability in PI 156-178.  However, I will address this below in relation to 
‘understanding’. 
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make judgements on Wittgenstein’s behalf that are, on occasion, too 
strong.  
   
I said earlier that, in many ways, Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
‘reading’ lays the groundwork for his treatment of ‘understanding’, 
and it is to this topic that I turn next.  
 
2. ‘Understanding’ 
 
In this section I examine Wittgenstein’s discussion on 
‘understanding’, principally in PI 151-154 and PI 179-183. The 
pattern of the discussion that follows, and many of its conclusions, 
largely mirrors what we saw earlier in the context of ‘reading’. One of 
the key questions discussed here is again the common feature question, 
whether there is one common thing in virtue of which we call different 
things by the same word ‘understanding’, and, as with ‘reading’ above, 
I will claim that Wittgenstein’s answer to this question is in the 
negative.  
 
The particular common feature investigated here is that of 
‘understanding’ being defined by a mental process. I will argue, in 2.1, 
that Wittgenstein shows that the definition may work in some cases, 
but not in all, defeating any ambitions we might have to make mental 
processes a common for ‘understanding’. Instead, I take Wittgenstein 
to suggest that mental processes can be part of the family of defining 
features, and that the concept is better understood as a ‘family 
concept’.  
 
In 2.2, I examine alternative readings and conclude that they are 
flawed, not least because of the presumption by some of the 
interpreters that the compatibility problem represents the best 
framework through which to interpret Wittgenstein’s work on 
‘understanding’. I will argue again that Wittgenstein’s discussion is 
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better framed by the context of the unity problem, and that my 
conclusions from 2.1 stand. 
 
In the last section, 2.3, I examine some of the implications of 
‘understanding’ being a ‘family concept’, looking in this context at the 
claims that it is an ability rather than a mental process. I conclude that 
this analysis demonstrates again the potentially distorting role that 
ignoring the importance of the unity problem in these passages can 
play. 
 
2.1. ‘Understanding’ – Wittgenstein’s position 
 
What we shall see is a similar approach to the one we have seen with 
‘reading’. Wittgenstein  agrees that under certain circumstances the 
definition the interlocutor proposes works, but then gives a 
counterexample where we use the word ‘understanding’ in a way 
which doesn’t fit with the interlocutor’s proposed definition. This is 
Wittgenstein’s negative approach, which is to be complemented by his 
positive approach in which he suggests that ‘understanding’ is a family 
concept. 
 
In PI 151 Wittgenstein introduces the problem; the problem is that 
philosophers take mental processes to be the common feature which 
defines ‘understanding’. For example, it seems that in a case of sudden 
understanding, a specific mental process happens in a flash; this 
constitutes understanding, and is reported by the exclamation ‘Now I 
understand’. Wittgenstein gives the following example: ‘A writes [a] 
series of numbers down; B watches him and tries to find a law for the 
sequence of numbers. If he succeeds he exclaims: “Now I can go on!”’ 
(PI 151). When someone understands the formula suddenly, in a flash, 
he exclaims ‘Now I understand’. The understanding of the formula is 
reported by the exclamation. ‘This capacity, this understanding, is 
something that makes its appearance in a moment’ (PI 151). In sudden 
cases of understanding, therefore, it seems that ‘understanding’ is a 
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specific mental process, such as the recognition of the formula in the 
case above.  
 
However, the key question is whether this mental process, the 
occurring of the formula, represents the defining feature common to 
all the cases of understanding how to continue the serious successfully, 
and the answer to this question is negative, as Wittgenstein now 
shows. 39   
 
In PI 155, Wittgenstein explains, ‘when he [B above] suddenly knew 
how to go on, when he understood the principle, then possibly he had 
a special experience [the occurring of the formula]’. It seems as if this 
special experience is the defining common feature which justifies B in 
saying that he understands, that he can go on. However, Wittgenstein 
continues: ‘for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an 
experience that justify him in saying in such a case that he understands, 
that he knows how to go on.’  
 
It therefore seems that we have two different views: the view that the 
occurring of the formula is the defining common feature for 
understanding the series, and the view that it is the specific 
circumstances under which the occurring of the formula occurred that 
justify B’s saying that he understands. To help to explain the 
differences between these two views, and what is meant by the 
circumstances which justify the claim of ‘understanding’, 
Wittgenstein then introduces the discussion on ‘reading’, stating 
explicitly, in PI 156, that ‘[T]his will become clearer if we interpolate 
the consideration of another word, namely "reading".’ And the clear 
message from my earlier interpretation of the discussion of ‘reading’ 
is that if ‘understanding’ turns out to operate in a similar manner to 
‘reading’, then the search for a common feature in all cases of 
                                                          
39 PI 152-154 discuss the issue from a different angle: looking for a hidden mental 
process. We don’t need to discuss this here.  
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‘understanding’ will not succeed, and that ‘understanding’ will turn 
out to be a family concept. I will revisit this issue shortly when I 
examine other prominent interpretations of both concepts. 
 
When Wittgenstein returns to his discussion on ‘understanding’ in PI 
179, he again uses the method we have seen him employ above in 
‘reading’, and for the same purposes. Wittgenstein examines the 
proposed common feature: the occurring of the formula in B’s mind. 
The question for Wittgenstein is, does someone who exclaims ‘Now I 
understand’ mean that the formula has occurred to him, as the 
interlocutor assumes? To answer this, Wittgenstein gives us two 
different examples, in 179-b and 179-c. 
  
In the first, Wittgenstein states that:  
 
‘[T]he words “Now I know how to go on” were correctly used 
when he [B above] thought of the formula: that is, given such 
circumstances as that he had learnt algebra, had used such 
formula before.’  
 
However, in the second example, Wittgenstein says that:  
 
‘We can also imagine the case where nothing at all occurred in 
B’s mind except that he suddenly said “Now I know how to go 
on” – perhaps with a feeling of relief; and that he did in fact go 
on working out the series without using the formula. And in 
this case too we should say – in certain circumstances – that he 
did know how to go on’. 
 
We are thus offered two different cases, where B exclaims ‘Now I can 
go on’ or ‘Now I understand’ in two different sets of circumstances. 
The main difference between them is that the formula occurs to B in 
179-b, but doesn’t occur to him in 179-c, where ‘he did in fact go on 
working the series without using the formula’. In PI 180 and 183, 
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Wittgenstein concludes from the comparison of the two examples that 
the words ‘Now I can go on’ or ‘Now I understand’ are used in two 
different ways in the two different examples. Wittgenstein writes in PI 
180: ‘It is quite misleading, in this last case, for instance, to call the 
words a “description of a mental state”. – One might rather call them 
a “signal”; and we judge whether it was rightly employed by what he 
goes on to do’.  
 
It is important to note that Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘the last case’ 
clearly refers to 179-c rather than the whole of 179, as some 
commentators presume (see the following section). In 179-c he is clear 
that ‘Now I understand’ is a signal, and because in that example the 
formula doesn’t occur to B, he concludes that it is quite misleading to 
call the words ‘Now I know how to go on’ a description of a mental 
state. This contrasts markedly with 179-b. 
 
In PI 183, Wittgenstein re-visits the example of continuing the series 
and asks, ‘did "Now I can go on" in case (151) mean the same as "Now 
the formula has occurred to me" or something different? We may say 
that, in those circumstances, the two sentences have the same sense, 
achieve the same thing.’ Since PI 179-b is a case of the subject uttering 
the words “now I know how to go on” on the basis of the formula 
occurring to him, it seems as though in both cases Wittgenstein has 
reach the conclusion that, in certain circumstances, the two sentences 
can be used interchangeably. However, Wittgenstein is equally clear, 
and this is his key point, that this will not always be the case: ‘in 
general these two sentences do not have the same sense.’ (PI 183). 
This, as we have seen, is borne out by 179-c, where the exclamation is 
not conceived of as a description of a mental process/state precisely 
because of the different set of circumstances.  
 
As a result, I claim we are entitled to draw the following conclusions. 
In considering whether the occurring of the formula is the defining 
common feature for all the cases of ‘understanding’, Wittgenstein has 
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considered two examples which, when analysed, demonstrate that the 
occurring of the formula, an inner process, is not necessary for 
‘understanding’ and therefore cannot constitute its defining common 
feature. Whilst 179-b shows that the proposed definition might work 
on occasion, 179-c represents a clear counterexample in which the 
occurring of the formula is not necessary for understanding. The 
conclusion is that the proposed common feature for ‘understanding’ 
fails in its ambition.  
 
I characterise the above examination as the negative side, where 
Wittgenstein argues that the proposed definition works in some cases, 
but not in all. Wittgenstein also suggests that ‘understanding’ is not a 
common feature concept, but it is a ‘family concept’, which represents 
the positive side of his approach. Wittgenstein writes: ‘Think how we 
learn to use the expressions "Now I know how to go on", "Now I can 
go on" and others; in what family of language games we learn their 
use.’ (PI 179). Wittgenstein thus takes ‘understanding’ to be a family 
concept, and not a common feature concept. 
What I suggest is an interpretation which connects the negative and 
positive side of his treatment of ‘understanding’, in the same way we 
have seen with ‘reading’, and the combination of the two represents 
one of his approaches to the unity problem. The positive side is built 
on the work of the negative side, and is a continuation of it. The 
negative side is the part in which the interlocutor is looking for a 
defining common feature, and proposes the mental process to be this 
feature. In response, Wittgenstein tries to show that the proposed 
definition is unlikely to work for all cases, casting doubt on the 
likelihood of uncovering a defining common feature. However, in 
exposing the deficiencies of the common feature approach, 
Wittgenstein shows that there are different features which appear in 
some cases but not in all, and this provides the platform for his claim 
that these features constitute a family. In that sense, we see that the 
word is a family concept, and not a common feature concept.  
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This concludes my examination of Wittgenstein’s passages on 
‘understanding’. In what follows, I will argue that some of the most 
influential interpreters misread the examined passages on 
‘understanding’. In 2.2, I will focus mainly on the negative side and 
the question whether ‘mental processes’ is part of the qualifying 
features of the family. In 2.3, I focus on the positive side and the 
implication of the notion that ‘understanding’ is a family concept’. 
 
2.2. Alternative interpretations - the negative side  
 
My reading of the three stages of the discussion on ‘understanding’ 
could broadly be summarised as follows. The first stage, PI 151-154, 
introduces the problem of looking at mental processes as a common 
feature. Wittgenstein ends this stage with the explicit remark that the 
discussion would be clearer after the discussion of ‘reading’. In the 
second stage, he goes on to discuss ‘reading’, stating that under 
different circumstances we count different characteristics as definitive 
of whether some activity counts as reading, and thus that there is no 
one defining common feature of ‘reading’, but, rather, that it is best 
thought of as a family concept. Returning to the issue of 
‘understanding’, he gives the reader two examples, one supportive and 
a counterexample, to show that the occurring of the formula or a 
mental process is not a feature common to all cases of ‘understanding’. 
 
A number of interpreters read these three stages differently. For some, 
they interpret the purpose of the first stage as being to demonstrate that 
‘understanding’ is not a mental process. Fogelin comments on this 
stage saying that ‘[t]he point … that Wittgenstein is making is that 
nothing occurring at the time of a performance shows that it is done 
with understanding; instead, we must appeal to the circumstances that 
surrounds the action to settle this question.’ (Fogelin, 1987, p. 147). 
Hacker takes a similar line, explaining this stage of the discussion as 
follows: 
 
84 
 
‘Wittgenstein describes what happens when one 
suddenly understands, specifying various 
accompanying processes. Now one might think that 
understanding is one of these… But none of these 
accompanying processes is either necessary or 
sufficient for understanding. Understanding is not a 
mental process at all. What warrants a person’s 
utterance “Now I understand!” is not an inner state or 
process that he observes in foro interno, but the 
circumstances of the utterance’. (Baker and Hacker, 
2005, pp. 306-307). 
 
Both interpreters conclude that Wittgenstein states that 
‘understanding’ is not a mental process, and that he suggests that what 
warrants an exclamation like ‘Now I understand’ are the 
circumstances of the utterance, not the presence or otherwise of any 
special experience or mental process. 
 
The crucial difference between their reading and mine concerns their 
representation of Wittgenstein as denying at this stage that 
‘understanding’ can be a mental process. Whilst I am happy to concede 
that the passages discussed show that ‘understanding’ need not be a 
mental process, Hacker’s and Fogelin’s claim is that it cannot. It is this 
stronger claim that I argue is unwarranted. After all, it certainly seems 
as though PI 155, as described by Wittgenstein, portrays a clear case 
in which recognition of possession of the formula (a mental state) 
justifies B in his assertion of his understanding. Thus, when 
Wittgenstein says that we need to look at the circumstances in order to 
judge whether the claim of understanding is warranted, it looks very 
much as though the possession of the formula can count as a qualifying 
feature. In other words, Hacker and Fogelin are not warranted in 
conflating Wittgenstein’s appeal to circumstances with the ruling out 
of mental processes or states: at the very least, nothing in his example 
shows that such states could not qualify as features. Hacker and 
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Fogelin have presumed a categorical distinction between inner 
processes and circumstances, but this is not explicitly argued for by 
Wittgenstein.  
 
In any event, Wittgenstein, as we have seen, states that the issue will 
become clearer after the second stage of the discussion, in which he 
addresses the topic of ‘reading’ before returning to the discussion on 
‘understanding’ in the third stage, and it is Hacker’s reading of the 
‘reading’ passages that is particularly important. As we saw earlier, 
Hacker takes the second stage to demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s 
purpose is to show that ‘reading’ is not an inner process, a position 
endorsed by Glock and Fogelin. The idea, according to Hacker, is that 
because of these interim conclusions generated by the discussion of 
‘reading’, when Wittgenstein returns to ‘understanding’ the reader 
will, as a result, be ready to see that ‘understanding’, too, is not a 
mental process. The determination that ‘reading’ is not an inner 
process or an inner experience but rather an ability to do certain things 
is therefore crucial to Hacker’s wider view of ‘understanding’, and 
thus the strength of the arguments made in support of his position on 
‘reading’ must, to a significant degree, also bear the weight placed on 
them by his similar position on ‘understanding’.  
 
In the previous section I argued that Hacker’s reading is inaccurate. I 
diagnosed his presumption that Wittgenstein was concerned with the 
compatibility problem as a key determinant of his over-strong reading 
of Wittgenstein’s examples, and that his conclusion that inner 
processes or experiences could never be part of the family of the 
qualifying features for ‘reading’ was unwarranted. As a result, my 
view is that Wittgenstein’s insertion of the discussion on ‘reading’ is 
intended to show the reader a case that closely parallels understanding 
and from which the reader is encouraged to see that it is possible for 
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mental processes sometimes to represent a qualifying feature.40 
Therefore, when the reader enters the third stage of the discussion of 
‘understanding’, her expectations will be different from those claimed 
by Hacker and Fogelin. 
 
Nevertheless, independent of the preparatory work done by the 
discussion of ‘reading’, stage three, as we saw, has its own content. In 
order to determine precisely what Wittgenstein is saying at this point, 
I suggested that we have to pay attention to the subtle differences 
between PI 179-b and PI 179-c, and explicitly read PI 180, where 
Wittgenstein says that ‘Now I understand’ is a signal, as referring 
solely to PI 179-c (the ‘‘last case’’).  
 
Baker and Hacker and Fogelin also distinguish in their commentary 
between the two cases when discussing PI 179,41 but they appear to 
ignore the difference between the cases when it comes to reading PI 
180. Thus, they each reach the conclusion that ‘Now I understand’ is 
not a report of a mental process, as if Wittgenstein in PI 180 were not 
commenting on just 179-c. Instead, they generalize the conclusion 
from PI 180 to all cases of someone uttering ‘Now I understand’, and 
thus conclude that this exclamation is not a description of a mental 
process. Hacker writes that ‘“Now I can go on!” does not mean “The 
formula has occurred to me” ... We should rather consider the 
exclamation to be a signal of understanding (PI §§ 180, 323)’. (Baker 
and Hacker, 2009, p. 368). According to Fogelin, ‘Wittgenstein 
suggests that the expression “Now I know how to go on” is not a report 
of my mental condition, but rather a signal. Whether the signal is 
                                                          
40 It is important to note that whilst Wittgenstein, in PI 156-178, PI 151-155 and PI 
179-183, discusses different kinds of inner processes and experience, for Hacker 
and Glock none of the inner experiences or inner processes or mental processes 
discussed is considered constitutive of ‘reading’ or ‘understanding’. Hacker, for 
example, discusses in separate sections why ‘understanding’ is not an inner 
experience and why it is not a mental process. See Baker and Hacker, 2009, pp. 367-
375. 
41 See Baker and Hacker, 2005, p. 351 and Fogelin, 1987, p. 153. 
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correctly or incorrectly employed is borne out by what the person goes 
on to do’. (Fogelin, 1987, p. 153). Given the clear distinction between 
179-b and 179-c, and Wittgenstein’s apparently explicit reference to 
the latter in 180, this is a difficult move to justify.  
 
In addition, it also appears as though their generalization can only be 
made if the commentators ignore Wittgenstein’s suggestion in PI 183 
that the exclamation might be a description of a mental process in 
some cases: ‘But did "Now I can go on" in case (151) mean the same 
as "Now the formula has occurred to me" or something different? We 
may say that, in those circumstances, the two sentences have the same 
sense, achieve the same thing.’ But it seems as though this is precisely 
what Baker and Hacker do. They comment on PI 183: ‘It is slightly 
curious inasmuch as W. has already argued at length that the two 
sentences do not have the same meaning’. (Baker and Hacker, 2005, 
p. 354). This remark betrays Baker and Hacker’s polarised reading of 
Wittgenstein’s purpose. It seems far more plausible to me that 
Wittgenstein’s aim is subtler, and that he is seeking to show, 
principally, that there is no common feature to ‘understanding’, and 
therefore that the two sentences will not always have the same 
meaning. However, and this is the subtlety that Baker and Hacker 
ignore, he equally acknowledges that, under specific circumstances, 
they may be equivalent, and this is the point that he is making clear in 
PI 183. Given that 183 occurs almost immediately after 179, and given 
that one of the two cases in question precisely mirrors that discussed 
in 179-b, it is difficult not to think that Wittgenstein is referring to 179-
b.  
 
PI 179, therefore, offers both a case where a mental process might be 
a feature of understanding (179-b) and a case where it clearly is not 
(179-c). Given this, Baker and Hacker’s generalisation seems 
unwarranted. As a result, I take the third stage of the discussion on 
‘understanding’ to underwrite the conclusions already reached 
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concerning inner processes and ‘reading’, namely, that the search for 
a common feature is likely to end in disappointment.  
 
However, Wittgenstein’s discussion is not restricted to showing that 
mental processes need not be the common feature of understanding. 
Just as in the case of ‘reading’, he also proposes an alternative in the 
shape of the ‘family concept’. We will see in the next section that this 
interpretation has more support amongst commentators, although 
there are still areas of disagreement.  
 
2.3. Alternative interpretations - the positive side  
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein suggests that an 
alternative to the common feature account is one in which examples 
are subsumed under the concept in question, rather than possessing 
such a single distinguishing feature instead share different kinds of 
relations and affinities in virtue of which they are referred to by the 
same word. This type of concept I termed a ‘family concept’. I argued 
that ‘reading’ is such a concept and that Wittgenstein intends us to 
draw a similar conclusion regarding ‘understanding’. In particular, I 
argued that mental processes, whilst neither necessary nor sufficient 
in every case, qualify as features of this family concept 
‘understanding’. 
 
However, some commentators argue for a different reading.  They 
argue that, whilst it is possible to read Wittgenstein as characterising 
‘understanding’ as a family concept, inner and mental processes are 
not (ever) one of the features of this family. Prominent amongst these 
interpreters are Glock, and Baker and Hacker. Glock writes that 
Wittgenstein ‘may have … held that linguistic understanding and other 
types of understanding, like understanding people or AESTHETIC 
understanding, are connected by overlapping similarities.’ (Glock, 
2009, p. 374). In other words, Glock allows that ‘understanding’ might 
be a family concept. Baker and Hacker agree that Wittgenstein largely 
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dispels the idea of ‘understanding’ being a common feature concept: 
‘one may plausibly claim that understanding utterances, music, 
painting, women, politics, life, etc. have no common properties in 
virtue of which they are all cases of understanding’. (Baker and 
Hacker, 2009, p. 223). However, they leave open the issue of whether 
Wittgenstein regarded ‘understanding’ as some sort of family concept: 
Wittgenstein ‘does not explicitly commit himself to the view that it 
[understanding] is a family-resemblance term.’ (Baker and Hacker, 
2009, p. 385). 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, though, they argue that even if 
‘understanding’ is, or might be, a family concept, Wittgenstein does 
not regard it as a mental process. Baker and Hacker write: ‘[W]e must 
distinguish, as Wittgenstein later did, between the phenomenological 
accompaniments that may accompany understanding something said 
or read and the understanding’. (Baker and Hacker, 2009, p. 223). For 
them, the inner processes or the mental processes that might be present 
in cases of ‘understanding’ simply are never qualifying features of 
‘understanding’. Glock has a similar reading. He explains that: 
 
‘Understanding is neither a mental nor a physical event, 
process or state. This is not to deny that there may be 
characteristic mental or physiological 
‘accompaniments’ of understanding, it is to deny only 
that these constitute our understanding.’ (Glock, 2009, 
p. 374). 
 
This issue concerning whether mental processes or phenomena may or 
may not on occasion qualify as features of ‘understanding’ is almost 
identical to the dispute discussed in section 1 concerning ‘reading’. 
Hacker, in particular, clearly carries through his stance from ‘reading’ 
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to ‘understanding’, 42 and, perhaps not surprisingly, my objections to 
his stance on ‘understanding’ are similar to those I raised against his 
position in the earlier context.  
 
In particular, I take the view that Wittgenstein is not seeking to show 
that mental or inner processes can never be qualifying features for 
‘understanding’: that would be too strong a reading. Instead, in his 
initial negative approach, he is intent on showing that what we might 
have thought was a necessary condition for ‘understanding’ turns out 
not to be. In other words, the occurring of the formula is not necessary 
for an event to be considered a case of ‘understanding’, as 
demonstrated by the counterexample in 179-c. However, as in the case 
of ‘reading’, it also seems clear that Wittgenstein offers examples that 
support the idea that mental processes can be the qualifying feature for 
‘understanding’, in the right circumstances. Thus, in cases like PI 179-
b, if the person in question ‘had learnt algebra’ and ‘had used such 
formulae before’, then the occurrence of the formula is reported by the 
exclamation ‘Now I understand’, and the mental process reported 
qualifies as a valid feature of ‘understanding’. 
 
And, again, it seems clear to me that Wittgenstein does not adopt his 
negative method, just so that he can offer an alternative common 
feature in its place. Rather, his purpose is to demonstrate that both 
‘reading’ and ‘understanding’ are not common feature concepts, his 
consequent positive method suggesting that they are both better 
regarded as family concepts. Under such a construal, it seems likely 
that mental processes would qualify as one of the many features that, 
in the right circumstances, could constitute ‘understanding’.  
 
                                                          
42 Fogelin’s text is less detailed. On the one hand he, unlike Hacker and Glock, 
doesn’t hesitate to attribute to Wittgenstein the view that ‘understanding’ is a 
family concept: he writes that the ‘examination of instances [of understanding] 
reveals…a family of loosely interrelated cases’ (Fogelin, 1987, p. 152). However, he 
doesn’t include inner processes in the family. 
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However, there are two potential issues that my reading may have to 
address. The first of these concerns Wittgenstein’s use of the term 
‘accompaniments’ in connection with the mental processes or feelings 
that he (and Hacker and Glock) recognises are present on occasion in 
cases of ‘understanding’. I have to acknowledge that, ceteris paribus, 
the term generally implies a lack of centrality, and it is clearly this 
connotation that Hacker and Glock pick up on. However, if one takes 
the view that Wittgenstein’s purpose is to negate the claim that 
understanding is always a mental process, and that mental processes 
are not the common feature present in all cases of ‘understanding’, 
then it is possible to see Wittgenstein’s use of this particular term as a 
rhetorical device aimed at characterising mental processes as 
peripheral rather than central, thereby questioning and destabilising 
the framework of the common feature presumption, rather than ruling 
mental processes out as qualifying features under all circumstances.   
 
In any event, far more important than a debate over semantic 
implications is the proper analysis of the case which we have been 
explicitly discussing (179-b and 179-c), where Wittgenstein directly 
compares two cases of ‘understanding’. Here, there is no mention of 
the term “accompaniments”. Instead, we are given, in 179-b, what 
Wittgenstein presents as a bona fide case of understanding in which 
the presence of a valid mental process is central. By contrasting this 
instance with 179-c, he shows that the case in which mental processes 
justified the use of the term ‘understanding’ cannot be generalised to 
all cases. But there is no suggestion that the presence or otherwise of 
mental processes are somehow not directly relevant. Indeed, it seems 
that their presence or otherwise is Wittgenstein’s particular focus, and 
constitutes the essence of his argument in showing that they are not 
necessary in all cases. It seems to me, therefore, that Hacker and Glock 
have placed too much emphasis on the term ‘accompaniments’, 
generalising beyond its context in a way that is not warranted, and 
failing, in my view, to recognise Wittgenstein’s main intentions and 
argument in these passages.   
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The second area for comment concerns the idea that ‘understanding’, 
and ‘reading’, are abilities. As we have seen above, this notion is used 
by commentators to argue against the idea that mental processes could 
ever be qualifying features for ‘understanding’. Hacker’s reading of 
the passages on ‘understanding’ is that they should be taken to show 
that Wittgenstein thought that ‘understanding’ is not a mental process 
but, rather, an ability. Hacker writes:  
 
‘[P]hilosophy is concerned with questions that require, 
for their resolution or dissolution, the clarification of 
concepts and conceptual networks … These concepts 
are constituted by the sense-determining rules for the 
use of the words we use … So, for example, 
“understanding is an ability, not a mental state or 
process” is tantamount to the grammatical explanation 
that to say that someone understands something is not 
to say what mental state he is in or what process is 
taking place in his mind, but to indicate something he 
can do.’ (Hacker, 2009, p. 143-144). 
 
According to Hacker, Wittgenstein clarifies the sense-determination 
rules for the use of ‘understanding’ and draws the conclusion that it is 
nonsensical to say that ‘understanding’ is a mental process or state, 
suggesting instead that ‘understanding’ should be conceived of as an 
ability.  
 
A key reason given by Hacker for this conclusion is Wittgenstein’s 
treatment of the exclamation ‘Now I understand’ discussed earlier. 
Hacker is adamant that Wittgenstein’s purpose here is to provide 
evidence in support of his contention that understanding is not a 
mental process. Thus, Hacker writes that ‘“Now I can go on!” does not 
mean “The formula has occurred to me” ... We should rather consider 
the exclamation to be a signal of understanding (PI §§ 180,323)’. 
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(Baker and Hacker, 2009, p. 368). Hacker therefore takes Wittgenstein 
to have set out rules, based on our ordinary language, for the use of the 
concept ‘understanding’, and to have drawn the conclusion that 
‘understanding’ is not a mental process based on examples that 
demonstrate that to regard ‘understanding’ as a process that is taking 
place in the mind violates those rules. 
 
Glock takes a similar line, both on Wittgenstein’s method and his 
specific position in relation to ‘understanding’. He represents 
Wittgenstein’s method as consisting in tabulating rules which prevent 
us from violating the bounds of sense: ‘Grammatical rules … 
determine the prior question of what it makes sense to say ... [The 
function of these rules] is to draw attention to the violation of 
linguistic rules by philosophers, a violation which results in nonsense.’ 
(Glock, 1991, pp. 77-78). 
 
So far as his opinion on Wittgenstein’s stance on ‘understanding’ is 
concerned, the entry under ‘understanding’ in Glock’s Wittgenstein 
dictionary reveals the following conclusion: ‘[U]nderstanding is 
neither a mental nor a physical event, process or state.’ (Glock, 1996, 
p. 374). Glock explains that ‘linguistic understanding is an ability … 
the mastery of the techniques of using words in countless speech 
activities.’ (Glock, 1996, p. 376). As for the exclamation ‘Now I 
understand’, he takes PI 179-181 as a whole to show that ‘it is not a 
description or a report, but an AVOWAL of understanding.’ (Glock, 
1996, p. 374). 
 
In the same vein, R. Fogelin comments on the passages we examined, 
concluding  that understanding is ‘not an occurrent mental state, 
because understanding involves an ability to do various things which, 
whatever mental state we may happen to be in, we may not be able to 
perform when called upon to do so’. (Fogelin, 1987, p. 152). 
According to him, ‘Wittgenstein suggests that the expression “Now I 
know how to go on” is not a report of my mental condition, but rather 
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a signal. Whether the signal is correctly or incorrectly employed is 
borne out by what the person goes on to do’. (Fogelin, 1987, p. 153). 
 
Whilst not all the commentators cited above comment explicitly on 
Wittgenstein’s method, and whilst their individual interpretations of 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of “Now I know how to go” have subtle 
differences, their common claims can, I think, fairly be represented as 
follows. Firstly, Wittgenstein’s writing is best viewed through the lens 
of the compatibility problem. He is seeking to establish rules for the 
employment of particular terms based on ordinary language usage, and 
violations of these rules will be shown as nonsense. Secondly, 
‘understanding’ should not be equated with a mental process, but 
should instead be regarded as an ability.43  
 
My position on these conclusions is similar to that presented in the 
analysis of ‘reading’. I argue that it is both more plausible and more 
productive to regard Wittgenstein’s writing on ‘understanding’ as 
focused on the unity problem rather than the compatibility problem, 
and that the proposal that ‘understanding’ should be regarded as an 
ability and not as a mental process represents too strong a reading of 
Wittgenstein’s text and turns out, again, to be a by-product or 
consequence of the compatibility problem presumption.  
 
In fact, I am happy to concede that understanding is an ability precisely 
because I regard its being so as orthogonal to the issue under 
discussion.44 According to my analysis above, there are different 
features of ‘understanding’, and abilities and mental processes are 
some of them. In seeking to set up an exhaustive disjunction, mental 
                                                          
43 Similar readings are presented in Pitcher (1964) and Hallett (1977). 
44 Wittgenstein writes in PI 150: ‘The grammar of the word "knows" is evidently 
closely related to that of "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that of 
"understands". ('Mastery' of a technique)’. 
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process or ability, Glock and Hacker interpret beyond what is 
warranted by the text itself, and do so because they focus on the 
compatibility problem: seeking to identify instances where 
philosophers misuse ordinary language. But Wittgenstein’s purpose in 
these passages is, I claim, better seen as focusing on the unity problem, 
for the reasons argued above.  
 
Viewed through this perspective, the apparent exhaustive disjunction 
is dissolved: both ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’ may be described as 
abilities without ruling out mental processes as potential qualifying 
features. Indeed, it is worth noting that regarding ‘reading’ and 
‘understanding’ as abilities tout court runs the risk of licensing the idea 
that being an ability is a common feature and ‘reading’ and 
‘understanding’ are, therefore, both common feature concepts, a 
notion Wittgenstein clearly has set his sights against throughout these 
passages. Again, it seems as though downplaying the unity problem, 
or presuming the compatibility problem, has caused these 
commentators to ignore the finer grained issue of whether features 
may be necessary or simply sufficient on occasion, an issue that would 
be highlighted were they to view Wittgenstein’s writing through the 
lens of the unity problem.  
 
In case this conclusion might still be in doubt, recall Hacker’s 
insistence that we should consider the exclamation “Now I know how 
to go on” to be a signal of understanding. I showed earlier that his view 
simply generalises from 179-c and ignores the more powerful 
counterexample of 179-b, in which it seems perfectly clear that 
Wittgenstein recognises that, under specific circumstances, mental 
processes can be the qualifying feature for ‘understanding’. As implied 
by my earlier commentary, it is difficult not to read Hacker as forcing 
the text somewhat to conform to his own presuppositions. 
 
As a result, I conclude that Wittgenstein’s text and method argue 
against Hacker’s strong conclusion that the purpose of the passages 
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discussed is to show that the mental processes or feelings that on 
occasion accompany ‘reading’ or ‘understanding’ can never be 
features of ‘reading’ or ‘understanding’. It seems to me far more 
plausible to take Wittgenstein as demonstrating that the common 
feature view that such features are necessary for an act of ‘reading’ or 
‘understanding’ cannot be sustained, but that this finding in no way 
entails that mental processes can never be qualifying features. 
 
I showed earlier how, in the context of ‘reading’, Hacker’s 
preoccupation with finding inconsistencies or incompatibilities 
between the philosopher’s use of language and the way in which 
ordinary language actually works generally inclines him to take a 
somewhat black-and-white approach of ruling in or out absolutely. 
This, in turn, leads him often to interpret Wittgenstein as following a 
similar polarising line. As a consequence, in the context we have been 
discussing, he paints Wittgenstein as ruling out absolutely mental 
processes as features of ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’ precisely 
because, for him, the only alternative would be to rule them in as 
necessary features, something we all agree Wittgenstein is against. 
The text, however, does not support the strength of this interpretation 
and the exhaustive disjunction, as I have argued. Instead, I regard it as 
more plausible to take Wittgenstein to be following a softer and more 
subtle line, simply seeking to show how to negate common feature 
claims, whilst allowing that mental processes, may be qualify as 
members of the family of features that make up ‘reading’ and 
‘understanding’.  
 
3. Conclusions 
 
In the introduction, I said that the two main aims of this chapter were, 
firstly, to show the importance of the unity problem for Wittgenstein 
in the context of specific, prominent examples from his work, and, 
secondly, to substantiate my earlier claim that his treatment of these 
concepts does not fit well into the model presumed by the 
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compatibility problem. The analysis above has shown that the unity 
problem is central to his discussion of ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’ 
in that his primary purpose is to demonstrate that the assumption that 
there must be a common feature for these concepts is not justified, and, 
instead, that these concepts are family concepts.  
 
In doing so, I highlighted the two sides to Wittgenstein’s method: one 
negative and the other positive. Wittgenstein’s work on the negative 
side is designed to show that the proposed definition need not work 
for all cases, but may still work for some. In both ‘reading’ and 
‘understanding’ this approach is evident, and consists in 
Wittgenstein’s offering a counterexample to the proposed common 
feature alongside an instance that supports it. The purpose of this is 
twofold: the counterexample shows that the presence of the feature 
under examination is not a necessary condition for a phenomenon to 
be subsumed under the concept. The supporting example, however, 
allows that such a feature might, nevertheless, under specific 
circumstance, be the qualifying feature. This lays the groundwork for 
the second stage, the positive approach, in which Wittgenstein 
suggests that the concept in question is better conceived of as a family 
concept, phenomena falling under the concept in virtue of their 
possessing features which are not necessary but which overlap, and 
are related to, those of other members in the appropriate way.  
 
Note that Wittgenstein does not explicitly specify the particular 
relations that obtain between different cases of ‘understanding’ or 
‘reading’ that make them family concepts. We saw that this leaves 
room for some commentators, such as Glock and Hacker, to interpret 
him as saying that the examined concepts might be family resemblance 
concepts. However, I think this stronger reading is not justified by the 
text, and I prefer to claim only that the more generic term ‘family 
concept’ applies here.  
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I also highlighted the influence that the presumption of the 
compatibility problem, in which it is assumed that the focus should be 
on philosophers saying something which we would not say in OL, has 
on the way in which Wittgenstein is read in the passages analysed. I 
showed in his discussions on ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’ that his 
focus is not on the claim that what philosophers say is incompatible 
with OL. I argued against Hacker’s strong conclusion that the purpose 
of the passages discussed is to show that the mental processes or 
feelings that on occasion accompany ‘reading’ or ‘understanding’ can 
never be features of ‘reading’ or ‘understanding’, and diagnosed the 
problem with his approach as stemming from his (compatibility 
problem) preoccupation with finding inconsistencies or 
incompatibilities between the philosopher’s use of language and the 
way in which ordinary language actually works. This, I claimed, 
generally predisposed him to take a somewhat absolutist approach, 
leading him to impute a similar polarising line to Wittgenstein. This 
resulted in his portraying Wittgenstein as ruling out absolutely mental 
processes as features of ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’ precisely 
because the only alternative would be to rule them in as necessary, 
something we all agree Wittgenstein is against. I have argued that this 
strong interpretation is not supported by the text and that one should, 
instead, see Wittgenstein as simply seeking to show how to question 
common feature claims, whilst allowing that mental processes may 
qualify as members of the family of features that make up ‘reading’ 
and ‘understanding’.  
 
Overall, therefore, it seems clear that Wittgenstein’s focus in these 
important examples is on the unity question, and that a preoccupation 
with viewing his work through the lens of the compatibility problem 
is likely to lead to misinterpretation and a failure to acknowledge an 
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important aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that has wider 
ramifications. 45 
 
This concludes my examination of Wittgenstein’s treatment of the 
unity problem. In the next two chapters I examine Austin’s approach 
to the same question. My analysis will follow a similar pattern to that 
taken in the treatment of Wittgenstein, in that I will, in chapter 4, 
examine the theory behind Austin’s position before, in chapter 5, 
analysing his treatment of specific examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 I find a similar issue regarding ‘thinking’, PI 317-341, where I take it that 
Wittgenstein wants to show that inner processes are part of the family of features 
of thinking, meanwhile commentators such as Hacker, Glock and others take 
Wittgenstein to show that ‘thinking’ is not an inner process.  
If my reading is accurate, then it will change the way we understand Wittgenstein’s 
work on psychological concepts, the inner / outer and the issue of behaviourism in 
Wittgenstein’s writings.  Many philosophers find Wittgenstein’s work to be 
behaviourist. And it seems to me that the above commentators give a behaviourist 
reading to the text, because their reading excludes inner and mental processes 
from the features of ‘reading’, ‘understanding’ ‘thinking’…etc. My reading is not 
behaviourist, since it includes inner and mental processes into the constitutive 
features of reading, understanding, thinking…etc. I don’t have space to follow the 
issue further, but it is one of the interesting results of the above examination.  
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Chapter 4 
Austin and the unity question 
 
Introduction 
This chapter and the next address Austin’s work on the unity problem. 
Austin is generally considered one of the main figures in OLP, along 
with Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Strawson, and most interpreters, as we 
saw in the first chapter, tend to portray these four philosophers as 
focussing on the compatibility problem, cases where philosophers say 
something which we would not say in OL in the discussion of various 
philosophical problems (such as the mind-body problem, the nature of 
truth etc,), identifying it as a common source of philosophical 
difficulties.  
In this thesis I argue that this reading is too restrictive and that 
interpreting their thought in this way tends to understate or miss their 
contribution to important elements of OLP. My claim is that the 
problems that they are concerned to expose are often significantly 
different from the characterisation given by such interpreters. In the 
cases of Austin and Wittgenstein, in particular, I claim that viewing 
their writing exclusively through the lens of the compatibility problem 
leads commentators to neglect a particular thread in Austin’s and 
Wittgenstein’s writings in which they identify a different problem: 
what I badge the ‘unity problem’. The unity problem arises when we 
look for one common thing in all of the cases in which the same word 
is used, and it is this presupposition that Austin and Wittgenstein show 
can lead to philosophical trouble.  
In chapter 2 I examined Wittgenstein’s treatment of the unity question 
as it appears, for instance, in the passages PI 65-67. Here, Wittgenstein 
argues that there need not be one common thing in virtue of which we 
use the same word in different cases, but rather that there might be 
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different kinds of relations and affinities between such cases. We term 
these concepts ‘family concepts’, in contrast with ‘common feature 
concepts’. In chapter 3, I examined concrete examples from the PI in 
the context of discussing specific philosophical problems, where 
Wittgenstein tries to show that each concept he discusses need not 
have something in common in all its uses. 
In the analysis of Austin in the next two chapters I will follow a similar 
pattern to that taken with Wittgenstein. In this chapter I principally 
examine Austin’s answer to the unity question, relying on 
reconstructions and extracts from his works and writings. In the next 
chapter, I study Austin’s application of this answer in the context of 
discussing specific philosophical problems, in particular his 
discussions on ‘real’ and ‘truth’. Throughout both chapters I attempt 
to be as faithful as possible to Austin’s writing, but rendering his 
account completely systematic in the way that is necessary to illustrate 
the key points made in these two chapters has its difficulties and 
requires a little interpretation at times. In particular, it is not possible 
to have complete certainty regarding all of the detail of the three key 
distinctions that he makes in relation to grammatical function and 
meaning, due to a level of inconsistency and some gaps in his writing. 
However, I indicate explicitly where any licence is taken.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 1, I introduce the 
unity problem as Austin sees it. Then, in section 2, I examine early 
Austin’s treatment of the question. In sections 3 to 7, I examine later 
Austin’s treatment of the question. Finally, in section 8, I draw some 
conclusions. 
1. The problem introduced 
The unity problem raises the following question: Is there something in 
common between all of the cases for which we use the same word? 
According to Austin, as we shall see, philosophers give the following 
answer: There must be something in common in virtue of which we 
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use the same word in different cases. Austin scrutinises this answer 
and argues that in OL things are more complicated than this.   
 
He starts by distinguishing between two kinds of words: words that 
have one meaning, and words that have multiple, unrelated meanings. 
In his examination of the different uses of ‘real’, Austin points out that 
this word ‘does not have one single, specifiable, always-the-same 
meaning... Nor does it have a large number of different meanings - it 
is not ambiguous, even “systematically.”’ (Austin, 1962, p. 64). 
According to Austin, there are words that have always-the-same-
meaning, like ‘yellow’ or ‘horse’, and, on the other hand, there are 
ambiguous words like ‘bank’, which can mean either a financial 
institution or the edge of a river. These are completely different 
meanings.46 There is, nevertheless, a middle ground between these two 
kinds of words. According to Austin, many philosophers neglect that 
third kind. He writes; ‘If we rush up with a demand for a definition in 
the simple manner of Plato or many other different philosophers, if we 
use the rigid dichotomy “same meaning, different meanings”… we 
shall simply make hashes of things.’47 (Austin, 1979, p. 74). The root 
cause of the problem, as Austin sees it, is that philosophers don’t study 
OL. If they did, they would see that many words have a number of 
different but related meanings. 
 
However, as we shall see, there are differences between early Austin 
and later Austin. Although the question is the same, the notion of ‘what 
is in common’ or ‘one meaning’ is used in two different ways in his 
writings. Early Austin seems to define it as ‘the one entity the word 
names’. Later Austin, however, uses it as the ‘one feature or 
characteristic…etc.’ which is common between all of the cases for 
which we use the same word. The change in how this idea is used is 
                                                          
46 ‘Yellow’ and ‘horse’ are Austin’s examples; ‘bank’ is mine.  
47 Austin takes Plato to be committed to the search for one meaning for each word. 
Elsewhere, he also contrasts this with Aristotle. 
103 
 
related to the development of Austin’s work, and, accordingly, he 
gives two different answers to the unity problem. Early Austin argues 
that in OL, there need not be something in common in terms of what 
the word denotes. Later Austin argues that there might sometimes be 
something in common on an ‘abstract’ level, but that there also are 
many differences, which philosophers ignore, at the ‘concrete’ 
contextual level. I will explore each of Austin’s answers in detail.   
 
2. Early Austin on the unity question 
Early Austin introduces the question and identifies the problem as a 
commitment to the doctrine of naming. In 2.1, I will explain what the 
doctrine states, and in 2.2 I examine early Austin’s objections to it. 
2.1. The doctrine of naming 
The doctrine, which Austin identifies as essentially stemming from a 
problematic presupposition regarding how individual words function 
in OL, states the following: All individual words are proper names, 
words name objects, and every word is correlated with one object, 
which is the meaning of the word. Austin writes that ‘there is the 
curious belief that all words are names, i.e., in effect proper names, 
and therefore stand for something or designate it in the way that a 
proper name does.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 69). According to Austin, then, 
there is an assumption that all words function in the same way as 
proper names, designating objects in the world. Every proper name 
denotes one object in the world.48 Austin seeks to question whether 
concept-words function in this manner. 
                                                          
48 This is what I take from Austin’s early articles on proper names: that every proper 
name denotes one object in the world. It seems that Austin endorses this view on 
proper names in his early writings. However, here he was not interested in proper 
names in themselves, only mentioning them in his discussion on universals and 
concepts. He discusses proper names later in ‘How to Talk’. For our purposes we 
are only interested in the doctrine and its effect on concepts. 
104 
 
Austin notices that concepts are usually explained by reference to 
universals. For this reason he examines first the nature of a universal. 
The standard understanding goes as follows: ‘It is assumed that we do 
“sense” things, which are many or different… [and] we make the 
practice of calling many different sensa by the same single name.’ 
(Austin, 1979, p. 33). He continues; ‘since we use the same single 
name in each case, there must surely be something “there” in each 
case: something of which the name is the name: something, therefore, 
which is “common” to all sensa called by that name. Let this entity, 
whatever it may be, be called a “universal”.’ (Austin, 1979, pp. 33-
34). Since we call different things by the same name, it is suggested, 
there must be something identical between all of these cases. This 
common thing is the universal, for which the word stands. Austin 
explains that this is applied to any object of ‘acquaintance’. It doesn’t 
make any difference, for the doctrine, whether these things are 
material objects or what is known as ‘sense data’, or even non-
sensuous. He then explains that there is a ‘suppressed premise which 
there is no reason whatever to accept, that words are essentially proper 
names’. (Austin, 1979, p. 38). According to this premise, each proper 
name denotes one object, and since all words are essentially proper 
names, each individual word stands for one object. This premise leads 
us to the notion that there must be something in common between all 
the cases for which we use the same word. A concept-word thus names 
one entity, the universal.  
To summarise, the suppressed premise is that all words are proper 
names, and that each individual word stands for one ‘entity’ in the 
world. Therefore, concept-words also function as proper names, and 
each concept-word stands for one ‘entity’. But we use concept-words 
in different cases, so there must be something in common between all 
the cases in which we use the same concept-word. This object, the 
common thing, is the abstract entity, the universal, which the concept-
word names. The object that the word names is the meaning of the 
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word. According to the doctrine, then, each individual word denotes 
one thing, and thus has one meaning.49 
2.2. The early objections 
In objecting to the above approach, early Austin retains the 
denotational framework, but denies that each individual word denotes 
one thing. His target at this stage, therefore, is not specifically the unity 
question in all its guises, but the unity question insofar as it is sustained 
by the idea that words must always denote a single object. For Austin, 
the position is more subtle than this notion, and he seeks to show that 
some words denote different kinds of things, in different ways, and 
that such words might have a number of different but related 
meanings. He asks, ‘why, if “one identical” word is used, must there 
be “one identical” object present which it denotes? Why should it not 
be the whole function of a word to denote many [different kinds of] 
things?’ (Austin, 1979, p. 38). Thus, instead of postulating one entity, 
the universal for which the concept-word stands, Austin suggests that 
some words might denote many different kinds of things. He thinks 
that there are many ‘different kinds of good reasons to call different 
things’ by the same word. (Austin, 1979, p. 70). In what follows, I 
examine briefly four examples given by Austin to support the idea that 
there need not be one meaning, one entity, that a word denotes in all 
of it uses.50  
The first example is taken from Aristotle: the word ‘healthy’.51 Austin 
writes that ‘[w]hen I talk of a healthy body and again of a healthy 
                                                          
49 What I called ‘the doctrine of naming’ was discussed by many philosophers at the 
time. See, for example: Carnap, 1967, p. 97, Wittgenstein’s PI passage 1, and Ryle’s 
‘Theory of Meaning’, Ryle (1963). Different objections to the doctrine are raised 
from different points of view. It would be interesting to follow the issue and compare 
the different objections. However, I confine myself to Austin’s objections.  
50 Austin gives seven reasons in ‘The Meaning of a Word’; here I discuss the four 
clearest.  
51 Here, I confine myself to explaining what Austin takes Aristotle to say. Whether 
Austin’s reading is accurate or not is not relevant for us. 
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complexion, of healthy exercise: the word is not just being used 
equivocally.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 71). He then explains that there is a 
primary nuclear sense of ‘healthy’52, the one used for a healthy body; 
‘I call this nuclear because it is “contained as a part” in the other two 
senses, which may be set out as “productive of healthy bodies” and 
“resulting from a healthy body”.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 71). Austin thus 
claims that the word doesn’t have just one meaning in all its uses, but 
three different meanings. His objection to the doctrine of naming, 
therefore, is that its proponents should not claim that a word always 
has one and the same meaning, namely the one ‘entity’ the word 
denotes.   
Some might be tempted to object that the common nuclear entity is the 
element that all three uses have in common and is the entity that the 
word names. Austin’s point, however, is that this cannot tell the full 
story. Whilst the nuclear element is indeed contained in the other 
meanings, claiming that this abstract entity is what each of the 
different uses means cannot tell anything like the full story of meaning, 
since it would mandate that all three uses had the same meaning, the 
nuclear one. The nuclear element allows the three meanings to be 
related and yet not identical.  
The second example covers words such as ‘youth’ and ‘love’, ‘which 
sometimes mean the object loved, or the thing which is youthful, 
sometimes the passion “Love”, or the quality “youth”’. (Austin, 1979, 
p. 73). Austin maintains that the two uses clearly have different 
meanings not one, and that there is no one ‘entity’ that the word names 
in the two uses. Equally, though, he thinks that this is clearly not a case 
of simple ambiguity, since the two uses are not unrelated. 
The third example is very close to Wittgenstein’s notion of family 
resemblance (which we examined in the second chapter) in which a 
                                                          
52 Later in the chapter we will see that the nuclear word is something of a prototype 
for Austin's treatment of dimension words. 
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network of similarities exists between the different cases rather than 
each case denoting a common object. According to Austin, it is the 
former rather than the latter which justifies our using the same word 
in these different cases. As Austin puts it: ‘Another case is where I call 
B by the same name as A, because it resembles A, C by the same name 
because it resembles B, D… and so on. But ultimately A and, say, D 
do not resemble each other. This is a very common case: and the 
dangers are obvious, when we search for something 'identical' in all of 
them!’ (Austin, 1979, p. 72). Again, the presupposition of the doctrine 
of naming is shown to be false in that there is no one common object 
denoted in all cases. 
Austin’s fourth example focuses on words such as ‘fascist’: ‘[T]his 
originally connotes, say, a great many characteristics at once: say x, y, 
and z. Now we will use “fascist” subsequently of things which possess 
only one of these striking characteristics.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 72). In that 
case, we don’t use the word because there is something identical 
between all cases of its use, some one entity the word denotes. The 
doctrine assumes that there is one abstract ‘entity’ the word names, but 
there is no one common thing named in all the cases here. Rather, we 
use the word in situations where one of the many characteristics of 
‘fascist’ might apply.  
Early Austin’s general contention in the context of the doctrine of 
naming is therefore that there need not be one identical thing/abstract 
entity the word names in all its uses. In each example, the word has 
different related meanings, a phenomenon which the doctrine seems 
unable to account for due to its central presumption that there is one 
meaning for each word and that this is the entity which the word 
denotes. He suggests widening the investigation to incorporate a study 
of the ‘different kinds of good reasons to call different things by the 
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same word’ in OL, and is confident that this would show us that the 
doctrine of naming is wrong53.  
Austin’s question was ‘why, if “one identical” word is used, must there 
be “one identical” object present which it denotes? Why should it not 
be the whole function of a word to denote many [different] things?’ 
(Austin, 1979, p. 38). He has answered this by showing that when we 
use the same word in different cases, the word need not denote one 
entity. Instead, it has different related meanings and might denote 
different kinds of things, in different ways. 54  
Later Austin, however, shifts his target from the doctrine of naming 
and its focus on a single entity determining meaning, and instead 
addresses the unity question in a different manner, examining the 
assumption that ‘what is in common’ is instead the ‘one common 
feature, or characteristic’ which defines the use of a word. However, 
it is only against the background of early Austin’s initial remarks about 
‘what is in common’ that we can fully understand the depth and 
importance of this later work. In sections 3 to 7, I set out later Austin’s 
answer to the unity question.  
 
                                                          
53 See Austin, 1979, p. 38 and pp. 69-74. 
54 Austin relates this discussion to an ‘historical dispute’: the nominalist-realist 
dispute on universals. See Austin 1979, p. 70. According to Austin, the realists 
think that there must be something in common: ‘some entity or other to be that of 
which the “name” is the name’ (Austin, 1979, p. 69). This is the universal. The 
nominalist replies that the reason that we call different things by the same word is 
that they are similar. Austin notes that it is always open to the realist to respond to 
this by saying that they are similar in ‘a certain respect, and that can only be 
explained by the common feature’. (Austin, 1979, p. 70). For Austin, the 
nominalist’s reply is not satisfactory. He suggests that we examine the linguistic 
facts where we will see different reasons to call different things by the same word. 
There is nothing identical, but to say that there is similarity is also misleading.  
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3. Later Austin on the unity question 
Later Austin makes two distinctions that are fundamental to his answer 
to the unity problem. The first distinguishes between the grammatical 
function of a word and its meaning, and the second between two types 
of meaning that the word might possess. The grammatical function is 
the role of the word, e.g., to name, to exclude, to adjust, and words can 
be typed by their grammatical function (excluder words, adjuster 
words and so on). Meaning, on the other hand, involves two levels: 
what Austin terms ‘abstract meaning’/‘semantic function’ and 
‘specific meaning’. The former, in virtue of being abstract, might well 
be consistent across uses of the word in different contexts and cases, 
whereas the latter is likely to vary depending on the circumstances and 
contexts in which the word is used.  
These distinctions underpin the later Austin’s stance on the unity 
question, and also explain its development. Whilst the early Austin 
showed that words need not name one thing, he nevertheless presumed 
the framework in which naming was the sole function of a word. The 
purpose of the later Austin’s focus on the grammatical function is to 
show that such a framework is too restrictive and does not reflect the 
way words work: words may have many different grammatical 
functions, and, in certain cases, multiple grammatical functions at the 
same time. Thus, for later Austin, a consideration in answering the 
unity question was understanding and identifying the grammatical 
functions of words.  
So far as meaning is concerned, by giving up the framework of naming 
the later Austin is able to expand the list of factors to be considered in 
answering the question of what words might have in common beyond 
simply the object denoted, and to include in addition ‘characteristic’55, 
                                                          
55  See Austin, 1962, p. 70. 
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‘criterion’56, and ‘account’57. The unity question is then to be put in 
the following way: does the word have one meaning/something in 
common, in all its uses, whatever its function is? As we will see, by 
introducing the two levels of meaning, the later Austin is able to show 
that the answer to this question is both positive and negative. Yes, it 
may have something in common at the abstract/semantic function 
level, and no, it need not have anything in common at the concrete 
level that takes into account context. For Austin, it is the presence of 
this abstract level that leads philosophers into both the commitment to 
a common feature, and the misleadingly polarised dichotomy ‘one 
meaning/different meanings’.  
In what follows, in this chapter and in the next, we will see that he is 
at pains to show that this abstract level is extremely thin and will not 
bear such weight, and it is often the misplaced reliance by philosophers 
on the substance of this layer that can be identified as the culprit in 
generating philosophical problems. Austin instead shows that the 
focus in determining meaning should predominantly be on the 
concrete level, but that this poses severe difficulties for the unity 
problem because the specific meaning will vary depending on context 
and will typically not provide a common specific meaning.    
In sections 4 to 6 of this chapter I examine three kinds of words that 
Austin discusses in his later writings, words that he terms ‘adjuster-
words’, ‘trouser-words’, and ‘dimension words’ respectively. The 
analysis will proceed through the lens of the three level model, looking 
at the three levels in turn, and clarifying and expanding the general 
points made above. In doing so, Austin’s stance on the unity question 
will become apparent. However, the vehicle of the three level 
framework is something of a reconstruction based on Austin’s writing, 
rather than an explicit device that he overtly employs. It therefore 
                                                          
56  See Austin, 1962, p. 76.  
57  See Austin, 1962, p. 83.  
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needs to be handled with care, not least because in Austin’s work not 
every level is given equal treatment in the discussion of each kind of 
word, and therefore a little “gap filling” is occasionally required. 
Nevertheless, I will demonstrate that the model is a valid 
representation of his explicit and implicit position, and, where I have 
to fill gaps, I will explain my reasoning.    
   
4. Trouser-words 
The first kind of word which I will examine is what Austin terms 
‘trouser-words’. I will start with the grammatical function in 4.1, 
before turning to the two levels of meanings in 4.2. 
4.1. Grammatical function 
Trouser words have a complicated and slightly counterintuitive 
grammatical function. To explain this, I start with Austin’s distinction 
between positive looking words (such as ‘real’, ‘freely’, ‘voluntarily’, 
‘advertently’, ‘intentionally’, and so on) and negative looking words 
(such as ‘unreal’, ‘involuntarily’, ‘inadvertently’, ‘unintentionally’, 
and so on). He says that the affirmative use of the term is usually basic; 
‘to understand “x”, we need to know what it is to be x... [and] knowing 
this apprises us of what it is not to be x’. (Austin, 1962, p. 70). In other 
words, the positive looking word has a positive meaning and is basic, 
and the negative looking word is a negation of the positive one. The 
negative looking word thus doesn’t add anything by itself, it only rules 
out the possibility of the positive looking one. 
However, some words work in the opposite way, and these he terms 
‘trouser-words’. Austin explains; ‘it will not do to assume that the 
“positive” word must be round to wear the trousers; commonly enough 
the “negative” (looking) word marks the (positive) abnormality, while 
the “positive” word… merely serves to rule out the suggestion of the 
abnormality.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 192). Words such as ‘real’, ‘free’, and 
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‘directly’ work in this way. While they are positive looking words, 
they serve merely to negate a contextually implicit negative looking 
word. Thus, the word that wears the trousers, has the positive meaning, 
is the implied negative looking word. This is best understood by 
looking at the examples Austin offers, starting with ‘real’.  
According to Austin, ‘a definite sense attaches to the assertion that 
something is real... only in the light of a specific way in which it might 
be... not real.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 70). For example, the phrase ‘a real 
duck’ is used to rule out the possibility of an apparent duck being a 
dummy, a toy, a picture, a decoy, etc. In this use of ‘real’ as a ‘trouser-
word’, ‘real’ has nothing positive itself to add, but only excludes the 
possibility of something being unreal. 
Another example is the word ‘directly’; ‘it is essential to realize… that 
the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the trousers - “directly” takes 
whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite.’ (Austin, 
1962, p. 15). For example, you can contrast ‘seeing directly’ with 
‘seeing through a periscope’, or ‘seeing something in the mirror’, or 
‘seeing the shadow on the blind’. Or, again, you can contrast ‘hearing 
the music directly from inside the concert hall’ with ‘hearing it from 
outside the hall’. In all of these cases, ‘directly’ is used to rule out the 
possibility of something being perceived indirectly, but has nothing 
positive to add in itself. To perceive something directly is thus to rule 
out the possibility of perceiving it indirectly.58 
‘Free’ is another example; ‘[w]hile it has been the tradition to present 
this [free] as the “positive” term requiring elucidation, there is little 
doubt that to say we acted “freely”... is to say only that we acted not 
un-freely... Like “real”, “free” is only used to rule out the suggestion 
of some or all of its recognized antithesis’. (Austin, 1979, p. 128). 
                                                          
58 All the above examples on ‘real’ and ‘directly’ are from Austin’s S & S. 
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From these examples we can see that in the case of trouser words the 
positive looking word is not in fact the one that leads in determining 
the meaning: that role is taken by the negative looking word. What 
Austin is showing is that there is no a priori reason why the positive 
looking words should “wear the trousers”, and that in the cases he 
discusses they clearly do not. Instead, the positive looking word 
functions as an excluder, ruling out one, or some, or all of its 
opposites59.  
There is an obvious potential objection to Austin’s position. How is a 
‘trouser-word’ different from other kinds of words, which are not 
‘trouser-words? Doesn’t being ‘red’, for example, exclude being green 
or yellow, etc.? An answer to this objection is given by Roland Hall in 
his article on ‘excluders’. Hall explains Austin’s position on the 
difference between an excluder and what he calls a ‘simple predicate’, 
such as being ‘red’. 60 ‘It may not be clear why “bare” is an excluder 
and “red” not, since it might be maintained that “red” could be defined 
as not-green, not-blue, etc.’61 (Hall. 1959, p. 5). The difference is the 
following: ‘whereas “red” would be a genuine predicate even if it 
could be defined negatively, “bare” is an excluder because it must be 
defined negatively.’ (Hall, 1959, p. 5). Excluders do not have positive 
meanings by themselves; they can only be defined negatively, in the 
sense of saying what they exclude. While a simple predicate, such as 
‘red’, might be defined negatively, it also has a positive meaning by 
itself, and we can define it by this positive meaning. In other words, a 
simple predicate has a positive meaning independent of such a 
                                                          
59 One of the difficulties in immediately understanding Austin's account of trouser 
words is that the word he badges ‘trouser word’ (the positive looking word that 
merely excludes) is not the one that wears the trousers (this being its (often 
contextually implicit) opposite, the negative looking word). 
60 It seems that Hall’s account of excluders is wider than that given by Austin: an 
excluder is any word which excludes its opposite, and doesn’t add anything positive 
by itself. Austin focuses mainly on words that look positive, but which exclude their 
opposites; these are ‘trouser-words’. See Hall (1959). 
61 ‘Bare’ is one of Hall’s examples of excluders. 
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negative construction – it does not need to be defined as ‘not-green’, 
‘not blue’, etc... Excluders are different, Hall contends, in that they can 
only be defined by their opposites, not possessing themselves an 
independent positive meaning.  
To summarise then, the grammatical function of a ‘trouser-word’ is to 
rule out the possibility of its opposite(s) in a particular context. Its 
import for Austin in the discussion of specific philosophical problems 
is that it challenges the assumption that the ‘positive looking word’ 
must always be the one to which philosophers pay attention, and, when 
we ask philosophical questions such as ‘what is real?’ and ‘what is 
freedom?’, it is likely that we will need to understand what is excluded 
and the context in which this exclusion arises. This latter point is 
explored further in the discussion below.  
4.2. Meaning - The semantic function and different 
specific meanings 
Austin explains why a trouser-word need not have one specific 
meaning by suggesting that there are two levels of exclusion. The first 
level is the exclusion of different kinds of things; the second level 
concerns the exclusion of different cases of the same kind of things. 
Again, this is best explained with the help of examples, starting with 
“real”. 
According to Austin, ‘the function of “real” is not to contribute 
positively to the characterization of anything, but to exclude possible 
ways of being not real - and these ways are both numerous for 
particular kinds of things, and liable to be quite different for things of 
different kinds.’ (Austin, 1979, pp. 70-71). He offers examples of the 
former first. ‘“A real duck” differs from the simple “a duck” only in 
that it is used to exclude various ways of being not a real duck - but a 
dummy, a toy, a picture, a decoy, &c.; and moreover I don't know just 
how to take the assertion that it's a real duck unless I know just what, 
on that particular occasion, the speaker has it in mind to exclude.’ 
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(Austin, 1962, p. 70). Thus, the phrase ‘a real duck’ potentially 
excludes many different things, but only if I knew the specific situation 
would I know which one of the different things is excluded.  
Take another example. A ‘real knife’ might be used to exclude 
different ways of being not-a-real-knife; for example, being a ‘real 
knife’ would exclude being a toy knife for a doll’s kitchen, or might 
even exclude being a small knife in situations where what you need is 
a big knife, or a dull knife if you need a very sharp one, and so on.62 
Being a ‘real duck’, or a ‘real knife’, excludes different things. There 
is no one way of being not-real for any specific type of thing: it is the 
context that determines what is specifically excluded, and therefore 
what being “a real x” means.  
In addition, there are different ways of being not-real for different 
kinds of thing. Being a ‘real knife’, for example, is different from 
being a ‘real duck’, and different again from being a ‘real diamond’, 
which might exclude being a rhinestone or a piece of glass in costume 
jewellery.63  
In an important indication of his stance on the unity question, Austin 
comments further, saying that the above examples shows ‘why the 
attempt to find a characteristic common to all things that are or could 
be called “real” is doomed to failure.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 70). Because 
we use ‘real’ to exclude many different kinds of things, and many 
different variations of any given kind of things, it doesn’t have one 
defining characteristic in all of its uses. 
‘Real’ is not the only example available to us. Any of the trouser words 
listed earlier, such as ‘directly’, will pattern in the same way, yielding 
                                                          
62 Austin mentions ‘a real knife’ in a different context, where he states that ‘real’ 
might be a dimension-word, as I will explain below. However, the different ways of 
being not a ‘real knife’ are my examples.  
63 The example is from Austin, 1962, 67. 
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the same moral. In all of these examples, there is no one characteristic, 
feature or criterion which helps us to understand the word in all of its 
uses. 
However, whilst this means that, in the context of the three level model 
discussed earlier, almost all of the meaning of a trouser word seems to 
be determined by the context of its use (the second level of meaning), 
asserting that such words have no abstract level (the first level of 
meaning) would be going too far, and Austin is clear in rejecting such 
a view. Austin’s explanation of the way in which the word ‘real’ works 
is more sophisticated and suggests that there is, in fact, something in 
common between cases of ‘realness’ on one level, but nothing in 
common on another level; ‘[I]t is this identity of general function 
combined with immense diversity in specific applications which gives 
the word “real”… the baffling quality of having neither one single 
'meaning', nor yet ambiguity, a number of different meanings.’ 
(Austin, 1962, pp. 70-71). Although Austin is not explicit about which 
‘function’ is meant here, the ‘grammatical function’ or the ‘semantic 
function’, it seems almost certain that we should take ‘function’ here 
to mean the ‘semantic function’ (i.e., the first level of meaning). 
Austin is clearly talking about ‘real’, rather than trouser words in 
general, and the ‘general function’ that provides a common identity is 
that which covers all the cases of the application of real, not all the 
cases of trouser words.  
Thus, it is the abstract meaning/semantic function which Austin 
describes as ‘general’, and it is this thin abstract level which is shared 
between all the cases in which we use the same trouser word. 
However, as we have seen above, the work is done at the concrete level 
where the word may have many different specific meanings when used 
to exclude its opposite. The ‘abstract meaning’ alone cannot be used 
to determine what is excluded, its function being almost entirely 
restricted to the merely taxonomic, i.e., providing a general identity 
sufficient to differentiate it from other words but insufficient to 
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determine, in anything other than that differentiating, its meaning. 
Thus, in the context of determining what words have in common and 
the advisability of using that common factor as the basis for analysing 
philosophical problems, Austin is clear. The different uses of the same 
word do have something in common, but it is far too abstract and 
ephemeral to give us a proper sense of how it works. For this, we must 
turn our attention to the use of the word in its specific context. In the 
case of trouser words, this will determine for each use the specific 
negative looking word that the positive looking trouser word excludes. 
For each trouser word the range of possible contexts of use, and 
therefore possible meanings, is vast.  
In summary, trouser words have a complicated and novel grammatical 
function in which the positive looking word, despite being described 
as a trouser word, does not in fact wear the trousers. The work is done 
by the (often implicit) negative word. So far as the meaning of trouser 
word is concerned, this cannot be determined to any useful degree 
without attention to the context of use. Although, in terms of the three 
level model, trouser words have something abstract in common that 
differentiates the sum of their uses from that of other trouser words, 
this abstract level is unable to contribute substantially to the 
determination of the meaning of the trouser word in any specific usage. 
Instead, meaning is almost entirely determined by the particular 
negative looking word that the specific context of employment 
generates. It is the context that picks out the precise negative looking 
word from the enormous range of possible opposites to the positive 
looking trouser word.  
Thus, to summarise the analysis of trouser words using the specific 
vehicle of the three level model: they have a complicated and novel 
grammatical function that places the weight in terms of meaning 
determination on the context, for it is this that will determine the 
specific word that wears the trousers. Trouser words also have an 
abstract layer (or semantic function), but this is thin and serves merely 
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to provide type identity. The second layer of meaning, the concrete or 
contextual, is extremely rich and is the principal factor in determining 
meaning in any specific use of the trouser word. As a result, 
approaches to philosophical problems that rely principally on the 
presence of a common feature in all uses of the word under discussion 
are likely to encounter difficulties, and Austin’s message, from the 
study of trouser words at least, is that progress will only be made when 
focus is turned to the specific context in which the word is used.  
5. Dimension-words 
Dimension words are discussed in many places in Austin’s writings 
and are the most important of the three types of word discussed in this 
chapter, at least for the purposes of the thesis. Although it is not 
explicitly acknowledged by Austin, their genesis may stem from his 
earlier ideas concerning nuclear words, although there are some key 
differences between the two types, as will become apparent. A 
dimension word, according to Austin, ‘is the most general and 
comprehensive term in a whole group of terms of the same kind, terms 
that fulfil the same [semantic] function.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 71). 
Interestingly, as we will see, dimension words don’t seem to have any 
specific grammatical function of their own, although, in certain cases, 
they can also (at the same time) be other types of word, such as trouser 
words, in which case they can inherit the grammatical function of that 
other type. I will expand on this feature towards the end of the section, 
but the absence of a specific grammatical function for dimension 
words means that the analysis that follows focuses initially on the two 
levels of meaning. 
5.1. Meaning - semantic function and different specific 
meanings 
In Austin’s works there are two ‘dimension-words’ which are 
discussed in depth: ‘truth’ and ‘real’. ‘Truth’ will be studied in depth 
in the next chapter, and so here the focus will be on ‘real’ and other 
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dimension words which are less prominent in his writing but clarify 
important aspects of the term.  
Following Austin’s definition of a dimension word given above, ‘real’ 
is the most abstract term in a group of words which have the same 
semantic function, the same abstract meaning. Members of this group 
of terms, ‘on the affirmative side, are, for example, “proper”, 
“genuine”, “live”, “true”, “authentic”, [and] “natural”; and on the 
negative side, “artificial”, “fake”, “false”, “bogus”, “makeshift”, 
“dummy”, “synthetic”, [and] “toy”.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 71). Thus, ‘real’ 
picks out a set of terms which all possess the same semantic function, 
the abstract meaning ‘real’, but which are also individually chosen in 
their different forms in order to convey the particular sense of ‘reality’ 
(or its opposite) appropriate to the specific context in which they are 
used. This becomes explicit when we look at Austin’s treatment of 
‘good’ and ‘freedom’, both also dimension words. 
‘Good’ is described by Austin as ‘the most general of a very large and 
diverse list of more specific words, which share with it the general 
[semantic] function of expressing commendation64, but differ among 
themselves in their aptness to, and implications in, particular contexts’ 
(my italics). (Austin, 1962, p. 73). Here, Austin reiterates the notion 
that the semantic function serves to identify the group of words in 
virtue of their shared abstract meaning, but he also makes explicit the 
idea that such an abstract concept is often too general to capture the 
required specific meaning in a particular context of use.  
It is, however, in his discussion of ‘freedom’ that Austin best clarifies 
his use of the term ‘dimension’ for these types of words. He claims 
that just ‘[a]s “truth” is not a name for a characteristic of assertions, so 
“freedom” is not a name for a characteristic of actions, but a name of 
                                                          
64 From this it is clear that the interpretation of function intended by Austin must be 
semantic and cannot be grammatical, ‘commendation’ being the abstract meaning 
shared by the family of words. 
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a dimension in which actions are assessed’ (my italics). Here the 
semantic function of the different terms within the ‘freedom’ family is 
to assess the responsibility of the person engaged in an action, with the 
range of terms available relating to the many ways ‘in which each 
action may not be “free”’. (Austin, 1979, p. 179). 65 
Dimension words, then, define a semantic dimension and the range of 
terms appropriate to the particular abstract meaning or semantic 
function of the particular dimension word. The dimension word could, 
in fact, substitute for any of the members of the family of words within 
its dimension in virtue of all members possessing this abstract meaning 
along with their own context specific concrete meaning. However, the 
necessarily abstract nature of the meaning of the dimension word 
means that its usage in particular situations would be unlikely to 
convey the required specificity of concrete meaning. This is apparent 
if we look at an example. The difference between the dimension word 
‘real’ and the less abstract terms in its family of words is the following: 
‘the less general terms on the affirmative side have the merit, in many 
cases, of suggesting more or less definitely what it is that is being 
excluded; they tend to pair off, that is, with particular terms on the 
negative side and thus, so to speak, to narrow the range of 
possibilities.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 71.) Austin offers some examples of 
this; ‘[I]f I say that I wish the university had a proper theatre, this 
suggests that it has at present a makeshift theatre; pictures are genuine 
as opposed to fake, silk is natural as opposed to artificial, ammunition 
is live as opposed to dummy, and so on.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 71). In each 
of these cases, that which is excluded is more clearly defined, and the 
intended meaning better captured, because the more specific and more 
                                                          
65 On the relation between responsibility and freedom, Austin states that ‘questions 
of whether a person was responsible for this or that are prior to questions of 
freedom… to discover whether someone acted freely or not, we must discover 
whether this, that, or the other plea will pass—for example, duress, or mistake, or 
accident, and so forth.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 273). For us, the point is that ‘free’ is the 
most abstract term in a group of words that have the same semantic function. 
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concrete member of the family is used rather than the more abstract 
dimension-word.  
Thus, it is clear that, although the abstract meaning/semantic function 
of all of the terms in one family is the same and is constant in all the 
uses of a dimension word, Austin wants to show, in a similar manner 
to the discussion concerning abstract meaning in trouser words, that 
identifying this ‘common thing’ and focusing on it will not provide a 
sufficiently robust or accurate basis on which to determine meaning. 
As a result, philosophical discussion or analysis that focuses on the 
abstract component of meaning is likely to run into problems, as will 
be shown in more detail in chapter 5. Instead, we need to know the 
different features, or characteristics, or criteria, for each specific 
concrete case, as it is these which will enable us to accurately 
distinguish real from not real, good from not good, and free from 
unfree in the particular circumstances of their use, and apprehend more 
precisely what is meant. The semantic function, or abstract meaning, 
is too thin; it needs to be supplemented by the specific meaning, which 
is to be changed according to the context.  
It is the combination of the shared abstract meaning and the context-
related specific meaning which means that dimension words don’t 
have one meaning in all of their uses, and yet are not ambiguous. 
Rather, they have a number of different-but-related specific meanings 
which are unified by their common possession of the ‘abstract 
meaning’ of the term. 66 
We are now in a position to review the grammatical function of 
dimension-words.  
                                                          
66 Note the difference between Wittgenstein and Austin: Austin uses the term 
‘family’ when he is talking about a family of words; Wittgenstein uses the term when 
he is talking about family of cases where we use the same word.  
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5.2. Grammatical function  
The similarities between trouser words and dimension words in terms 
of meaning are apparent from the discussions of each: both appear to 
have an abstract and concrete layer, and in both cases it is the concrete, 
or specific meaning, which is the more important in any given use of 
the word. So far as the grammatical function of a dimension word is 
concerned, the fact that most of the examples Austin discusses are 
words that are both dimension words and trouser words might lead us 
to similarly equate their grammatical functions, and to attribute the 
grammatical function of excluding to all dimension words.  This, for 
example, appears to be Jean-Philippe Narboux’s reading. However, in 
what follows I will argue that identifying the two kinds of word, and 
taking excluding to be the grammatical function of dimension words, 
is not justified by the text, and even Narboux does not consistently 
maintain this position. Instead, I will argue that dimension words, in 
and of themselves, possess no particular grammatical function. Rather, 
they are able to inherit the grammatical functions of other types of 
word.  
From the perspective of meaning, Narboux67 characterises dimension-
words in a manner similar to that given above, citing the same 
passages. For Narboux, ‘the “dimension of assessment” designated by 
a “dimension word” is named after the most general and 
comprehensive term fulfilling the function around which it revolves. 
Examples of dimension words that he [Austin] gives are “felicitous”, 
“real”, “good”, “true”, “beautiful” and “serious”’.68 (Narboux, 2011, 
p. 216). However, Narboux also gives an explicit account the 
                                                          
67 Narboux’s main focus is what he calls ‘terms of assessment’. These, for Narboux, 
assess the relation between words and the world, and include terms such as ‘real/not 
real’, ‘free/unfree’, ‘true/false’, and so on. He focuses especially on the dichotomies 
of ‘sense/nonsense’ and ‘true/false’. The discussion of ‘dimension-words’ attempts 
to show that focusing only on these dichotomies, and thus ignoring the less abstract 
words in the associated dimension, leads to philosophical problems. See Narboux 
(2011). 
68 I take it that Narboux here means the ‘semantic function’. 
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grammatical function of ‘dimension-words’, which he explains in the 
following way: 
‘[T]he dimension-word… only acquires a special importance from a 
special ability to rule out a variety of specific ways of going wrong on 
a variety of specific occasions and for a variety of specific purposes. 
It does so in virtue of the abovementioned feature (shared by 
dimension-words) of being a ‘trouser-word’, that is, a word whose 
positive use is parasitic upon its negative use.’ (Narboux, 2011, p. 
220). 
Narboux therefore seems to claim that dimension words are 
necessarily (“in virtue of being”) trouser words, and thus they have the 
grammatical function of excluding, although towards the end of the 
article he softens this stance, stating that ‘[d]imension words are 
typically “trousers words”.’ (Narboux, 2011, p. 237). 
There is little to object to in the weaker reading: the dimension words 
that Austin cites are indeed typically also trouser words, but there is 
no textual evidence that Austin intended the stronger interpretation. It 
seems from the description of ‘dimension words’ that a dimension 
words is the word that plays the role of the most abstract term in a 
family of words that share the same semantic function, and that there 
is no necessary relation between this semantic role and any specific 
grammatical function. I suggest therefore that dimension words, in and 
of themselves, possess no particular grammatical function. Rather, 
they are able to inherit the grammatical functions of other types of 
word. To be sure, when a dimension word operates as a trouser word 
it acts in precisely the way that Narboux claims, but this is in virtue of 
the grammatical function of the trouser word, not that of the dimension 
word.  
Finally, it is important, particularly for the analysis that takes place in 
the next chapter, to remember that Austin’s interest in ‘dimension-
words’ is related to specific philosophical problems. His complaint is 
124 
 
that philosophers usually focus on the most abstract terms, the 
dimension-words, and try to give an account of these abstract terms 
without any regard for how they are used in specific contexts. His 
suggestion is that examining less abstract terms from the same 
dimensional family, and realising that troublesome philosophical 
words like ‘true’, ‘real’ and ‘good’ don’t have any one specific 
meaning that covers all their uses, will help us to answer troublesome 
philosophical questions. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss in greater detail ‘truth’ as a 
dimension-word in Austin’s work in order to explain more clearly the 
importance of dimension-words. 
6. Adjuster words 
The third kind of word to be examined, again utilising the vehicle of 
the three level framework, is the ‘adjuster word’. 
6.1. Grammatical function 
Adjuster words are words ‘by the use of which other words are 
adjusted to meet the innumerable and unforeseeable demands of the 
world upon language.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 73). According to Austin, ‘our 
language contains words that enable us… to say what we want to say 
in most situations.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 73). I label these cases, where 
words need no particular adjustment or qualification, ‘ordinary cases’. 
However, Austin claims, there are rarer cases or situations where it 
turns out that such words are inadequate on their own, and I don’t 
know what to say: I label these situations ‘extraordinary cases’. It is in 
this kind of case that we use adjuster words. The difference between 
the two types of cases is crucial to understanding the grammatical 
function of adjuster words.  
I gave an account of ‘extraordinary cases’ in the second chapter, where 
I discussed open and closed concepts. A closed concept is a concept 
which is liable to a universal definition. For a definition to be 
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universal, i.e., applicable to all possible cases, it must be applicable to 
cases which have not yet happened, including novel or unpredictable 
situations, and, in those cases, the definition must be able to tell us 
whether the case at hand counts as X or not. We have seen that both 
Wittgenstein and Austin argue that there might be concepts in OL 
which leave the boundaries open. I called such concepts ‘open 
concepts’. Here are the two examples of extra ordinary cases that we 
addressed.  
The first example is from Austin: ‘Suppose I was asked if the bird 
which I see is a goldfinch, and I say “I am sure it is a real goldfinch”, 
and then it does something outrageous, like explodes or quotes Mrs. 
Woolf... [in such a case] we don’t know what to say’. (Austin, 1979, p. 
88).  
The second example is from Wittgenstein: 
I say, ‘There is a chair.’ What if I go up to it, meaning 
to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight?——
‘So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion.’——
But in a few moments we see it again and are able to 
touch it and so on.——‘So the chair was there after all 
and its disappearance was some kind of illusion.’——
But suppose that after a time it disappears again—or 
seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you 
rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one 
may use the word ‘chair’ to include this kind of thing? 
(PI 80) 
The point of these examples is not simply to argue that something is or 
is not a chair, or that something is or is not a goldfinch; the point is 
that in situations such as these I don’t know explicitly how to decide 
whether the disappearing/reappearing chair is a chair, or whether a 
Woolf-quoting goldfinch is a goldfinch or not. There are no rules to 
tell me what to say in such circumstances. In OL, we might sometimes 
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face such novel cases which invite us to decide whether or not we want 
to extend a concept in order to include the case at hand. Open concepts 
leave the boundaries of application open to the inclusion of new, novel 
cases which may involve changing the way in which we use the 
concept-word. This is what is meant by expanding the boundaries of a 
concept.  
Austin distinguishes between extraordinary cases and ordinary cases 
in the following way: ‘the position... is that at a given time our 
language contains words that enable us... to say what we want to say 
in most situations that are liable to turn up. But vocabularies are finite; 
and the variety of possible situations that may confront us is neither 
finite nor precisely foreseeable.’ (Austin, 1962, pp. 73-74). According 
to Austin, there are familiar cases in which I know how to distinguish 
X from not-X, but there are also other cases in which I don’t 
necessarily know what to say because I am not familiar with them. 
When we face an extraordinary case, a case which we are not familiar 
with, the ordinary use of language ‘breaks down’ , and we are 
potentially left speechless. (Austin, 1979, p. 68).Austin suggests that 
there are some devices in OL which help us to say something at this 
point. Although we are unfamiliar with the extraordinary cases, we can 
adjust our language to cope with the difficulties using these devices. 
Adjuster words help us to say something in these extraordinary cases. 
The following example may be helpful in illustrating Austin’s point. 
‘One day we come across a new kind of animal, which looks and 
behaves very much as pigs do, but not quite as pigs do’. (Austin, 1962, 
p. 74). What would we do in this case? There are many possibilities. 
We might invent a new word for these creatures, but what we would 
probably do first is to say ‘it is not a real pig’, or that ‘it is not a true 
pig’ but instead merely something ‘like a pig.’ (Austin, 1962, pp. 74-
75). In these examples, we use ‘adjuster words’ such as ‘like’, ‘true’ 
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and ‘real’69 to help us ‘handle the unforeseen.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 75). 
We thus adjust the word ‘pig’ by using an adjuster word, thereby 
coming to refer to the ‘pigs’ with which we are familiar as ‘real pigs’ 
or ‘true pigs’. As for the new kind of animals, we are still not sure what 
to call them; they are creatures which are ‘like pigs’. We might at some 
later point come to call them pigs, but we might not. Or we might 
invent a new word for these creatures. In the meantime, however, 
when faced with a new phenomenon which seems to defy our ordinary 
use of language, ‘adjuster words’ can help us to say something. 
The grammatical function of adjuster words is not to name things: it is 
to adjust other words. 
6.2. Meaning - semantic function and different specific 
meanings  
The grammatical function of an adjuster word is now hopefully clear, 
and, from the account of its operation above, it is equally apparent that 
the employment of an adjuster word in a particular situation serves to 
qualify or extend the specific meaning of other words along a 
particular aspect (likeness, realness, etc.) relevant to the specific 
context of use, enabling us to say something meaningful in novel 
situations. The straightforward implication of this is that the specific 
meaning of an adjuster word is clearly likely to change with the 
circumstances of its use. I will set out Austin’s position on this before 
examining whether, despite his focus on specific meaning, adjuster 
words also have a semantic, or abstract, function. The answers to both 
questions are relevant to the unity question.  
                                                          
69 Note that these words are used in other contexts in which they do not function as 
adjuster words: ‘real’, for example, is used as a trouser-word in ordinary cases, and 
‘like’ is used in a family of words related to ‘look’ and ‘seem’ in ordinary cases (see 
S &S , chapter IV). ‘True’, meanwhile, is used to assess the relation between 
utterances and facts (see the next chapter of this thesis). There is no need to assume 
that there is one grammatical function for any of these words. 
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Austin explains that there is not any single ‘always the same [specific] 
meaning’ for ‘real’ (when used as an adjuster word), stating that ‘there 
are no criteria to be laid down in general for distinguishing the real 
from the not real.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 76). Rather, the criteria ‘must 
depend on what it is with respect to which the problem arises in 
particular cases’. (Austin, 1962, p. 76).The reasons for not having any 
general criteria are twofold, and are similar to those offered in the 
context of trouser words earlier. In the first place, there are different 
kinds of things to which adjuster words can be applied in different 
extraordinary cases; and, in the second, even when applied to one 
particular kind of thing, there may be different extraordinary cases or 
situations which call on the adjuster word to be applied in different 
ways. Austin uses ‘real’ as an example that illustrates both. 
He invites us to compare the above example of the pig with a situation 
in which ‘someone produces a new kind of wine, not port exactly’, but 
similar to what we call port. (Austin, 1962, p. 75).  In this latter case, 
we might well use adjuster words, describing the new drink as ‘like 
port’, but not a ‘real port’. This, according to Austin, differs 
significantly from the example of the pig-like creature above, as the 
criteria which we use to distinguish a real pig from the pig-creature are 
not the same as those which we use to distinguish the real port from 
the new kind of wine. What it means for something to be a ‘real pig’ 
is not the same as what it means for something to be a ‘real port’, and 
this finding justifies his first reason. 
Moreover, Austin argues, ‘even for particular kinds of things, there 
may be many different ways in which the distinction may be made 
(there is not just one way of being ‘not a real pig’)’ and this will depend 
on the particular circumstances in which the adjuster word is used.70 
(Austin, 1962, p. 76). This seems to validate his second reason, and 
the combination of the two demonstrates that an adjuster word need 
                                                          
70 Austin doesn’t give an example here. 
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not have one defining characteristic, one specific meaning in all of its 
uses because we use it to adjust many different kinds of things, (pig, 
port…etc.) and to adjust in many different circumstances any given 
kind of thing.  
Each time we adjust a word in an extraordinary case, we use the word 
with a new specific meaning. What is adjusted by an adjuster word, 
and how it is adjusted, depend on the particular case, and thus we 
cannot formulate any general criteria with which to distinguish, for 
example, ‘real’ from ‘not real’ in every possible situation: we can’t 
find one specific meaning for the adjuster word in all its uses. ‘How 
this is to be done [the adjusting] must depend on what it is with respect 
to which the problem arises in particular cases’ and ‘this depends on 
the number and variety of the surprises and dilemmas nature and our 
fellow men may spring on us, and on the surprises and dilemmas we 
have been faced with hitherto.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 76). 
An adjuster word is likely to have a ‘new specific meaning’ each time 
it is used, because the extraordinary case is novel and the adjusting 
needs to correspond to this novelty. The very idea of adjusting an 
extraordinary case presupposes something with which we are not 
familiar and this will in turn demand a new specific way of adjusting 
the words to this novel circumstance.  
The grammatical function and specific meaning of an adjuster word 
are now clear, but we have not yet investigated whether adjuster words 
possess a semantic function or abstract meaning. Unfortunately, 
Austin is silent on this matter in his discussion of ‘adjuster words’, but 
I think it is appropriate to attempt to fill that gap, and I suggest a 
familiar way in which adjuster words may be taken to possess 
semantic function, albeit ‘thinly’. 
The rationale will be familiar from our discussion of trouser words. 
Adjuster words clearly operate within different aspects of adjustment 
(likeness, realness, etc), and some property or criterion individuates 
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each adjuster word so as to differentiate it from its conspecifics. These 
differences can only exist at the level of the semantic function of the 
various words since, as with trouser-words above, it is difficult to see 
how we could distinguish between different words that have the same 
grammatical function (in this case adjuster words) if the content of the 
semantic function or abstract level was empty. Nor could the answer 
comes from within the third level, that of specific meaning, since at 
that level the particular adjuster word has already been identified. 
However, the abstract meaning/semantic function which is held in 
common between all of the cases of use of a particular adjuster word 
is clearly thin – the minimum necessary to enable individuation and 
choice between adjuster words. As with trouser words, the semantic 
weight rests almost completely on the specific meaning, which in turn 
is heavily dependent on the context or circumstances of use: I need to 
know exactly what is being adjusted and the relevant circumstances in 
order to know what the adjuster word means in any particular case. 
From this we can see that it is again the combination of the (thick) 
diverse concrete features and characteristics of the use of a word in a 
particular context along with the (very thin) abstract meaning of a 
word, the semantic function, that gives a word what Austin describes 
as the feature of not having one univocal meaning in all of its uses, and 
yet not being ambiguous. Rather, such words have a range of different 
but related specific meanings which are minimally unified by the 
‘abstract meaning’. 
7. Interim summary  
I can now compare and contrast the three words types from the 
perspective of the three level framework. This will organise the 
findings in preparation for the discussion of Austin’s answer to the 
unity question addressed in the last section.  
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Firstly, so far as grammatical function is concerned, trouser words and 
adjuster words each have individual and significant grammatical 
functions, whereas dimension words appear to lack such a property, 
inheriting any grammatical function that they do exhibit in any 
particular circumstances in virtue of also being, in that specific case, 
another type of word, such as a trouser word or an adjuster word.  
Secondly, there are important differences between the three words in 
terms of meaning. All three word types have an abstract meaning or 
semantic function, but in the case of trouser words and adjuster words, 
this is minimal, being sufficient only to differentiate specific words 
within the word type from each other. In the case of dimension words, 
however, the abstract level is ‘thicker’, and could allow the 
substitution of the dimension word for any of the members of its 
family in any specific circumstances. However, Austin is clear that, 
even in these cases, the abstract level remains relatively thin and that 
such a substitution would almost always fail to capture the specific 
meaning on any specific occasion of use. As a result, reliance solely 
on the content of such an abstract semantic function to determine 
meaning in any given circumstance would result in significant 
problems, particularly in philosophical enquiry.  
This is because, thirdly, in the case of all three word types it is the 
specific meaning that carries the semantic weight, and the specific 
meaning is highly context and circumstance dependent. These 
meanings are, however, related, and it is the common abstract layer, 
or semantic function, that performs this function, although the strength 
of this relation varies in proportion to the thickness or thinness of the 
particular type of word’s abstract component.  
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8. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have used the analysis of the three word types to 
elucidate Austin’s answers to the unity question: i.e., do we use the 
same word in different cases because the cases have something in 
common? Austin tackles the question by attacking the answer given 
by philosophers who adopt the false dichotomy that words must either 
have one unequivocal meaning or a number of different meanings, and 
those who also support the notion that a word either has just one and 
the same meaning in all instances of its use or is ambiguous and has a 
number of totally different meanings. In opposition to this, Austin 
wants to show that there are some words which have a range of 
different-but-related meanings. The problem as he sees it is that 
philosophers ignore these kinds of words. 
 I have characterised Austin’s writings as having two distinct phases, 
early Austin and later Austin, and each of these periods provides a 
different sense of how Austin understands the notion of there being 
something ‘in common’ between all uses of a word. Early Austin 
accepts the general denotational framework but rejects the specific 
‘doctrine of naming’ which construes ‘one meaning’/‘what is in 
common’ as referring to a single entity that the word denotes. Contrary 
to this doctrine, he suggests that a word might stand for various 
different kinds of things, not just one ‘entity’.  
Later Austin, on the other hand, targets the doctrine of naming in a 
more radical way and attacks the basic denotational assumption that 
all words must name things. He suggests that ‘naming’ is just one 
function that words fulfil: a word might function to adjust other words 
in extraordinary cases, as in ‘adjuster words’, or to exclude its 
opposite, as in ‘trouser-words’, and so on. So far as determining 
meaning is concerned, he suggests that looking for the entity, or even 
entities, that a word names is therefore not necessarily the route that 
should be followed. Instead of the exclusively denotational 
framework, he thinks that meaning will rather depend on the different 
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features, characteristics and criteria that a word might have in the 
various different circumstances in which it is used.  
However, he distinguishes between two levels of ‘meaning’ and 
acknowledges that, whilst it is clear that at the lower level of concrete 
or ‘specific’ meaning this diversity is present and it is driven by 
circumstance or context, at the abstract, or semantic function, level 
there is something that is held in common by the word in all its uses. 
However, in the case of trouser words and adjuster words this is 
minimal, and even in the case of dimension words it is insubstantial 
and certainly insufficient to be the predominant focus of enquiry if the 
objective is to determine the meaning of a word. Thus, such words 
might have something in common, but Austin has reset the perspective 
on how significant this common feature in fact is. 
Despite these differences between two Austin’s periods, a level of 
consistency is also apparent. Nuclear words, for instance, such as 
‘health’, from his early period, are similar in character to dimension 
words and may in some sense be considered prototypes for the latter: 
in both cases the nuclear or abstract element unifies, and is contained 
in, the relevant family of words. The main difference between the two 
largely consists in different levels of strength between the nuclear 
word the abstract level of the dimension word: the former is 
considerably stronger and can operate more easily without 
qualification, whereas the latter, although it can be substituted for 
members of its family, lacks the substance or specificity to represent 
the meaning in particular circumstances of use. This difference, 
perhaps, indicates the increasing importance that Austin accorded to 
context as his philosophy developed.   
The above summary provides a reasonably stable theoretical platform 
from which to examine, in the next chapter, two of the central 
examples in Austin’s writings of his treatment of the unity problem in 
the context of some philosophical problems. Analysing in depth his 
treatment of ‘real’ and ‘truth’ will show in particular how fundamental 
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the notion of a dimension word is to his treatment of specific 
philosophical problems and the development of his theory of speech 
acts. Throughout, it will be apparent that interpreting Austin as being 
concerned with the unity problem rather than the compatibility 
problem is a far more fruitful approach to explaining his thought, as 
well as being a more plausible way of representing his interests and 
interpreting his texts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Examples from Austin 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the theory behind Austin’s answer 
to the unity question, i.e., do we use the same word in different cases 
because the cases have something in common? He approaches the 
question by attacking the answer given by philosophers who adopt the 
false dichotomy that words must have either one unequivocal meaning 
or a number of different meanings, and subscribe to the notion that a 
word either has just one and the same meaning in all instances of its 
use, or is ambiguous and has a number of totally different meanings. 
Austin seeks to show that there are some words which have a range of 
different-but-related meanings, and his concern is that philosophers 
ignore these kinds of word.  
 
In this chapter, I will examine Austin’s application of his answer in 
the context of discussing specific philosophical problems. Using two 
central examples in Austin’s writing, his discussions on ‘real’ and 
‘true’, I will show that the failure to recognise that some words have 
different related meanings can be a serious source of philosophical 
problems, and will underline the importance of the unity problem. 
 
Section 1 addresses how we might distinguish between reality and 
appearance in the case of material things. Austin examines Alfred 
Ayer’s approach and finds it unsatisfactory because it is too narrow. 
Ayer’s mistake, according to Austin, is to take specific examples of 
usage in OL and generalise from these to claims about all uses. In 
doing so, he ignores the varied range of uses present in ordinary 
language which invalidate such generalisations. 
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The rest of the chapter is taken up with the discussion of ‘true’, and its 
impact on Austin’s wider philosophical interests. Austin thinks that 
‘true’ is a dimension word and, in virtue of this, that all of its uses do 
have something in common, what, in the previous chapter, we called 
the ‘abstract meaning’ or semantic function. Equally, in common with 
all other dimension words, ‘true’ also does not have one specific or 
concrete meaning that is consistent and stable in all contexts and 
circumstances of use. This discovery plays a central role in his wider 
contribution to a range of issues in the philosophy of language. It is 
not only part of his objections to Ramsey’s redundancy theory of truth 
and Strawson’s performative theory of truth, it is also central to the 
genesis of his theory of speech acts.  
 
I will show that underestimating the importance to Austin of ‘true’ as 
a dimension word led to what I call the ‘propositional interpretation of 
locutionary meaning’, introduced by John Searle and P.F. Strawson. I 
will argue for a different interpretation, one which is closer to Charles 
Travis’s ‘pragmatic interpretation’. If my reading is accurate, it will 
shed light on Austin’s answer to one of the central questions in 
philosophy of language, the nature of truth and its relation to meaning. 
 
Finally, in the conclusion, I will summarise the relation between the 
unity problem and the compatibility problem. The examples examined 
will demonstrate that Austin’s focus was more on the former than the 
latter, contradicting the received view in OLP.  
 
1. Real 
 
Austin discusses ‘real’ in two chapters in S &S. In the first, chapter 
VII, he writes that ‘real’ ‘does not have one single, specifiable, always-
the-same meaning...Nor does it have a large number of different 
meanings.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 64). The chapter is dedicated to showing 
that there are many different related meanings of ‘real’, and that it 
might possess different grammatical functions: it might be an ‘adjuster 
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word’, a ‘trouser-word’, and a ‘dimension word’, as we have seen. In 
chapter VIII in S & S, Austin explains what he finds problematic in 
one influential philosophical account of how to distinguish reality 
from appearance: Ayer’s discussion of ‘real’. He writes, ‘what is 
wrong in principle with Ayer’s account of the use of ‘real’ is just that 
he is attempting to give one account- or two...’ (Austin, 1962, p. 83). 
In what follows I will examine Austin’s objections in detail (1.1), 
before analysing Ayer’s reply (1.2) and summarising (1.3). 
 
1.1. Austin’s objections to Ayer’s position 
 
According to Austin, Ayer makes a distinction ‘between ‘perceptions’ 
which are ‘qualitatively delusive’ and ‘existentially delusive.’’ 
(Austin, 1962, p. 78). In a case of quantitative delusion, ‘something is 
or might be supposed to have a characteristic which it does not really 
have’. (Austin, 1962, p. 80). An example is when we look through a 
dark blue glass at an object which is not blue: it looks blue, but it isn’t 
really blue. In existential delusion, however, ‘something is or might be 
taken to exist when it does not really exist at all’, an example being a 
mirage in the desert. (Austin, 1962, p. 80). One thinks one sees an 
oasis, but, in fact, the oasis does not exist at all. Ayer focuses on the 
former, the ‘qualitatively delusive’ perceptions, and he ‘undertakes as 
his major enterprise to 'furnish an explanation of the use of the word 
"real" as it is applied to the characteristics of material things'.’ (Austin, 
1962, p. 80). 
 
The criterion by which we distinguish the real characteristics of 
material things from the apparent ones is that the real ones ‘occur 'in 
what are conventionally taken to be preferential conditions'… [for 
example] we say that the 'real shape' is the shape the thing looks at the 
more moderate range.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 81). I don’t stand too close to 
the object, or too far from it.  Take another example, ‘if I look at an 
object through dark glasses, it may be hard to tell what colour it will 
look when I take them off; hence, through dark glasses, we say, it 
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doesn't look its 'real colour'.’ (Austin, 1962, pp. 81-82). It is not the 
‘real colour’ because the preferential conditions are not satisfied. The 
criterion for distinguishing the real characteristic from the apparent 
one in the case of a material thing, i.e., how we recognize the 
‘qualitatively delusive’ perceptions, is by being in a position where we 
perceive these characteristics in the preferential conditions. 71   
 
Austin complains that, although Ayer’s account of the distinction 
between what is real and what is not real is not wrong, it is too limited. 
He has two objections, and they are both concerned with the scope of 
the application of Ayer’s account.  
 
Firstly, Ayer’s distinction between ‘perceptions’ which are 
‘qualitatively delusive’ and ‘existentially delusive’ ‘divides up the 
topic in a way that leaves a lot of it out.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 80). It 
doesn’t cover all the cases where we do distinguish between reality 
and appearance. For example, it doesn’t cover the cases ‘in which 
something is or might be taken to be what it isn't really’. (Austin, 1962, 
p. 80). Austin gives two examples. First, when ‘I see a decoy duck and 
take it for a real duck’, and the second, when I think I see a real 
diamond and it is really a paste diamond. (Austin, 1962, pp. 79-80). 
These cases, Austin claims, constitute a third category which can’t be 
subsumed under Ayer’s two categories. They don’t fall under the 
‘existentially delusive’ because I don’t take something to exist where 
nothing exists at all. And they don’t fall under the ‘qualitatively 
delusive’ because I don’t take the thing to have qualities which it 
doesn’t have. Rather, I take the paste diamond to be a real diamond, 
and I take the decoy duck to be a real duck. In both cases, I take 
something to be something else. This is not to take something to exist 
where it doesn’t really exist, and it is not to take something to have 
                                                          
71 I ignore here for brevity’s sake some points which Austin criticises in Ayers’ 
account of ‘the preferential conditions’.    
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qualities which it doesn’t really possess, and the problem, as Austin 
sees it, is that Ayer’s account doesn’t cover these kinds of cases.  
 
Secondly, even for the qualitatively delusive perceptions, Austin 
thinks that Ayer overlooks the variety of cases. Austin gives this 
example: ‘'That's not the real colour of her hair.' Why not? ... because 
she has dyed her hair.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 82). According to Ayer’s 
taxonomy, this is a case of qualitatively delusive perception where we 
take something to have a characteristic which it doesn’t really have: 
we take the hair to have the colour which it doesn’t really have. Whilst 
Austin concedes that this example falls within this category, he claims 
that it doesn’t conform to Ayer’s account for the following reason. 
Ayer suggests that we need to be in the preferential conditions to 
distinguish between real characteristics and apparent ones. However, 
the conditions are totally irrelevant here: however you change the 
conditions, you won’t be able to know if the quality is real or not. 
Rather, the reason why this is not the real colour of her hair is that she 
dyed her hair. Ayer’s account of the preferential conditions doesn’t 
cover this case of qualitatively delusive perceptions. It is true in some 
cases of qualitatively delusive perception that the preferential 
conditions would help us to distinguish between the real quality and 
that which is not real, but in other cases, such as the dyed hair, those 
conditions are irrelevant. What is wrong in Ayer’s account is that he 
takes one correct account and generalizes it to all the cases.  
 
Austin explains that, ‘what is wrong in principle with Ayer's account 
of the use of 'real' is just that he is attempting to give one account - or 
two, if we include his perfunctory remarks on the 'existentially' 
delusive... Just why it is a mistake to look for any single, quite general 
account of the use of the word 'real' has, I hope, been made clear 
enough already.’ (Austin, 1962, p. 83). According to Austin, then, 
Ayer has not quite committed the crude mistake that many 
philosophers make of looking for one constant meaning of the word 
‘real’, but he has made the same broad methodological error. Whilst 
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Ayer’s characterization divides the field into two and then focuses on 
one type, attempting to give one account, or criterion, by which the 
real characteristic of material things might be distinguished from the 
apparent ones, his resulting account is based on inadequate survey of 
the actual uses in this field of ordinary language. As result, Austin’s 
claim is that Ayer over-generalises, and as a result fails to 
acknowledge or take account of further distinctions in the way ‘real’ 
is used. Ayer’s account is therefore limited: it is correct in many cases, 
but, as a generalisation, it fails. 
 
1.2. Ayer’s reply 
 
Ayer seems to acknowledge the problem that Austin identifies. He 
writes: ‘Austin does achieve what seems to be his main purpose of 
showing how multifarious are the uses to which the word 'real' is put.’ 
(Ayer, 2011, p. 301). However, he claims that the objection has little 
force. Thus, he accepts that it is true that we use the word to mean 
different things, and that some of these are not covered by his 
distinction between ‘perceptions’ which are ‘qualitatively delusive’ 
and ‘existentially delusive’, but he claims that those which fall outside 
his distinction are not relevant, because in any particular philosophical 
investigation the philosopher is concerned only with distinctions ‘that 
are the ones that are relevant to his argument. The fact that he does not 
deal with distinctions which are not relevant is not a reproach to him.’ 
(Ayer, 2011, pp. 301-302). In his own case, therefore, he claims that 
even if the case of the dyed hair was not covered, it is not to be taken 
as a defect in his account because ‘I was not concerned with the 
distinction, also sometimes marked by the word 'real', between the 
natural and the artificial.’ (Ayer, 2011, p. 302). 
  
It seems to me that Ayer’s reply is not very convincing. Whilst it is 
true that if Ayer never intended to give a full account of how to 
distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘unreal’, then there is no inconsistency 
between the two accounts because Ayer’s generalisation is only 
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partial, and reinforces Austin’s contention that further study of 
ordinary language is necessary if any truly general account is to be 
attempted. However, if Ayer’s main interest was concerned with 
distinguishing real characteristics from apparent ones for material 
things, then it seems that the cases that Austin offers, and Ayer seeks 
to avoid, are extremely relevant. Ayer’s stated purpose of giving the 
criteria by which the overall distinction for material things could be 
made was not qualified in a way that would allow him to exclude these 
troublesome cases, and it seems that Austin’s criticism is well directed 
and relevant.72  
 
By validly identifying these finer gradations in the use of ‘real’ in OL, 
Austin again demonstrates the danger of being in thrall to the idea that 
the way in which philosophical problems are solved is to search for a 
single meaning for a word. In the particular case of Ayer above, it 
could at least be argued that his over-rapid generalisation may be a 
result of such a quest, methodologically and empirically blinding him, 
initially at least, to the approach and examples that Austin offers.  
 
1.3. Conclusions 
 
In the previous chapter we saw that Austin suggests that some words 
in OL have more than one meaning and often have different but related 
meanings. He thinks that philosophers tend to look for one meaning of 
the word, and this is unjustified in OL. In the analysis of Ayer above 
we have seen an example of this. This further bears out my earlier 
contention that it is a mistake to see Austin as solely concerned with 
the compatibility problem, as many OLP interpreters do. The 
compatibility problem focuses on cases where philosophers say 
something which we would not say in OL, and Austin’s objections to 
Ayer don’t fit with this characterisation. Austin’s objection is not that 
                                                          
72 See the full account given by Ayes in his original text The Foundation of Empirical 
Knowledge, chapter 24, “Appearance and Reality”, Ayer, 1963), pp. 263-273.  
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what Ayer says is incompatible with OL, but rather that it can be 
portrayed as an attempt to solve the unity problem in which Ayer is 
looking for just one or two meanings of the word. This approach 
prevents him from looking in depth OL, where he would find that the 
word has many different, but related, meanings.73  
  
Now we move to our second example. 
2. True 
 
I said in the previous chapter that some words, according to Austin, 
have different related meanings, and one of the types of word of which 
this is true is dimension words. The dimension word ‘is the most 
general and comprehensive term in a whole group of terms of the same 
kind, terms that fulfil the same [semantic] function.’ Austin thinks that 
‘true’ is a ‘dimension word’, in virtue of which it has something in 
common in all of its uses, what we called the ‘abstract 
meaning’/semantic function, but no one specific meaning in all of its 
contexts or circumstances of use.  
 
According to Austin the semantic function associated with ‘true’ 
fulfils the following purpose: ‘'True' and 'false' are just general labels 
for a whole dimension of different appraisals which have something 
or other to do with the relation between what we say and the facts.’ 
(Austin, 1979, pp. 250-251). In addition, he notes that the different 
terms which belong to the family, and share this semantic function, are 
quite diverse. Thus, we find within its ambit terms such as 
‘exaggerated’, ‘vague’, ‘bald’, ‘rough’, ‘misleading’, ‘not very good’, 
‘general’, ‘too concise’, ‘fair’ … etc. These are the terms which we, in 
ordinary language, used for the appraisals of utterances. All members 
                                                          
73 For more discussions on Austin’s treatment of ‘real’ see Jonathan Bennett (2011) 
and Simon Glendinning (2011). The former objects to Austin’s characterization of 
the use of ‘real’ in many different ways, largely beyond the scope of this thesis. For 
example, he claims that the word ‘real’ is never used as an adjuster word, and has 
many comments on Austin’s method. The latter mainly discuss Austin’s method in 
(re)solving philosophical problems.  
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of the family share the same semantic function, but differ from each 
other in other aspects and characteristics.  
 
According to Austin, it is rare that we use ‘true’ or ‘false’ in OL. 
Austin, as we shall see, thinks that ordinary users employ these 
abstract terms only in logic and mathematics. Instead, in our ordinary 
use, we tend to pick a member of the family (such as ‘exaggerated’ or 
‘vague’) that better represents the particular aspect of truth or falsity 
appropriate to the situation. Philosophers, however, tend to do the 
opposite and focus only on the two most abstract terms in their 
discussions, and ignore the other terms of the family more suited to 
normal or ordinary cases. 74  
 
In what follows I will explore the consequences of the claim in 
Austin’s writings that ‘true’ is a dimension word, and show that this 
assumption is crucial for a wide range of issues in philosophy of 
language. Firstly, in 2.1, we will see how Austin’s discussion on ‘true’ 
as a dimension word plays a central role in his objections both to 
Ramsey’s redundancy theory of truth and to Strawson’s performative 
theory of truth. Secondly, in 2.2, I will argue that Austin’s view of 
‘true’ as a dimension word plays a central role in introducing his 
theory of speech acts. Then, in 2.3, we will see the role the same 
assumption plays in understanding the relation between the two parts 
of the speech act, the locutionary and the illocutionary. I will show that 
underestimating the importance of ‘true’ as a dimension word led to 
what I call the ‘propositional interpretation of locutionary meaning’, 
which was introduced by Searle and Strawson. I argue instead for a 
‘pragmatic interpretation’, which is close to Charles Travis’s reading 
of Austin. If my reading is accurate, it will clarify Austin’s answer to 
                                                          
74 Austin discusses the different terms of the family we use on OL in ‘Performative 
Utterance’, see Austin,1979, p. 250; HDTW, see Austin, 1975, pp. 122-174 and 
‘Truth’ see Austin, 1979, pp. 129-130.  
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one of the central questions in philosophy of language, the nature of 
truth, and its relation to meaning. 
  
Throughout all of this it will be clear that failing to pay attention to the 
different concrete or specific contextual meanings of the less abstract 
members of the family leads philosophers astray in understanding the 
role of ‘truth’ in language. 
 
2.1. Strawson and Austin on ‘truth’ 
 
I will start by setting out the redundancy theory of ‘truth’, which both 
Austin and Strawson discuss, before explaining Strawson’s own 
theory. I then outline Austin’s objection to both theories, based on his 
regarding ‘truth’ as a dimension word. Finally, I examine Strawson’s 
rejoinder, and show it to be unsatisfactory.  
 
Both Austin and Strawson reject the redundancy theory of ‘truth’, 
which states the following: ‘[I]n all sentences of the form ‘p is true’ 
the phrase ‘is true’ is logically superfluous’. (Austin, 1979, p. 125). 
What exactly is meant by logically superfluous here? Ramsey 
explains: ‘it is evident that “it is true that Caesar was murdered” means 
no more than that Caesar was murdered’. (Ramsey, 1927, p. 157). 
Whenever I say ‘it is true that P’, or ‘P is true’, ‘it is true that …’ or 
‘… is true’ is redundant, because we can just say ‘P’. ‘It is true…’ 
doesn’t add anything.  
 
Austin and Strawson, however, react differently to the redundancy 
theory. Rather than rejecting the theory wholesale, Strawson sees 
himself as developing its main insight. Austin, on the other hand, 
thinks that the theory is wrong and argues that both the redundancy 
theory itself and Strawson’s development of it are flawed. I will start 
with Strawson’s view.   
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Strawson thinks that the redundancy theory ‘is right in asserting that 
to say that a statement is true is not to make a further statement; but 
wrong in suggesting that to say that a statement is true is not to do 
something different from, or additional to, just making the statement.’ 
(Strawson, 1949, p. 84). He thus accepts that ‘is true’ doesn’t assert 
anything, nor does it make any statement, in addition to P, and he uses 
this aspect of the redundancy theory to attack what he calls ‘the 
semantic theory of truth’.  
 
The semantic theory states that ‘to say that a statement is true is to 
make a statement about a sentence of a given language’. (Strawson, 
1949, p. 83). When I say ‘P is true’, I talk about the sentence P, and I 
make a statement about this statement (or sentence).  In that sense, 
according to the theory, ‘is true’ is used to assert P. Strawson concurs 
with the redundancy theory in denying this. For him, in saying ‘it is 
true that P’ or ‘P is true’, ‘is true’ doesn’t make any assertion about P.  
 
However, Strawson disagrees with the redundancy theory, and claims 
that ‘is true’ has a role and is neither logically superfluous nor 
redundant. He thinks that ‘in using such expressions [‘it is true that…’ 
or ‘… is true’] we are confirming, underwriting, admitting, agreeing 
with, what somebody has said ; but …  we are not making any assertion 
additional to theirs ; and are never using ‘is true’  to talk about 
something which is what they said, or the sentences they used in 
saying it.’ (Strawson, 1949, p. 93). 
 
What Strawson therefore takes from the redundancy theory is the 
following. When I say ‘P is true’, I don’t make any other assertion, or 
statement, except that P.  I call this ‘claim A’. On the other hand, 
although I don’t make an assertion, or a statement, about P, I do 
something else by saying ‘P is true’: I express my agreement with what 
has been said. I call this ‘claim B’.  
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Austin discusses both claims A and B. Here, my analysis will focus on 
Austin’s rejection of claim A, with the discussion of claim B and 
Austin’s ultimate denial that such a sharp distinction between the two 
claims can be drawn postponed until section 2.2. 
 
In ‘Truth’ (1950)75, where he replies to Strawson’s ‘Truth’ (1949), 
Austin promotes a version of ‘correspondence theory of truth’. He 
makes the observation that ‘true’ is a dimension word to support this 
theory. ‘True’, as a dimension word, is the most abstract term in the 
family, and all the terms in the family ‘true’ assess the relation 
between what is said and the world and are part of the family of ‘true’ 
in their own particular way.  
 
‘Claim A’ is that ‘is true’ is not used to assess the relation between the 
words and the world, and that ‘is true’ is never used for making an 
assertion about what is said. Austin complains that to say ‘is true’ is 
not used to make any assertion about P overlooks the role of ‘true’ as 
a dimension word. He explains that ‘[T]here are numerous other 
adjectives which are in the same class as ‘true’ and ‘false’, which are 
concerned... with the relations between the words...and the world, and 
which nevertheless no one would dismiss as logically superfluous.’ 
(Austin, 1979, p. 129). For example, a ‘certain statement is 
exaggerated or vague or bald, a description somewhat rough or 
misleading or not very good, an account rather general or too concise.’ 
(Austin, 1979, p. 129). All these terms are used to assess the relation 
between the words and the world, and none of them is superfluous.  
‘True’ is just another term in the family, and it is used to assert what 
is said, just like any of these terms is used to assess the relation 
between what is said and the world, in different ways. For Austin, to 
say ‘is true’ is superfluous’ overlooks the fact that that ‘true’ is part of 
the family. For him, there can be no justification in singling out one 
                                                          
75 For clarity, all references to this article are to Austin’s 3rd edition of Philosophical 
Papers (1979).  
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term in the family for special treatment and asserting that it is 
superfluous, or that it is not used to make an assertions about what is 
said, or that it is not used to assess the relation between the words and 
the world, when it is clear that all the other members of the family 
could not be so treated. 
 
Thus, in Austin’s view, ‘true’, in virtue of being a dimension word, 
and in virtue of being a member of a family words within that 
dimension, has the right to be treated in precisely the same way as any 
other member of the family. As a result, he believes that ‘claim A’ is 
wrong, and that ‘is true’ is used to assess the relation between the 
words and the world.  
  
Strawson responds to Austin’s position in his paper ‘Truth’ (1950). 
His reply is complex, but for present purposes I will focus on his 
rejection of Austin’s claim that ‘true’ is a dimension word. In this 
context, Strawson writes, ‘[N]ot all the words taken by Austin as likely 
to help us to be clear about "true" are in the same class as one another. 
"Exaggerated" is, of those he mentions, the one most relevant to his 
thesis... Being "over-concise" and "too general" are not ways of being 
"not quite true." These obviously relate to the specific purposes of 
specific makings of statements; to the unsatisfied wishes of specific 
audiences… Whether the statement (that p) is true or false is a matter 
of the way things are (of whether p); whether a statement is 
exaggerated (if the question arises – which depends on the type of 
statement and the possibilities of the language) is a matter of the way 
things are (e.g., of whether or not there were fewer than 2,000 there). 
But whether a statement is over-concise or too general depends on 
what the hearer wants to know.’ (Strawson, 1950, p. 152). 
 
In other words, according to Strawson, Austin is mistaken in taking all 
these terms to belong to the family. While some terms, such as ‘true’, 
‘false’ and ‘exaggerated’ depend on how things are (whether P or not), 
other terms, such as ‘too concise’ or ‘too general’, depend on ‘the 
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specific purposes of specific makings of statements’, not only on how 
things are. The two sets of terms are not in the same class, and so, 
according to Strawson, they don’t belong to the same family, and the 
argument from ‘true’ as a dimension word therefore fails. The key 
issue is that Strawson takes being true or false as a matter of ‘whether 
P’, independent of the ‘purposes of specific makings of statements; to 
the unsatisfied [or satisfied] wishes of specific audiences.’ He claims 
that these features don’t enter in our consideration of whether an 
utterance is true or false. Austin’s mistake is to confuse the two sets of 
features and place them all in one class. 76 
 
In order to assess Strawson’s criticism, it will be helpful to focus on a 
specific example from Austin. The example Austin gives is ‘the galaxy 
is the shape of a fried egg’, and he encourages us to ask whether this 
statement is true or false.  His view is that we can’t tell if this statement 
is ‘true’ or ‘false’ independent of the purpose of making it and its 
audience. Instead, we have to take into account the very considerations 
which Strawson thinks are irrelevant for such a judgement. Thus, if 
the context and audience are such that a rough or approximate 
similarity will suffice, such as might occur in a discussion with young 
children about shapes of different star systems, then we may agree that 
the statement is ‘true’. Similarly, if we were talking to an 
astrophysicist who would base a number of precise calculations on our 
answer, we will almost certainly have to reply that the statement is 
‘false’. 
 
I find this example persuasive, and I think it illustrates an additional 
aspect of Austin’s argument that further supports his underlying claim 
                                                          
76 Note that Strawson changes his mind in ‘Truth’ (1950) in relation to ‘claim A’: ‘It 
will be clear that, in common with Mr. Austin, I reject the thesis that the phrase "is 
true" is logically superfluous, together with the thesis that to say that a proposition 
is true is just to assert it and to say that it is false is just to assert its contradictory. 
"True" and "not true” have jobs of their own to do... In using them, we are not just 
asserting that X is Y or that X is not Y. We are asserting this in a way in which we 
could not  assert it unless certain conditions were fulfilled; we may also be granting,  
denying, confirming, etc.’ (Strawson , 1950, p. 147). 
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that ‘true’ is a dimension word. As we have seen above, we are able to 
answer the question concerning the truth of the claim if we are given 
sufficient context, and this seems clearly to refute Strawson’s claim 
that ‘true’ or ‘false’ are decided independent of context. In addition, it 
seems equally clear that, in ordinary language, we would indicate any 
contextually determined lack of precision by using a more specific 
word from within Austin’s putative family of words in the ‘true’ 
dimension. Thus, in the circumstances of discussing the shapes of star 
systems with small children, we might well say that the galaxy is 
‘like’, or ‘roughly’ the shape of a fried egg. This seems to indicate that 
the range of words Austin’s ‘true’ dimension can be used, from the 
abstract through to the concrete, depend on the purpose, audience and 
context of the utterance. This fits precisely with Austin’s description 
of the way in which a dimension word works set out in the previous 
chapter: the context-independent abstract level (in this case ‘true’) is 
generally too thin to carry the burden of expressing specific semantic 
meaning, hence its substitution in specific circumstances by the sorts 
of words Austin lists. However, the dimension word, in virtue of being 
the most abstract representation, can in principle substitute for any of 
the specific words in its family, but it is clear from these examples that 
its effectiveness in conveying meaning in such circumstances will be 
limited.  
  
It therefore seems that it is not the case that being ‘true’ or ‘false’ has 
nothing to do with the ‘purposes of specific makings of statements; to 
the unsatisfied [or satisfied] wishes of specific audiences.’ Austin 
argues that ‘true’ is a dimension word, and that all the terms of its 
family are used to assess the relation between the words and the world, 
and it is subject to the purposes and intentions of the speaker, the 
audience to which it is directed, the circumstances under which it is 
uttered…etc. This is Austin’s version of the ‘correspondence theory 
of truth’. It is mainly a version which takes the different dimensions 
and degrees of correspondence to be crucial to understanding the job 
the word ‘true’ does in OL. These dimensions and degrees change 
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according to the context and circumstances under which we utter our 
words.  
 
2.2. The performative/constative distinction and its 
collapse 
 
Austin’s claim that ‘true’ is a dimension word was clearly central to 
his theory of truth, but also had important ramifications for his wider 
philosophy. In particular, it influenced the development of his theory 
of speech acts, ultimately forcing him to abandon his criticism of what 
he called the ‘descriptive fallacy’ by showing that his distinction 
between performatives and constatives, on which his position relied, 
was unsound.  
 
Understanding precisely how he came to this insight is important, and 
I will claim that commentators in general misunderstand Austin’s 
position. In particular, I will show that the idea that there is continuity 
between the distinction between performatives and constatives, on one 
hand, and the later distinction between the locutionary and 
illocutionary acts, on the other, is mistaken. I will explain in detail how 
this misunderstanding arises in 2.2, before arguing, in 2.3, that there is 
no such continuity, and that the correct understanding of the relation 
between the two distinctions plays a vital role in both choosing 
between two interpretations of Austin’s theory of speech acts, and 
understanding his theory of truth and meaning.  
 
In his earlier writings, such as ‘Other Minds’ and ‘Truth’, Austin 
proposes that we can distinguish between ‘performatives’ and 
‘statements’. I will call this the ‘constative/performative doctrine’. In 
HTDW, ‘Performative Utterances’ and ‘Performatives-Constatives’, 
however, Austin later finds that the distinction is instable, because 
‘truth’ is a dimension word, and he comes to realize that a new theory 
of speech acts is needed. In what follows, I trace his thought through 
this development. 
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2.2.1. The descriptive fallacy and the constative/performative 
distinction  
 
According to Austin, philosophers used to take every utterance of the 
declarative grammatical form (an utterance which is a not question, 
command… etc.) to describe states of affairs, or report or state facts. 
As a result, they thought that they must be either true or false.77 Other 
utterances, which don’t take the declarative mood, such as questions 
or commands, are not ‘true’ or ‘false’. Let us call utterances which are 
either true or false ‘statements’. However, says Austin, ‘it has come to 
be realized that many utterances which have been taken to be 
statements (merely because they are not, on grounds of grammatical 
form, to be classed as commands, questions, &c.) are not in fact 
descriptive, nor susceptible of being true or false.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 
131). Austin observes that an utterance, which takes the declarative 
mood, is not a statement ‘when it is a formula in a calculus: when it is 
a performatory utterance: when it is a value-judgement: when it is a 
definition: when it is part of a work of fiction’. (Austin, 1979, p. 131). 
These are different kinds of utterances: they take the declarative mode, 
but are not descriptive.  
 
The descriptive fallacy, then, is the fallacy of taking all utterances of 
the declarative mood to be descriptive, to be statements, and to be 
either true or false. One such kind of utterance is the ‘performative’. 78   
                                                          
77 Austin discusses the descriptive fallacy in a number of different places: see Austin, 
1979, pp. 97-103, pp. 130-132 and pp. 233-234; and Austin, 1975, pp. 1-4 and p. 
100.  
78 Austin is part of the history of the unmasking of the descriptive fallacy. He is not 
the first to do so, but he takes himself to deepen the insight that not all declarative 
sentences are descriptive. It is important to see how Austin himself sees the 
connections between his work and previous philosophers, such as Kant, and logical 
positivists. See Austin, 1975, pp. 1-4, and Austin. 1979, pp. 233-235.  
Here we might draw an analogy between the sentences and the words. As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, Austin rejects the claim that all words ‘refer’ to things, 
152 
 
 
According to Austin, the distinction between performatives and 
constatives is as follows.79 Constatives are utterances which are either 
true or false. For example, when you state something, or describe 
something, or report something, your utterance is either true or false.80 
Take for example ‘the cat is on the mat’. This is a declarative sentence, 
which is descriptive. It describes how things are, and it is true or false, 
if the states of affairs are, or are not, as it states.   
 
In uttering a performative, on the other hand, I do not describe a state 
of affairs, or report something, and my utterance cannot be taken to be 
true or false. Instead, I do something. For example, in a marriage 
ceremony, when I say ‘I do’, ‘I am not reporting on a marriage: I am 
indulging in it’ (Austin, 1975, p. 6); or when in some official ceremony 
I am supposed to name a ship, I say, ‘I name this ship the Queen 
Elizabeth’; or when I say ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’. 
Other examples include: ‘I promise that ...’ and ‘I apologize’. Thus, in 
uttering a performative we get married, or name something, or 
promise, or apologize. What we say is not true or false, and we don’t 
state, or describe, or report anything. We do something else. 
  
                                                          
and he rejects that all declarative sentences describe states of affairs. In both, Austin 
attacks what we might call the ‘referential picture of language’. 
79 In the three later works mentioned above, HTDW, ‘Performative Utterances’ and 
‘Performatives-Constatives’, Austin examines the distinction before declaring that it 
is not working. Most of what follows depends on the characterization of the 
distinction as it appears in the major work, HTDW, Austin (1975). 
80 Austin in (1975) was suspicious of the two terms: ‘descriptive fallacy’ and 
‘statements’, ‘perhaps this is not a good name, as 'descriptive' itself is special. Not 
all true or false statements are descriptions, and for this reason I prefer to use the 
word 'Constative'.’ (Austin, 1975, p. 3).  The point is this: the fallacy takes all 
utterances of the affirmative grammatical form as either true or false. The utterances 
which are either true or false are ‘constatives’. Austin was led to see that there is a 
problem in lumping all these terms, such as stating, describing, reporting…etc. under 
the heading ‘descriptive’ or ‘statement’. See ‘How to Talk’, where Austin tries to 
give an account of the differences between these different terms. We need a term to 
describe what seems to be either true or false, and ‘Constative’ is the one Austin 
used in his major work, HTDW (1975). 
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However, simply uttering a performative is not sufficient to constitute 
the specific act, as can be seen in the cases above. Saying a few words 
is not marrying: ‘The words have to be said in the appropriate 
circumstances.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 236). One way to highlight this 
dependence on appropriate circumstances is to consider how we might 
fail in doing the act. For example, if I am married already, then saying 
‘I do’ in the ceremony, will not make me married. If I am not the 
person who was chosen to name the ship, then saying ‘I name this 
ship…’  fails: the ship was not named, even though I uttered the words; 
and if no one wants to bet me, then I haven’t bet anyone. In each of 
these situations something goes wrong because some factor in the 
context is inappropriate. In such circumstances, according to Austin, 
the act is ‘to some extent a failure: the utterance is then, we may say, 
not indeed false but in general unhappy’. (Austin, 1975, p. 133).  
  
However, in the next section we will see that there is some tension 
inherent in the constative/performative distinction which becomes 
apparent in Austin’s reply to Strawson.  
 
2.2.2. A problem in the distinction - background 
 
In 2.1, we saw that Austin rejects claim A on the grounds of ‘true’ 
being a dimension word. However, it is his discussion of claim B that 
leads to the realisation that the distinction between performatives and 
constatives may be unstable. To see precisely how this comes about, 
it is necessary to understand the background to Strawson’s claim B. 
 
The historical account of Austin-Strawson debate is important. The 
debate is initiated by Austin’s paper ‘Other Minds’ (1946), which 
introduces the descriptive fallacy and the constative / performatives 
distinction. This is followed by Strawson’s ‘Truth’ (1949), which 
elaborates Austin’s distinction and applies it to ‘truth’, and then finally 
we have both Austin’s ‘Truth’ (1950), and Strawson’s reply ‘Truth’ 
(1950). 
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Strawson introduces his theory of truth in ‘Truth’ (1949), as an 
elaboration of Austin’s distinction between performatives and 
constatives. According to Strawson, ‘the phrase 'is true' is not 
descriptive at all.’ (Strawson, 1949, p. 94). He explains that the source 
of the problematic accounts of ‘truth’ which he finds in the literature 
‘is the ancient prejudice that any indicative sentence is, or makes, a 
statement.’ (Strawson, 1949, p. 94). In other words, that all declarative 
sentences are descriptive: what Austin calls the descriptive fallacy. 
Strawson suggests that there are other uses of declarative sentences, 
which he calls ‘performatory’, taking this term from Austin’s ‘Other 
Minds’, as opposed to ‘descriptive’, ‘assertive’… etc.81   
 
According to Strawson, ‘the phrase ‘is true' can sometimes be 
replaced, without any important change in meaning, by some such 
phrase as "I confirm it", which is performatory...’82 (Strawson, 1949, 
p. 95). For Strawson, the prejudice, or the fallacy, is to take every 
indicative sentence as descriptive, assertive, etc. whereas, in fact, some 
utterances of the declarative mood are not descriptive. Just as Austin 
says that ‘I promise’ and ‘I know’ are not descriptive but performative, 
so, according to Strawson, ‘is true’ isn’t descriptive or assertive: 
instead, it shows that I confirm something, agree with it…etc.  
Strawson’s theory takes its name ‘the performative theory of truth’ 
from that idea, that in uttering ‘is true’ we perform something: we 
agree or confirm what someone has said. This is what I called claim 
B.  
 
                                                          
81 Austin suggests that ‘I know such and such’ and ‘I promise’ are performative, and 
not descriptive. See Austin, 1979, pp. 98-103.  
82 In both papers, Austin (1946) and Strawson (1949), the promise is that we would 
know something about ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ by seeing that ‘I know…’ and ‘P is 
true’ are not descriptive but performative. For a criticism of both, see Searle’s 
influential criticism in Searle (1962) and Searle (1969). For a recent attempt to 
defend Austin and Strawson see Avner Baz (2012): chapters 1 and 2. 
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In his analysis of Strawson’s theory, Austin agrees with ‘claim B’. He 
says: ‘I agree that to say that ST [statement is true] 'is' very often, and 
according to the all-important linguistic occasion, to confirm tstS [the 
statement that S] or to grant it or what not.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 133). 
However, he adds, ‘but this cannot show that to say that ST [Statement 
is true] is not also and at the same time to make an assertion about tstS 
[the statement that S].’ (Austin, 1979, p. 133). Austin argues, as we 
have seen in 2.1, that ‘is true’ is used to make an assertion about P, 
and therefore he rejects claim A.  
 
He explains that ‘[I]t is common for quite ordinary statements to have 
a performatory 'aspect': to say that you are a cuckold may be to insult 
you, but it is also and at the same time to make a statement which is 
true or false.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 133). Austin thus agrees with Strawson 
that there is a performative aspect to ‘is true’, but, unlike Strawson, he 
also thinks that there is a descriptive aspect.  
2.2.3. The collapse of the distinction 
 
Perhaps part of the problem in interpreting Austin on this matter stems 
from a lack of clarity in his exposition of the relation between 
constatives and performatives. In the same paper, ‘Truth’, Austin says 
that ‘many utterances which have been taken to be statements…are 
not in fact descriptive, nor susceptible of being true or false.’ (Austin, 
1979, p. 131). He gives some examples, performatives being one83. 
However, in his criticism of Strawson’s claim B, he states that it is 
common for statements to have a performatory aspect. The utterance 
‘you are a cuckold’ is both: it is performative, to insult you, and it is 
descriptive, it is a statement, which is either true or false. 
  
The difficulty is that this position seems inconsistent: on the one hand 
Austin seems to be denying performatives the capability to indicate 
truth or falsehood, but, on the other, he seems to grant this ability. As 
                                                          
83 See Austin, 1979, p. 133. 
156 
 
a result, the fundamental distinction between performatives and 
constatives seems to be threatened, and Austin himself quickly realises 
this.  
 
In particular, he recognises that for both kinds of utterances we often 
appraise the relation between the words and the world in the same way, 
using the same family of terms which belong to the dimension of 
‘truth’. Any utterance is appraised in relation to both the appropriate 
circumstances under which it is uttered, and the facts which the 
utterance somehow ‘corresponds’ to. Thus, constatives are assessed 
(being true or false) in relation to facts, as is the ‘happiness’ of some 
performatives: we estimate rightly or wrongly; we find correctly or 
incorrectly; we argue soundly; we advise well; we judge fairly; we 
blame justifiably. In all these cases, our assessment relies on the facts: 
‘the question always arises whether the praise, blame, or 
congratulation was merited or unmerited’. (Austin, 1975, p. 141). 
 
Equally, ‘such adverbs as ‘rightly’, ‘wrongly’, ‘correctly', and 
'incorrectly' are used with statements too.’ (Austin, 1975, p. 141). All 
this makes us question the original distinction between two kinds of 
utterances, constatives which are merely true or false and correspond 
to facts, and performatives, which were thought not to be true or false 
in virtue of neither describing nor stating things, and therefore did not 
correspond to facts. As a result, Austin asks ‘Can we be sure that 
stating truly is a different class of assessment from arguing soundly, 
advising well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably? Do these 
[performatives] not have something to do in complicated ways with 
facts?’ (Austin, 1975, p. 142). In assessing a performative to be happy 
or unhappy, using the adjectives above, ‘[F]acts come in as our 
knowledge or opinion about facts.’ (Austin, 1975, p. 142). In other 
words, the happiness or unhappiness of performatives, which 
originally were thought to be independent of the facts, turns out to be 
related to facts, as are constatives.  
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A similar difficulty arises when we consider constatives, whose truth 
values were originally thought to be independent of the circumstances 
of uttering the words. Austin gives the following example. ‘Suppose 
that we confront 'France is hexagonal' with the facts, in this case, I 
suppose, with France, is it true or false? Well, if you like, up to a point; 
of course I can see what you mean by saying that it is true for certain 
intents and purposes.’ (Austin, 1975, p. 143). According to Austin, it 
is a ‘rough description’. But we can’t simply assess if it is true or false. 
Thus, ‘it is good enough for a general top-ranking general, but not for 
a geographer’. (Austin, 1975, p. 143). It is difficult to see how we can 
say it is true or false, without taking the circumstances of uttering it 
into account. Take another example: ‘Lord Raglan won the battle of 
Alma’. This is good enough for a school book, but not for a historical 
research. More examples from ‘Truth’ include: ‘Belfast is north of 
London’, ‘the galaxy is the shape of fried egg’.84 In all these cases, it 
seems that we can’t tell if the statement is true or false without taking 
into account the circumstances under which it was uttered.  
 
The upshot of this is that the distinction between performatives and 
constatives collapses. The distinction was supposed to show us that we 
have on one hand utterances which are true or false, which corresponds 
to the facts and are independent of the circumstances of utterance, and 
on the other hand, utterances which are not true or false, and are 
assessed according to the circumstances under which they are uttered. 
The above examination shows us that both kinds of utterances are 
often related both to facts and to the circumstances under which they 
uttered, and that they are both assessed in similar ways. And the key 
reason for this, according to Austin, is his view of ‘truth’ as a 
dimension word. The terms which we use in assessing the 
preformatives overlap with the terms we use in assessing constatives: 
we use the same family of words to describe and assess both 
                                                          
84 See the discussion above in 2.1 on the last example.  
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performatives and constatives. Austin concludes ‘[W]hen a constative 
is confronted with the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving 
the employment of a vast array of terms which overlap with those that 
we use in the appraisal of performatives.’ (Austin, 1975, pp. 142-143). 
 
2.3. Austin’s theory of speech acts and the role of ‘truth’ 
 
The failure of the distinction between ‘performatives’ and 
‘constatives’ prompted Austin to propose a new theory of speech acts. 
His key idea was that in analysing utterances we should distinguish 
between a locutionary act and an illocutionary act.  
 
The locutionary act is ‘the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of 
certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with 
a certain 'meaning'…’. (Austin, 1975, p. 94). This contrasts with the 
illocutionary act. As Austin puts it: ‘To determine what illocutionary 
act is so performed we must determine in what way we are using the 
locution: 
 
‘asking or answering a question, 
giving some information or an assurance or a warning, 
announcing a verdict or an intention, 
pronouncing a sentence, 
making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism, 
making an identification or giving a description, 
and the numerous like.’ (Austin, 1975, pp. 98-99). 
 
What we have here, then, is a new theory which distinguishes between 
two acts. Every utterance85 possesses a ‘locutionary act’ and an 
‘illocutionary act’, or what Austin sometimes calls ‘meaning’ and 
                                                          
85 Actually, almost every utterance: ‘whenever I 'say' anything (except perhaps a 
mere exclamation like 'damn' or 'ouch') I shall be performing both locutionary and 
illocutionary acts.’ (Austin, 1979, p. 133). 
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‘force’ respectively.86 Thus, for example, we distinguish between the 
meaning of the utterance: ‘Shoot her!’, and the force of that utterance, 
which depends on the circumstances but could consist in urging, or 
advising, or ordering me to shoot her.87  
 
Precisely how to interpret this distinction, and how it relates to ‘truth’ 
is disputed, and in what follows I will discuss two interpretations, 
concluding that one of them seems to be more compatible with 
Austin’s text. The first interpretation I call the ‘propositional 
interpretation’, following Strawson, and the second the ‘pragmatic 
view’, following Charles Travis.  
 
The propositional interpretation states the following: The locutionary 
meaning is to be identified with what was known as ‘constative’, or 
‘statement’ or ‘proposition’. The idea is that there is part of the speech 
act which corresponds to the facts, and which is to be ‘true’ or ‘false’. 
This part of speech act is the locutionary aspect.  
 
The pragmatic view, as I characterise it, states that what is true or false 
is the whole speech act. Whilst there is a distinction to be made 
between ‘meaning’ and ‘force’, between the locutionary and 
illocutionary parts, ‘meaning’ is not to be identified with what is true 
or false. I will argue that the crucial role of ‘truth’ as a dimension word 
will support the second interpretation.  
 
 
 
                                                          
86 Note that Austin gives a technical sense to both ‘meaning’ and ‘force’. 
‘Admittedly we can use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force- 'He 
meant it as an order', &c. But I want to distinguish force and meaning.’ (Austin, 
1975, p. 100).  
87 The example is from Austin, 1975, pp.101-102.  
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2.3.1. The Searle-Strawson interpretation: locutionary meaning and 
truth. 
 
Searle and Strawson both suggest that, for Austin, the locutionary 
meaning is the part of the utterance which is either true or false. Let us 
start with Searle. What is the distinction between locutionary and 
illocutionary acts? Searle writes: ‘Austin may have had in mind the 
distinction between the content or, as some philosophers call it, the 
proposition… and the force or illocutionary type of the act. Thus, for 
example, the proposition that I will leave may be a common content 
of different utterances with different illocutionary forces, for I can 
threaten, warn, state, predict, or promise that I will leave. … the same 
propositional act can  occur in all sorts of different illocutionary acts.’ 
(Searle, 1973, p. 155). It seems to me that Austin would agree with 
this characterization of the distinction so far.  As we have seen above, 
‘shoot her’ might be taken as advising, ordering, urging…etc, and 
these are different illocutionary forces, but the ‘content’, ‘the 
proposition’, the ‘locutionary meaning’, is the same in all of them. 
However, I will argue that Austin would not agree with what follows.  
 
Searle continues, ‘it is the proposition which involves 
"correspondence with the facts."… Propositions … can be true or 
false.’ (Searle, 1973, pp. 158-159). Searle then takes the content, the 
locutionary meaning, to be the part which is either true or false.  
 
Strawson has a similar view. He suggests the following interpretation 
of the locutionary meaning. ‘Propositions… are supposed to be bearers 
of truth-value…On any view, propositions may be expressed by parts 
of utterances… parts which are not themselves advanced with the 
force which belongs to the utterance as a whole; and it may be 
expedient to … [replace]… the term ‘propositions’…with one less 
general. For the purpose Austin’s own term ‘constative’ offers itself 
as a convenient candidate’. (Strawson, 1973, pp. 59-61). Strawson 
suggests that we can abstract from the whole utterance the locutionary 
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meaning, and separate it from the force. The locutionary meaning is 
the proposition, or the constative, and is what is true or false. 
 
It is important to note that Searle and Strawson don’t claim that they 
are just giving an interpretation to Austin’s distinction: according to 
them, Austin himself is not completely clear about the distinction. For 
them, there is something in Austin’s discussion which supports their 
‘propositional interpretation’, but there are other parts which don’t. In 
analysing their position, I will start, in 2.3.2, with the elements in 
Austin’s text which they think support their reading. I will argue that 
their reading of Austin is not very convincing, because they don’t take 
into account his clear view that ‘true’ is a dimension word.  Then, in 
2.3.3, I will address the part in Austin’s text which Searle thinks 
doesn’t support his reading. I will show that this may be based on a 
misunderstanding in reading Austin’s views on ‘truth’.88 My claim 
will be that taking proper account of the nature of ‘true’ as a dimension 
word leads to the view that what is true or false is the whole speech 
act, and not any single part of it.  
 
2.3.2. The constative/performative and locutionary/illocutionary 
distinctions  
 
I said above that Searle and Strawson find indications in Austin’s 
account of locutionary meaning which encourage them to adopt the 
propositional interpretation. This largely consists in what they take to 
be continuity between, on the one hand, the distinction between 
performatives and constatives, and, on the other, that between the 
locutionary and the illocutionary. 
  
Austin comments on the relation between the two distinctions as 
follows. ‘With the constative utterance, we abstract from the 
                                                          
88 Both Searle and Strawson change their minds about the issue, in different places 
and at different times. I examine here only their direct discussion of Austin.  
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illocutionary … aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the 
locutionary… With the performative utterance, we attend as much as 
possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from 
the dimension of correspondence with facts.’ (Austin, 1975, pp. 145-
146). Both Strawson and Searle cite this remark to motivate their 
reading89, and, taken in isolation, it perhaps seems reasonable to infer 
that Austin’s view is that the locutionary meaning is the heir of the 
constative, what is true or false, and the illocutionary force is the heir 
of the performative, doing something like arguing, stating, 
warning…etc. 
 
However, on the same page Austin also writes:  
 
‘Perhaps neither of these abstractions [constative as focusing on the 
locutionary, and performative as focusing on the illocutionary] is so 
very expedient: perhaps we have here not really two poles, but rather 
an historical development. Now in certain cases, perhaps with 
mathematical formulas in physics books as examples of constatives, 
or with the issuing of simple executive orders or the giving of simple 
names, say, as examples of performatives, we approximate in real life 
to finding such things. It was examples of this kind, like 'I apologize', 
and 'The cat is on the mat', said for no conceivable reason, extreme 
marginal cases, that gave rise to the idea of two distinct utterances.’ 
(Austin, 1975, p. 146).  
 
Austin here makes explicit the instability of the distinction between 
constatives and performatives that I identified at the end of 2.2. Whilst 
there are extreme cases where the distinction is clear, the vast majority 
of constatives and performatives fail to conform to this strict 
interpretation, and Austin, instead, seems to argue precisely for 
                                                          
89 See Strawson, 1973, p. 53, and Searle, 1973, p. 155. 
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making a break with the very notion of such a distinction in practice.90 
It is on the basis of this realisation that Austin wants to introduce his 
new theory of speech acts, the collapse of the old distinction having 
been driven, as we saw earlier, by the recognition that ‘true’ is a 
dimension word, and that we use the same family of words to appraise 
both kinds of utterances. 
 
The strange thing about Searle and Strawson’s reading (apart from 
failing to place in context the quotation on which they rely) is that it 
seems to fall back into the same problem that led Austin to move away 
from the constative/performative distinction and propose the new 
speech act theory. In particular, it seems that Austin recognises that at 
the heart of the collapse of the distinction is the realisation that we 
can’t separate the two categories by appealing to two distinct notions 
of appraisal: true/false and happy/unhappy. However, if the 
locutionary act is not strictly heir to the constative, what is it in an 
utterance which can be validly appraised as being ‘true’ or ‘false’? 
 
I claim that the most plausible reading of Austin’s position is that 
being true or false is to be assessed in relation to a whole speech act, 
and not any part of it. This position is consistent with the moral of the 
                                                          
90 Regarding the view that there are cases where the truth of what is said is not related 
to the circumstances under which the utterance is issued, and that Austin accepts that 
in some case this is valid, see the following. Travis in ‘Truth and Merit’ (2011) 
suggests that there might be reconciliation between two views on ‘truth’. And maybe 
the first one which he attributes to Frege, which doesn’t take into account the 
circumstances, is valid for some cases, while Austin’s view is valid in others. A 
similar suggestion is to be found in Warnock, 1989, pp. 59-61.  I agree with these 
readings. But the issues would be beyond the context of this reading. It seems to me 
that Austin, in this very compressed remark, doesn’t make distinctions between two 
cases which he says reach the ‘ideal’ of ‘constatives’ and ‘performatives’: First, the 
cases in mathematics and logic, where the circumstances under which the utterance 
is issued are not important. Second, the ‘marginal cases’ in OL, where we reach the 
two extremes. And then there is also a third issue regarding the notion of ‘historical 
development’, where it seems that he suggests that language was first used as pure 
‘performative’ or pure ‘constatives’ and later developed into the current mixture of 
both. These are clearly three different issues that cannot be fully explored here. 
However, the key point for present purposes is that although, on rare occasions, the  
ideal conceptions of the two terms can be validly employed, the vast majority of 
utterances are not polarised in this way.  
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collapse of the first distinction, where we had to take into account that 
the terms of assessment of ‘true’ and ‘false’ merged and overlapped 
with terms of assessments of ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’. The lesson there 
was that both types of assessment generally depended on, and were 
determined by, both facts and circumstances of utterance.  
 
Finally, let me clarify one aspect of my objection to the propositional 
reading. The problem with identifying the locutionary meaning as that 
which is true or false is that it treats it as a ‘proposition’ which is to be 
appraised as true or false regardless of the circumstances under which 
it is uttered. Whilst I take Austin to agree with Searle, as we have seen 
in 2.3.1, that the locutionary meaning might be shared by different 
speech acts and that it is something which we abstract from those 
different speech acts, Searle identifies the locutionary meaning with 
what is true or false, whereas I argue that Austin doesn’t. If Searle is 
right, then the locutionary meaning, which we abstract from different 
speech acts, can by itself - and independently of being uttered under 
specific circumstances, since it is abstracted from the actual 
circumstances under which it is uttered - be true or false. This is 
precisely the opposite of what I have tried to show for Austin: that the 
circumstances under which we utter the words is vital for applying the 
terms of the ‘truth’ family.  
 
And this account is symmetrical with Austin’s account of dimension 
words, and truth in particular. Whilst, in extreme cases, the abstract 
component of the dimension word can be used on its own without 
reference to the circumstances of use, in almost every normal case the 
abstract element is too weak to be used and, instead, other words in 
the same family are employed, words which better reflect the context.  
 
In summary, I argue that Searle and Strawson’s account is not 
compatible with Austin’s text, and that, in the general case, it is the 
whole speech act which is to be judged ‘true’ or ‘false’. This does not 
deny that there is a relation between the constative/performative 
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distinction and the locutionary/illocunary distinction. Indeed, Austin 
himself thinks that there is such a relation: ‘[T]he doctrine of the 
performative/constative distinction stands to the doctrine of 
locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech act as the special 
theory to the general theory.’ (Austin, 1975, p. 148). However, as I 
have shown, Austin doesn’t think that the locutionary meaning is the 
heir of the constative in the crucial sense that it is not what is true or 
false.  
However, Searle has a further line of attack.  
 
2.3.3. Searle’s second reading of Austin’s theory of truth  
 
Searle says that he wants to examine ‘one of Austin's most important 
discoveries, the discovery that constatives are illocutionary acts as 
well as performatives, or, in short, the discovery that statements are 
speech acts.’ (Searle, 1973, p. 157). It is true, as Searle explains, that 
Austin in the new theory regards stating, describing, arguing, 
warning…etc., as illocutionary forces. ‘Stating, describing, &c., are 
just two names among a very great many others for illocutionary 
acts...’ (Austin, 1975, pp. 148-149). It is this discovery, however, with 
which Searle in fact agrees, that Searle identifies as the source of the 
mistakes in Austin’s theory of truth.  
 
Searle starts by explaining that ‘statement’ ‘is structurally ambiguous.’ 
(Searle, 1973, p. 157). It has two meanings: ‘"Statement" can mean 
either the act of stating or what is stated.’ (Searle, 1973, p. 157). He 
calls the former ‘statement-acts’, which are illocutionary acts, and the 
latter ‘statement-objects’, which are the propositions/locutionary 
meanings stated. According to him, the distinction helps us to identify 
what is ‘true’ or ‘false’ clearly: ‘Propositions but not acts can be true 
or false; thus statement-objects but not statement-acts can be true or 
false.’ (Searle, 1973, p. 159).  It is the statement-object, the 
proposition, and not the illocutionary act of stating, Searle claims, 
which is to be identified as what is ‘true’ or ‘false’. 
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Austin, Searle thinks, has confused the two: ‘[T]he failure to take into 
account the structural ambiguity of ‘statement’… had very important 
consequences... For since statements are [illocutionary] speech acts, 
and since statements [the statement-objects, the propositions] can be 
true or false, it appears that that which is true or false is a 
[illocutionary] speech act. But this inference is fallacious, as it 
involves a fallacy of ambiguity…And the view that it is the act of 
stating which is true or false is one of the most serious weaknesses of 
Austin's theory of truth.’ (Searle, 1973, p. 157). Searle concludes, 
‘Statement-acts are illocutionary acts of stating. Statement-objects are 
propositions … The latter but not the former can be true or false. And 
it is the confusion between these which prevented Austin from seeing 
… [that illocutionary] acts cannot have truth values.’ (Searle, 1973, p. 
159). For Searle, it is the locutionary meaning / the proposition/ the 
statement-object which is true or false.  Austin was mistaken in taking 
the illocutionary act of stating to be true or false because Austin 
confused the act of stating with what is stated.  
 
I find this reading problematic for two reasons.  Firstly, Austin uses 
the term ‘constatives’ rather than ‘statements’ in his later writings, 
such as his major work on speech acts, HTDW. It therefore makes it 
difficult to understand the suggestion that he equivocates on the term 
‘statements’ in his argument. Indeed, it seems from Austin’s 
reservations of the terms used to designate what is true or false in the 
initial distinction he makes, that he was at pains to avoid using 
terminology that carries any specific traditional philosophical charge, 
precisely to avoid misleading himself or the reader.  
 
Secondly, Searle’s reading does not engage with the idea that for 
Austin ‘true’ is a dimension word. This means, as we have seen, that 
Austin thinks that we apply a family of different terms to appraise the 
relation between utterances and the world, and that it is therefore the 
full speech act which is liable to be ‘true’ or ‘false’. In particular, it 
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seems clear that he believes that the whole speech act is assessed for 
truth or falsehood, whatever the illocutionary force. In addition, 
Searle’s position here is weak because of the lack of pertinent textual 
evidence in support of his claim. Although Searle is perfectly right in 
saying that, for Austin, stating is an illocutionary force, there is no 
textual evidence to suggest that Austin might have thought that what 
is true or false is the illocutionary act of stating alone. In fact, there is 
a paragraph where Austin seems explicitly to reject Searle’s reading. 
Here is what Austin writes in the last lecture of HTDW, on the same 
page where he says that stating is an illocutionary force:  
 
‘Stating, describing, &c., are just two names among a very great many 
others for illocutionary acts; they have no unique position… In 
particular, they have no unique position over the matter of being 
related to facts in a unique way called being true or false, because truth 
and falsity are (except by an artificial abstraction which is always 
possible and legitimate for certain purposes) not names for relations, 
qualities, or what not, but for a dimension of assessment-how the 
words stand in respect of satisfactoriness to the facts, events, 
situations, &c., to which they refer.’ (Austin, 1975, pp. 148-149). 
 
Here, then, Austin re-states the position that we examined earlier: 
except in extreme cases or artificial circumstances of abstraction, truth 
and falsity represent a family or dimension of terms the use of which 
depends upon the circumstances (facts, situations etc), and 
illocutionary acts of any type, whether or not they consist in stating or 
describing, are insufficient on their own to determine truth or falsity. 
Instead, consideration of the speech act in the round is necessary for 
such an assessment.  
 
It therefore doesn’t seem that Austin was misled by the two meanings 
of ‘statements’, as Searle claims, since this assertion is not backed up 
by the text (he doesn’t use ‘statement’ in his initial distinction to refer 
to what is true or false in HTDW), nor is it compatible with Austin’s 
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explicit perspective on ‘truth’ as a dimension word, a factor which 
Searle ignores.  
 
The next section draws to a conclusion the examination of ‘true’ and 
the importance for Austin of its being a dimension word by focusing 
on a recent debate between Alice Crary and Nat Hansen concerning 
Austin’s view of ‘literal meaning’. I will argue that whilst both parties 
represent some aspects of Austin’s position correctly, it is again the 
failure to ramify fully his view that ‘true’ is a dimension word that 
undermines their conclusions.  
 
2.3.4. The Crary-Hansen debate: literal meaning and truth 
 
Crary gives a reading of Austin which portrays him as someone who 
attacks the view of ‘literal meaning’. According to Crary, Austin tries 
to show that the ‘traditional statement’ is an illusion. ‘The picture of 
correspondence between language and the facts that Austin takes to be 
implicit in a traditional ideal of the ‘statement’ is one on which the 
business of corresponding to the facts is the prerogative of what might 
be called bi-polar ‘statements’ or propositions, i.e. ‘statements’ or 
propositions that always describe states of affairs either truly or 
falsely.’ (Crary, 2002, pp. 59-60). And this perspective on Austin’s 
work seems to be consistent with my analysis above: the collapse of 
the constative/performative distinction and the realisation of the 
importance of the recognition of ‘truth’ as a dimension word clearly 
militate against the ‘traditional statement’ which is either true or false. 
 
However, Crary continues ‘[Austin] proceeds by arguing that this idea 
[the traditional statement] is nourished by a view of meaning on which 
sentences possess what are sometimes called literal meanings (i.e. 
meanings they carry with them into every context of use) and by 
arguing that this view fails to withstand critical scrutiny.’ (Crary, 
2002, p. 60). According to Crary, Austin attacks the traditional 
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statement and its traditional ‘true’ or ‘false’ by attacking the view of 
‘literal meaning’.  
 
Hansen disagrees with Crary. He argues that Austin seems to endorse 
the literal meaning view, where literal meaning ‘is that grasp of the 
meanings of words and the rules by which they are combined into 
complex expressions (including sentences) [which] enables one to 
know what has to be the case in order for the sentence to be true.’ 
(Hansen, 2012, p. 3). 
 
The question which Crary and Hansen debate is thus whether Austin 
thinks that there is a literal meaning of sentences which is what is true 
or false, and is invariant over different uses. Crary thinks that he 
doesn’t and Hansen thinks that he does. In what follows I will seek to 
show that the answer is somewhere between these two poles: I suggest 
that for Austin there is indeed a literal meaning which the sentence 
carries with it in all its uses, but this literal meaning is not to be 
identified with what is true or false.  
 
Crary’s argument can be divided into two steps. In the first, Crary 
maintains that ‘Austin stresses that he thinks that whenever I say 
anything (except things like ‘ouch’ and ‘damn’) I perform both a 
locutionary act ... and an illocutionary act…He is drawn towards this 
view by the thought that there is no such thing as identifying the 
meaning of a combination of words (or: no such thing as identifying 
the ‘locutionary act’ performed when a combination of words is 
uttered) independently of an appreciation of how those words are 
being used to say something to someone on a particular occasion (or: 
independently of an appreciation of their ‘illocutionary force’)’ 
(Crary, 2002, p. 680. 
 
In the second, Crary takes the interrelated connection between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts to show that there cannot be a literal 
meaning of sentences. ‘Austin’s account of locutionary and 
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illocutionary acts, taken as a whole, brings into question the idea that 
we might develop a theory that could be used to identify the 
locutionary acts performed whenever particular sentences are used… 
he criticizes it by rejecting as flawed an idea that it presupposes, viz., 
that it is possible to isolate the locutionary act that is performed when 
a particular sentence is employed in the absence of a grasp of the 
illocutionary force with which it is being used.’ (Crary, 2002, pp. 69-
70). 
 
According to Crary, then, Austin thinks that the sentence cannot carry 
with it an invariant literal meaning in all its uses because in order to 
understand an utterance, the whole speech act has to be grasped. 
Because we can’t separate the two acts, because we need to understand 
the speech act as a whole, it is not possible to understand the 
‘locutionary meaning’ in isolation from the whole speech act, and 
there therefore cannot be an invariant literal meaning.  
 
Hansen disagrees. Firstly, he maintains that Austin thought that 
locutionary acts could be separated from illocutionary acts. ‘Austin 
nowhere explicitly commits himself to the idea that identifying the 
locutionary act performed by an utterance requires an appreciation of 
the illocutionary act performed by that utterance as well.’ (Hansen, 
2012, p. 6). He quotes Austin saying that ‘it might be perfectly 
possible, with regard to an utterance, say 'It is going to charge', to make 
entirely plain 'what we were saying' in issuing the utterance… and yet 
not at all to have cleared up whether or not in issuing the utterance I 
was performing the [illocutionary] act of warning or not. It may be 
perfectly clear what I mean by 'It is going to charge' or 'Shut the door', 
but not clear whether it is meant as a statement or warning, &c.’ 
(Austin, 1975, p. 98). If Hansen is correct, and we can understand the 
locutionary meaning in isolation from the illocutionary force, it might 
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be possible to read Austin as allowing that a literal meaning might be 
assigned to the locutionary part.91  
 
But Hansen, secondly, goes further. According to him, even if you 
have to understand the whole speech act in order to understand the 
locutionary meaning, this does not entail that there is no ‘literal 
meaning’. As long as there is a distinction between ‘meaning’ and 
‘force’, and as long as we think that there is a way to make this 
distinction clear, it is possible that different speech acts might have 
different ‘forces’ and still share the same ‘meaning’. He maintains that 
there is nothing in Crary’s argument which blocks this approach92 and 
that, as a result, it is plausible that this shared ‘meaning’ is indeed 
invariant across different uses, and is what is true or false. 
  
However, both Crary’s and Hansen’s accounts of what is ‘true’ or 
‘false’ and the locutionary/illocutionary distinction is problematic. 
Crary, on the one hand, argues that for Austin there is no literal 
meaning, whereas Hansen, on the other, argues that probably for 
Austin there is such a literal meaning. I argue that the answer is in the 
middle: for Austin, there is indeed a literal meaning which the sentence 
carries with it in all its uses, but this literal meaning is not what is true 
or false.  
 
The pertinent issue, it seems to me, is the one discussed earlier in 
relation to Searle and Strawson’s propositional interpretation: it is the 
whole speech act which needs to be taken into account in order to 
assess the ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ of an utterance. 
   
Thus, based on the textual analysis and the earlier interpretations, it 
seems that Austin’s position may run something like this. On the one 
                                                          
91 See Hansen, 2012, pp. 6-7. He is aware that the text is not conclusive, which is 
why he only thinks we might attribute to Austin the literal meaning view.  
92 See Hansen, 2102, p. 6. 
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hand, Austin stresses that the illocutionary and locutionary are 
inseparable as acts. Austin writes about the relation between 
locutionary meaning and illocutionary force: ‘in general the 
locutionary act as much as the illocutionary is an abstraction only: 
every genuine speech act is both…’93 (Austin, 1975, p. 147).  Again, 
he says that ‘[T]o perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, 
also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act.’ (Austin, 1975, p. 98). 
It seems that this is what impresses Crary and gives strength to her 
reading. However, on the other hand, it seems clear that Austin doesn’t 
preclude (and may even support) the idea that the same locutionary 
meaning may persist across different forces. I agree with Hansen that 
it doesn’t seem that there is textual evidence for taking Austin to reject 
such an idea. The key point, though, is that this apparently stable and 
independent meaning is not truth evaluable: this is the province of the 
whole speech act.  
 
I therefore agree with Hansen that for Austin it is possible to abstract 
from the whole speech act ‘meaning’ and ‘force’, and that it is possible 
to abstract the ‘literal meaning’ of sentences, the ‘locutionary 
meaning’ from different speech acts. For example, by uttering ‘Shoot 
her!’, we might have different forces, such as urging, or advising, or 
ordering me to shoot her, but we have one locutionary meaning ‘Shoot 
her’. (Austin, 1975, pp. 101-102). In that sense, there might be literal 
meaning which is invariant in different uses. However, Hansen 
conflates meaning and truth evaluability in making his claim that the 
literal meaning, once abstracted, is what is true or false. On this point, 
Austin is better interpreted as I explained above: for him what is true 
or false is the whole speech act.  
 
Some indirect support for this position can be found in Charles 
Travis’s work. Whilst Travis does not give an explicit interpretation 
                                                          
93 He adds, ‘But, of course, typically we distinguish different abstracted 'acts'…’  
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of Austin’s text nor does he cash out his ‘pragmatic view’, as he calls 
it, in terms of locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, he 
nevertheless acknowledges Austin as an inspiration.  He (Travis) 
mainly focuses on the interrelation between being true and false and 
being uttered under specific circumstances. In particular, there is 
common ground in the idea that there is a level of meaning which the 
words (sentences) have, which is constant in different uses, but which 
is separate from the issue of being true or false.  
 
Travis distinguishes between two kinds of what he calls semantic 
properties for sentences. ‘The first sort of property is one of relating 
in a given way to truth (or falsity). Properties of being true (false) if, 
given, of, or only if, thus and so, or thus, or the way things are, are all 
within this class… The second sort are properties identified without 
mention of truth, and on which truth-involving properties depend’. 
(Travis, 2008, p. 110). According to Travis, there are some properties, 
what we can describe as a level of meaning the words (sentences) 
would have independent of being true or false. However, there is 
another level of meaning, other properties which relate to judgements 
of true or false. There is here a distinction between what the words 
mean on the one hand, and what is to be true or false on the other, the 
latter is to be identified according to a specific speaking of the words, 
in specific conditions. 
  
This distinction between two levels of meaning is very close to the 
interpretation I give to Austin’s text. I argued that for Austin, there is 
a level of meaning the words have (the locutionary part of the speech 
act), independent of being true or false. This seems to be invariant in 
different uses. Travis’s view is that this level of ‘[M]eaning fixes 
something words would do (and say) wherever spoken meaning what 
they do; something they are for, so also something about what they 
ought to do.’ (Travis, 2008, p. 96). This level fixes meaning in a way 
which is not related to any specific speaking of the words, and is not 
related to being true or false.  
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I also argued that being true or false is related to issuing a whole 
speech act in a specific situation. Travis’s view is that what words (a 
sentence) ‘mean leaves it open for them to be used (in suitable 
circumstances) to say any of various things, each true under, and on, 
different conditions.’ (Travis, 2008, p. 97). For Travis then, being true 
or false is a matter of uttering the words, the speech act, under specific 
circumstances, in specific conditions. Different speakings of the words 
share the same first level of meaning, which is constant and invariant, 
but being true or false is a matter for a specific speaking of the words 
under specific circumstances.   
 
3. Conclusions 
 
3.1. ‘True’ as a dimension word 
 
We saw that one of the central examples in Austin’s work, ‘truth’, is 
directly related to the unity problem. Austin protests against the 
assumption that ‘truth’ stands for something simple, that it has one 
meaning: ‘it is essential to realize that ‘true’ and ‘false’… do not stand 
for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a 
right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these 
circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with theses 
intentions.’ (Austin, 1975, p. 145). ‘True’, according to Austin, is a 
dimension word, it has one and the same semantic function in all its 
uses, but different specific meanings according to the context. It is the 
most abstract word in a family of words that are used to assess the 
relation between words and the world, ‘truth and falsity are (except by 
an artificial abstraction which is always possible and legitimate for 
certain purposes) not names for relations, qualities, or what not, but 
for a dimension of assessment- how the words stand in respect of 
satisfactoriness to the facts, event, situations &c., to which they refer.’ 
(Austin, 1975, p. 149). 
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This notion of ‘true’ as a dimension word is of vital importance to 
Austin’s work. As we have seen, it is foundational to his criticism of 
a number of different proposals concerning the nature of ‘truth’, and, 
at the same time, a substantial driver of his theory of speech acts. In 
section 2.1 we saw that the redundancy theory, and the first claim of 
Strawson’s performative theory, which states that ‘true’ is not used to 
make an assertion, are criticised by Austin. Austin complains that the 
claim that ‘is true’ is not used to make any assertion about P overlooks 
that fact that the expression is part of a family of words, that ‘true’ is 
a dimension word, and that all these expressions are used to assess the 
relation between the words and the world. 
 
In 2.2, we saw that the distinction between constatives and 
performatives, which was suggested as a solution to the descriptive 
fallacy, fails because ‘truth’ is a dimension word, and the terms we use 
to assess both kinds of utterances overlap. These terms belong to the 
family of ‘true’ where all terms are used to assess the relation between 
utterances and the world in different dimensions and degrees. In 2.3, 
we saw that the ‘propositional interpretation’ fails to give an accurate 
reading of Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts because it, too, misunderstands Austin’s views on ‘truth’ as a 
dimension word. In particular, it fails to appreciate the importance of, 
and the reasons for, the collapse of the constative/performative 
distinction, which provides Austin with the framework for introducing 
the new theory of speech acts. 
 
In addition, I argued that a proper understanding of Austin’s views on 
‘truth’ would clarify his views on the locutionary/illocutionary 
distinction and make it clear that ‘truth’ is to be applied only to the 
whole speech act, and not to the locutionary part or the illocutionary 
force of stating. This finding was also central to the adjudication on 
Crary’s and Hansen’s views concerning ‘literal meaning’, and 
demonstrated that, for Austin, there is a level of ‘literal meaning’ 
which is invariant in different uses but is not to be identified with what 
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is true or false, the latter being determined by the speech act as a 
whole.   
 
Finally, we can say that the ‘correspondence theory of truth’, which 
Austin adopts in ‘Truth’, is developed and broadened, not rejected. 
Austin still holds that the terms of the family of ‘truth’ are used to 
assess the relation between utterances and the world. However, it now 
includes different kinds of utterances which all ‘correspond to facts’ 
in different ways. Rather than restricting truth and falsity to statements 
alone, Austin proposes, with his new theory of speech acts, that any 
speech act as a whole may be judged in this way, in different degrees 
and dimensions depending on circumstances and context.  
 
Whilst Austin may not be completely systematic or comprehensive in 
his theories, the ‘pattern’ and influence of the dimension word (and its 
application to ‘true’ in particular) can be discerned throughout the 
elements examined in these two chapters. In particular, the idea of a 
thin, abstract semantic element which is shared by all members of the 
family, but which generally proves to be inadequate for the 
determination of truth in the varied range of contexts and 
circumstances of usage, serves to emphasise the importance of context 
in determining truth or falsity of an utterance, and the potential 
separation of judgements of sentence-meaning and truth.  
 
3.2. The unity problem and the compatibility problem 
 
The unity problem is the central theme of this thesis. In the previous 
chapter I addressed Austin’s ‘theoretical’ work on this issue and we 
saw that Austin suggests that some words in OL have more than one 
meaning, possessing instead a range of different but related meanings. 
He thinks that in these cases the mistake which philosophers make 
consist in their tendency to look, nevertheless, for the one common 
meaning of the word, and to base their philosophical analysis on this 
feature. Austin thinks that this approach is unjustified when we look 
177 
 
at how words work in OL. In this chapter, I examined cases where 
Austin addresses some philosophical problems, and sought to show 
how philosophers are led into problems because they look for this one 
meaning. However, there are differences between the two examples 
discussed here.  
 
In the first, ‘real’, the unity problem takes the following form: the 
problem is that philosophers focus on some cases, and generalize the 
account from these cases to all other instances. Thus, Austin’s 
objection to Ayer is that he focuses on just a few cases, and generalises 
from that small sample: ‘I should like to emphasize, however, how 
fatal it always is to embark on explaining the use of a word without 
seriously considering more than a tiny fraction of the contexts in which 
it is actually used...’ (Austin, 1962, p. 83). It is important to point out 
that in such examples Austin does not think that what the philosopher 
takes as the meaning is wrong, rather, that it is too narrow.  
 
In the second, ‘true’, Austin’s concern is different. His worry is that 
philosophers are fixated on uncovering the common feature of a word 
that all uses share, and that this causes them to focus, in the case of 
dimension words, on the abstract semantic function present in all such 
words. Whilst he is perfectly clear that this is legitimate in the sense 
that this abstract element is indeed common to all uses, he thinks that 
philosophers who do so radically misunderstand the nature of such 
words, missing the fundamental point that, in all but extreme cases, it 
is the concrete meaning, the meaning that will be different from 
context to context, rather than the common abstract element, which is 
relevant. Indeed, one of his clear findings is that the abstract or 
semantic layer is far too thin generally to bear the weight placed on it 
in philosophical enquiry by those who use it as a common feature.  
 
One qualification is in order, however. In claiming that examining 
Austin’s thought in these particular areas should be through the lens 
of the unity problem, I do not deny that it is often possible to read 
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Austin as, at the same time, reminding philosophers how ordinary 
language works and showing that their approach is inconsistent with 
this usage. My point is rather that attention to the unity problem 
alongside Austin’s analysis of the particular types of words that we 
have examined both better represents Austin’s approach and better 
explains how the offending philosophers come to make the mistakes 
that they do, including the error of using language in a way that runs 
counter to ordinary language usage. Thus, there will, on occasion, be 
lessons for philosophers concerning the use of ordinary language, but 
my contention is that focusing on these findings, as those who view 
his work through the compatibility problem lens do, is a far less 
profitable route from the perspective of explaining Austin’s thought, 
as well as being a less legitimate strategy so far as interpretation of his 
work is concerned. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
In this thesis I have argued that, in a number of prominent cases, 
Wittgenstein and Austin are more productively viewed as tackling a 
problem which I badged the ‘unity problem’. The unity problem, 
which receives little treatment in the literature, diagnoses the 
underlying issue in certain cases of philosophical difficulty not as a 
lack of compatibility with ordinary language but, instead, an implicit 
or explicit commitment to a search for a single common element that, 
it is presumed, is present in all cases where the same word is used.  
 
I have sought to show that one of the principal reasons why 
commentators largely ignore this approach is because they adopt an 
almost exclusive focus on what I call the ‘compatibility problem’.  The 
compatibility problem presumes that the underlying cause of 
philosophical difficulties relates to philosophers saying something 
which we would not say in OL, or violating its rules. OLP is then 
supposed to show philosophers that this transgression is a key source 
of traditional philosophical troubles in the context of specific issues 
such as the mind-body problem, the nature of truth… etc... By contrast, 
I claim that the purpose of the appeal to OL in these cases is not 
necessarily to identify specific sentences or strings of words that we 
would not ordinarily say, but rather to demonstrate that looking for 
something common to all cases in which we use the same word is 
misguided. 
 
Whilst I have claimed that viewing the writings of Austin and 
Wittgenstein on particular philosophical problems through the lens of 
the unity problem is both more productive in elucidating their 
positions and more faithful to the particular texts, I have also been 
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clear that there are, nevertheless, differences in their approaches. Thus, 
Wittgenstein often merely seeks to demonstrate that there need not be 
something in common between all the cases in which we use the same 
word, whereas Austin, for instance in the case of dimension words, 
recognises that there might indeed be something in common between 
the examples, but that it is too abstract and too weak to bear the weight 
expected of it by philosophers who search for a common feature that 
will resolve intractable philosophical problems.  
  
In analysing both Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s treatment of the unity 
problem, I distinguished between their underlying ‘theory’, on the one 
hand, and their practice when dealing with particular examples, on the 
other.  
 
In chapter 2, therefore, I firstly examined Wittgenstein’s general 
approach to the unity question, i.e., do we use the same word in 
different cases because the cases have something in common. I 
evaluated three possible interpretations of Wittgenstein’s position and 
concluded that what I labelled interpretation C was closest to his text 
and dealt with potential objections most effectively. This 
interpretation answers the unity question in the negative. However, I 
made it clear that Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of common 
feature concepts, but rather, according to this interpretation, he shows 
that certain concepts do not conform to that model. He suggests that 
phenomena are grouped under the same concept because of different 
kinds of relations and affinities between members of the concept’s 
family. Importantly, however, this interpretation also denies the 
exclusive role of similarities in determining qualifying members, and 
argues that such a narrow reading is likely to distort the interpretation 
of Wittgenstein’s overall perspective on concept attribution. 
Similarities, it proposes, should be regarded as only one of a number 
of potential relations, the others including mathematical, historical, 
and so on.  
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Interpretation C also clarified the potential confusion caused by 
Wittgenstein’s own term ‘family resemblance’, identifying the focus 
on the genetic or causal implications of the term ‘family’ as potentially 
misleading, and preferring instead the view that ‘family resemblance’ 
simply indicates a grouping formed in virtue of overlapping 
resemblance or similarity between members. ‘Family resemblance’ 
concepts, therefore, are a subset of the wider grouping ‘family 
concepts’.  
 
Finally, in that chapter, I clarified the relationship between open 
concepts and family resemblance concepts, showing that they were 
certainly not synonymous, and that even claims of a weaker 
association between the two could be misleading, particularly in the 
context of the unity problem where the distinction between ‘common 
feature concepts’ and ‘family concepts’ was critical.  
 
In chapter 3, I turned to the analysis of prominent practical examples 
from Wittgenstein’s work in order both to show the importance of the 
unity problem in his work, and to substantiate my earlier claim that the 
model presumed by the compatibility problem interpretation does not 
fit well with Wittgenstein’s treatment of particular concepts. My 
findings demonstrated that the unity problem is central to his 
discussion of ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’, and that his main purpose 
there is to show that the assumption that there must be a common 
feature for these concepts is not justified, and that they are instead 
better regarded as ‘family concepts’.  
 
I also highlighted the influence that the presumption of the 
compatibility problem, in which it is assumed that the focus should be 
on philosophers saying something which we would not say in OL, has 
on the way in which Wittgenstein is read in the passages analysed. I 
argued against Hacker’s strong conclusion that the purpose of the 
passages discussed is to show that the mental processes or feelings that 
on occasion accompany ‘reading’ or ‘understanding’ can never be 
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qualifying features of ‘reading’ or ‘understanding’, and diagnosed the 
problem with his approach as stemming from his (compatibility 
problem) preoccupation with finding inconsistencies or 
incompatibilities between the philosopher’s use of language and the 
way in which ordinary language actually works. This, I claimed, 
generally predisposed him to take a somewhat black-and-white 
approach, ruling in or out absolutely. I argued that this strong 
interpretation is not supported by the text and, instead, that one should 
view Wittgenstein as simply seeking to show how to falsify common 
feature claims concerning mental processes, whilst allowing that they 
(mental processes) may, under specific circumstances, qualify as 
members of the family of features that make up ‘reading’ and 
‘understanding’.  
 
I observed that Wittgenstein’s method in these cases consists of two 
sides: one negative and the other positive. The negative approach aims 
to show that the proposed definition does not work for all cases, 
although it may for some. In both ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’, this 
takes the form of Wittgenstein’s offering a counterexample to the 
proposed common feature alongside an instance that supports it. The 
purpose of this is twofold: whilst the counterexample shows that the 
presence of the feature under examination is not a necessary condition 
for the phenomenon to be subsumed under the concept, the supporting 
example, on the other hand, allows that such a feature might, 
nevertheless, be the qualifying feature under specific circumstances. 
This lays the groundwork for the second stage, the positive approach, 
in which Wittgenstein suggests that the concept in question is better 
conceived of as a ‘family concept’.  
 
My overall conclusion, in light of the above investigations into 
Wittgenstein’s ‘theory’ and practice in these particular areas, was that 
the framework of the unity problem had been shown to represent an 
important and somewhat neglected aspect of his philosophy, and that 
too strong an allegiance to viewing his work through the lens of the 
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compatibility problem has, in the case of certain interpreters, obscured 
this key facet of his philosophy, and led to a misunderstanding of his 
position.  
 
In chapters 4 and 5, I turned to the examination of Austin’s answer to 
the unity question. I adopted a similar approach to that taken above 
with Wittgenstein in which the wider ‘theory’ was analysed in the first 
chapter, with specific examples being examined in the second chapter.  
 
In answering the unity question, Austin attacks what he considers a 
false dichotomy, in which words must either have one unequivocal 
meaning or a number of different meanings. Instead, Austin wants to 
show that there are some words which have a range of different-but-
related meanings. His concern is that philosophers seem to ignore 
these kinds of words. In my analysis of his writing, I distinguished 
between two distinct phases, early Austin and later Austin, each of 
which provides a different sense of how Austin understands the notion 
of there being something ‘in common’ between all uses of the word. 
The early Austin accepts the general denotational framework, but 
rejects the specific doctrine of naming which construes ‘one 
meaning’/’what is in common’ as referring to a single entity that the 
words denotes. Austin instead suggests that a word might stand for 
various different kinds of things. 
 
Later Austin, on the other hand, targets the doctrine of naming in a 
more radical way and attacks the basic denotational assumption that 
all words must name things. He suggests that naming is just one 
function that words fulfil, and gives examples of words discharging 
different functions:  ‘adjuster words’, which function to adjust other 
words in extraordinary cases, and ‘trouser words’, which work so as 
to exclude its opposite. He also suggests that, so far as determining 
meaning is concerned, looking for the entity, or even entities, that the 
word names is not necessarily the route to be followed. As a result, he 
claims that meaning will often depend on the different features, 
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characteristics and criteria that a word might have in the various 
different circumstances in which it is used. 
 
However, in discussing a further word type, ‘dimension words’, he 
distinguishes between two levels of meaning. Whilst it is clear that at 
the lower level of concrete or ‘specific’ meaning the contextual 
influence described above is often dominant, he acknowledges that at 
the abstract, or semantic function, level there is something that is held 
in common by the word in all its uses. However, this is minimal in the 
case of trouser words and adjuster words, and even in the case of 
dimension words is insubstantial and insufficient, except in extreme 
abstract circumstances, to serve successfully as the predominant focus 
of enquiry if the objective is to determine the meaning of a word. Thus, 
Austin’s position on the unity question is different to that of 
Wittgenstein, but it is clearly a major focus of his, and his concession 
to the common feature theorist is minimal.  
 
The detailed discussion of two specific examples from Austin’s work 
in chapter 5 reinforced this position. In the first, ‘real’, the unity 
problem takes the following form: the problem is that philosophers 
focus on some cases, and generalize the account from these cases to 
all other instances. It is important to point out that in such examples 
Austin does not think that what the philosopher takes as the meaning 
is necessarily wrong, rather, that it is too narrow to be generalised. 
Austin here can be seen to be taking a similar, or at least related, 
position to that of Wittgenstein in questioning whether it is safe to 
draw classification rules from individual examples. 
 
In the second example, ‘true’, Austin’s focus is slightly different. His 
worry again concerns the idea that philosophers are fixated on 
uncovering the common feature of a word that all uses share, but in 
the case of ‘true’, a dimension word, Austin thinks that this causes 
them to focus on the abstract semantic function present in all such 
words (‘true’ is Austin’s parade case of a dimension word). Whilst he 
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is perfectly clear that this is legitimate in one sense, because this 
abstract element is indeed common to all uses, he thinks that 
philosophers who do so nevertheless radically misunderstand the 
nature of such words, missing the fundamental point that, in all but 
extreme cases, it is the specific or concrete meaning, i.e., the meaning 
that will be different from context to context, rather than the common 
abstract element, which is relevant. Indeed, one of his most important 
contributions is to demonstrate that the abstract or semantic layer is 
not what counts in the determination of meaning, and thus that reliance 
on it in the context of seeking to solve philosophical problems is likely 
to be fraught with difficulties.  
 
I claim that examining Austin’s thought in these particular areas is 
better undertaken through the lens of the unity problem, but I do not 
deny that it is often possible to read Austin as, at the same time, 
reminding philosophers how ordinary language works and showing 
that their approach is inconsistent with this usage. My point is that 
attention to the unity problem in interpreting Austin’s analysis of the 
particular types of words that I have examined both better represents 
Austin’s approach and better explains how philosophers come to make 
the mistakes that they do, including the error of using language in a 
way that runs counter to ordinary language usage. Thus there will, on 
occasion, be lessons for philosophers concerning the use of ordinary 
language, but focusing on these findings, as those who view his work 
through the compatibility problem lens do, is a far less profitable route 
from the perspective of explaining Austin’s thought on these matters, 
as well as being a less legitimate strategy for the interpretation of his 
work in these areas.  
 
Of the three types of word examined, the dimension word is by far the 
most important in Austin’s wider philosophy. The idea that ‘truth’ is a 
dimension word is foundational to his criticism of a number of 
different proposals concerning the nature of ‘truth’, and, at the same 
time, a substantial driver of his theory of speech acts. Austin criticises 
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both the redundancy theory and the first claim of Strawson’s 
performative theory from that standpoint, arguing that it is only in 
cases of artificial abstraction that truth and falsity are ‘names for 
relation, quantities, or what not’, and that it should rather be 
considered a dimension of assessment. The expression ‘is true’ is thus 
better viewed as part of a family of words, and all the expressions 
within the dimension are used to assess the relation between the words 
and the world.  
 
The implications of the realisation that ‘truth’ is a dimension word are 
also behind the collapse of the distinction between constatives and 
performatives which was initially suggested as a solution to the 
descriptive fallacy. Austin observes that the terms we use to assess 
both kinds of utterances overlap, and that these terms belong to the 
family of ‘true’ where all terms are used to assess the relation between 
utterances and the world in different dimensions and degrees. I 
diagnosed ‘the propositional interpretation’’s failure accurately to 
represent Austin’s distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts as resting on its failure to appreciate both the importance of, and 
the reasons for, this collapse.  
 
And it is this collapse, and, again, the notion that ‘truth’ is a dimension 
word, which provide Austin with the framework for introducing a new 
theory of speech acts in which it is clear that ‘truth’ is only to be 
applied to the whole speech act. These factors were also seen to be 
central to the adjudication on Crary’s and Hansen’s views concerning 
literal meaning, and demonstrated that, for Austin, whilst there is a 
level of ‘literal meaning’ which is invariant in different uses, it is not 
to be identified with what is true or false, this being determined by the 
speech act as a whole. 
 
The form of Austin’s views on sentence-meaning mirrors to a large 
degree his position in relation to the unity problem discussed above. 
Whilst the two accounts are distinct, what they share is a caution 
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concerning the attempt to isolate a common feature, either 
representing the essential factor in the specification of a concept or the 
essential component of sentence-meaning, independent of the 
influence of context. In both cases Austin recognises the initial 
attraction of such an approach, and is happy to concede that there may 
be a common feature shared by the discussed concepts on occasion, 
and an invariant literal meaning for sentences. However, his key point 
is that such an ‘essential’ component is generally far too weak to 
support the purposes for which it is employed philosophically, and, 
instead, it is the different contexts and circumstances in which the 
word is used, or the sentence uttered, which play the dominant role.  
 
Throughout the thesis, in both the particular discussions of Austin’s 
and Wittgenstein’s ‘theory’ and practice, and in the wider analysis of 
their similarities and differences, it is apparent that attention to the 
unity problem in their work is justified and represents an important 
way of understanding their thought and writing. Key passages in their 
work demonstrate that the tendency of philosophers to look for a 
feature that is common to all cases is unreliable in key cases. In 
addition, the analysis of prominent commentators undertaken in the 
thesis demonstrates, particularly in the case of Wittgenstein, that an 
overreliance on the compatibility problem framework for 
interpretation runs the risk of distorting the reading of the text and 
missing key insights that recourse to the unity problem lens reveals.   
 
This approach also demonstrates how subtle and carefully considered 
Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s positions in fact are. Whilst the lens of the 
compatibility problem tends to incline philosophers and commentators 
to black-and-white judgements, and to colour interpretation of 
Wittgenstein, in particular, accordingly, it is evident that both 
philosophers are themselves remarkable in their lack of dogmatism. 
Thus, Wittgenstein merely suggests through counterexamples and 
attention to the way in which examples are grouped under concepts, 
and Austin, although he recognises the presence of an essential 
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component in the discussed concepts, and the literal meaning for 
sentences, works carefully to show how misleading it would be to 
ignore the contextual differences which are crucial to understanding 
the work of words and sentences. 
  
Finally, I should make it clear that there is no suggestion that the lens 
of the unity problem is the only way in which to view Austin’s and 
Wittgenstein’s work. Rather, what I have sought to establish in this 
thesis is that such an approach is more legitimate in the particular 
examples analysed, and reveals aspects of both philosophers’ thought 
that might otherwise be neglected. Of course, that is not to say that the 
examples chosen, whilst prominent in each philosopher’s work, 
exhaust the potential fruitful application of this framework.  
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